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Shihui Yan

dblp:402/1874 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Image recognition and object detection · 50% Trustworthy machine learning · 50%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › backdoor defense
backdoor detection
0.912025
Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
object detection
0.912025
Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection
0.912025
Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models · CVPR 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

transformation consistency evaluation · 1.7foreground and background transformations · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Test-Time Backdoor Detection for Object Detection Models
abstract
Object detection models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where attackers poison a small subset of training samples by embedding a predefined trigger to manipulate prediction. Detecting poisoned samples (i.e., those containing triggers) at test time can prevent backdoor activation. However, unlike image classification tasks, the unique characteristics of object detection—particularly its output of numerous objects—pose fresh challenges for backdoor detection. The complex attack effects (e.g., "ghost" object emergence or "vanishing" object) further render current defenses fundamentally inadequate. To this end, we design TRAnsformation Consistency Evaluation (TRACE), a brand-new method for detecting poisoned samples at test time in object detection. Our journey begins with two intriguing observations: 1) poisoned samples exhibit significantly more consistent detection results than clean ones across varied backgrounds. 2) clean samples show higher detection consistency when introduced to different focal information. Based on these phenomena, Trace applies foreground and background transformations to each test sample, then assesses transformation consistency by calculating the variance in objects confidences. Trace achieves black-box, universal backdoor detection, with extensive experiments showing a 30% improvement in AUROC over state-of-the-art defenses and resistance to adaptive attacks.
Hangtao Zhang, Yichen Wang 0013, Shihui Yan, Chenyu Zhu, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Linshan Hou, Shengshan Hu, Yanjun Zhang 0002, Leo Yu Zhang
CVPR3