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Yuzhe Lai

dblp:402/1927 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0003-9281-4158ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
0.912025
SADBA: Self-Adaptive Distributed Backdoor Attack Against Federated Learning · AAAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
distributed backdoor attack
0.912025
SADBA: Self-Adaptive Distributed Backdoor Attack Against Federated Learning · AAAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
federated learning
0.912025
SADBA: Self-Adaptive Distributed Backdoor Attack Against Federated Learning · AAAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
model poisoning attack
0.912025
SADBA: Self-Adaptive Distributed Backdoor Attack Against Federated Learning · AAAI 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack
0.312025
SADBA: Self-Adaptive Distributed Backdoor Attack Against Federated Learning · AAAI 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

model poisoning · 0.9data poisoning · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 SADBA: Self-Adaptive Distributed Backdoor Attack Against Federated Learning
abstract
Backdoor attacks in federated learning (FL) face challenges such as lower attack success rates and compromised main task accuracy (MA) compared to local training. Existing methods like distributed backdoor attack (DBA) mitigate these issues by modifying malicious clients’ updates and partitioning global triggers to enhance backdoor persistence and stealth. The recent full combination backdoor attack (FCBA) further improves backdoor efficiency with a full combination strategy. However, these methods are mainly applicable in small-scale FL. In large-scale FL, small trigger patterns weaken impact, and scaling them requires controlling exponentially more clients, which poses significant challenges, while simply reverting to DBA may decrease backdoor performance. To overcome these challenges, we propose the self-adaptive distributed backdoor attack (SADBA), which achieves similar performance to FCBA with a lower percentage of malicious clients (PMC). It also adapts more flexibly through an optimized model poisoning strategy and a self-adaptive data poisoning strategy. Experiments demonstrate SADBA outperforms state-of-the-art methods, achieving higher or comparable backdoor performance and MA across various datasets with limited PMC.
Jun Feng 0007, Yuzhe Lai, Bocheng Ren
AAAI2