Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Shihui Yan
dblp:402/1874
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Image recognition and object detection · 50% Trustworthy machine learning · 50% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › backdoor defense
backdoor detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
object detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
transformation consistency evaluation · 1.7foreground and background transformations · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection ModelsabstractObject detection models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers poison a small subset of training samples by embedding a predefined trigger to manipulate prediction. Detecting poisoned samples (i.e., those containing triggers) at test time can prevent backdoor activation. However, unlike image classification tasks, the unique characteristics of object detection—particularly its output of numerous objects—pose fresh challenges for backdoor detection. The complex attack effects (e.g., "ghost" object emergence or "vanishing" object) further render current defenses fundamentally inadequate. To this end, we design TRAnsformation Consistency Evaluation (TRACE), a brand-new method for detecting poisoned samples at test time in object detection. Our journey begins with two intriguing observations: 1) poisoned samples exhibit significantly more consistent detection results than clean ones across varied backgrounds. 2) clean samples show higher detection consistency when introduced to different focal information. Based on these phenomena, Trace applies foreground and background transformations to each test sample, then assesses transformation consistency by calculating the variance in objects confidences. Trace achieves black-box, universal backdoor detection, with extensive experiments showing a 30% improvement in AUROC over state-of-the-art defenses and resistance to adaptive attacks. Hangtao Zhang, Yichen Wang 0013, Shihui Yan, Chenyu Zhu, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Linshan Hou, Shengshan Hu, Yanjun Zhang 0002, Leo Yu Zhang |
CVPR | 3 |