Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Runqi Fan

dblp:408/0467 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Web and mobile security · 50% Systems and software security · 50%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Program analysis · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery
prototype pollution
0.912025
Follow My Flow: Unveiling Client-Side Prototype Pollution Gadgets from One Million Real-World Websites · SP 2025
Web and mobile security
web application security
0.912025
Follow My Flow: Unveiling Client-Side Prototype Pollution Gadgets from One Million Real-World Websites · SP 2025
Program analysis
dynamic analysis
0.912025
Follow My Flow: Unveiling Client-Side Prototype Pollution Gadgets from One Million Real-World Websites · SP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

property injection · 1.7dynamic analysis · 1.7constraint solving · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Follow My Flow: Unveiling Client-Side Prototype Pollution Gadgets from One Million Real-World Websites
abstract
Prototype pollution vulnerability often has further consequences—such as Cross-site Scripting (XSS) and cookie manipulation—that are achieved via so-called gadgets, i.e., code snippets that change the control- or data-flow of a victim program for malicious purposes. Prior works face challenges in finding prototype pollution gadgets for such consequences because the control- or data-flow change sometimes needs the injection of complex property values to replace existing undefined ones through prototype pollution, which may not be seen before or cannot be solved by existing constraint solvers. In this paper, we design a dynamic analysis framework, called Gala, to automatically detect client-side prototype pollution gadgets among real-world websites, and implement an open-source version of Gala. Our key insight is to borrow existing defined values on non-vulnerable websites to victim ones where such values are undefined, thus guiding the property injection to flow to the sinks in gadgets. Our evaluation of Gala against one-million websites reveals 133 zero-day gadgets that are not found by prior works. For example, one gadget was from Meta's software and another from the Vue framework. Both have acknowledged and fixed it, with Meta rewarding us a bug bounty and Vue assigning CVE-2024-6783. Our evaluation also shows that 23 websites with prototype pollution vulnerabilities—which do not have further consequences as reported by prior works—have consequences due to gadgets found by Gala. In addition to the Meta and Vue gadgets, we also responsibly disclosed all the zero-day gadgets and those newly-discovered prototype pollution consequences to their developers.
Zifeng Kang, Muxi Lyu, Jianjia Yu, Runqi Fan, Song Li 0006, Yinzhi Cao
SP5