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Yangxu Yin

dblp:405/7840 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0002-9517-2667ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Image recognition and object detection · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
1.722025
A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2025
FFCBA: Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks · ACM Multimedia 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
clean-label attack
0.912025
FFCBA: Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks · ACM Multimedia 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › trigger design
frequency-domain trigger
0.912025
A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack
stealthy backdoor attack
0.912025
A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2025
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
image classification
0.312025
A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

wavelet transform · 1.7fourier transform · 1.7cosine transform · 1.7feature-space alignment · 0.9feature-based trigger design · 0.9feature space alignment · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 FFCBA: Feature-based Full-target Clean-label Backdoor Attacks
Yangxu Yin, Honglong Chen, Yudong Gao, Peng Sun 0003, Liantao Wu, Zhe Li 0026, Weifeng Liu 0001
ACM Multimedia1
2025 A Triple Stealthy Backdoor: Hidden in Spatial, Frequency, and Feature Domains
abstract
Backdoor attacks pose significant security risks to deep neural networks (DNNs). These attacks involve models that make intentionally incorrect (and potentially targeted) predictions on poisoned inputs containing carefully crafted triggers, while operating normally with clean inputs. Prior studies have investigated the invisibility of backdoor triggers to improve attack stealthiness. However, they primarily concentrate on achieving invisibility solely in the spatial domain, ignoring the generation of invisible triggers in the frequency and feature domains. This constraint makes the poisoned images vulnerable to detection by recent defense mechanisms. To tackle this problem, we introduce a Triple stealthy BAckdoor attack approach, termed TriBA, which simultaneously ensures the invisibility of triggers in all the spatial, frequency, and feature domains, to achieve desirable attack performance, while ensuring strong stealthiness. Specifically, we initially utilize Wavelet Transform to embed the high-frequency information from the trigger image into the clean image to ensure effective attack performance. Then, to achieve strong stealthiness across both spatial and frequency domains, we integrate Fourier Transform and Cosine Transform to blend the poisoned image and clean image in the frequency domain. Furthermore, TriBA adopts an attack strategy to make the backdoor features similar to clean features in the feature space, which guarantees trigger invisibility in the feature domain while maintaining attack effectiveness. We theoretically prove the effectiveness of this strategy. Finally, TriBA has been comprehensively evaluated on four datasets against popular image classifiers, demonstrating a marked improvement over existing state-of-the-art backdoor attacks in terms of both attack success rate and stealthiness.
Yudong Gao, Honglong Chen, Peng Sun 0003, Junjian Li, Yangxu Yin, Zhibo Wang 0001, Weifeng Liu 0001
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.5