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Yinhang Zhou

dblp:408/6209 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 50% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 50%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 77% Speech recognition and synthesis · 23%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness
0.912025
Evaluating Robustness of Large Audio Language Models to Audio Injection: An Empirical Study · EMNLP 2025
Cyber-physical and IoT security › sensor security
acoustic injection attacks
0.912025
Evaluating Robustness of Large Audio Language Models to Audio Injection: An Empirical Study · EMNLP 2025
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial robustness
0.912025
Evaluating Robustness of Large Audio Language Models to Audio Injection: An Empirical Study · EMNLP 2025
Natural language and speech › Speech recognition and synthesis
audio-language model
0.312025
Evaluating Robustness of Large Audio Language Models to Audio Injection: An Empirical Study · EMNLP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

benchmark evaluation · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Evaluating Robustness of Large Audio Language Models to Audio Injection: An Empirical Study
abstract
Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet their robustness against malicious audio injection remains underexplored.To address this gap, this study systematically evaluates five leading LALMs across four attack scenarios: Audio Interference Attack, Instruction Following Attack, Context Injection Attack, and Judgment Hijacking Attack.We quantitatively assess their vulnerabilities and resilience using metrics: the Defense Success Rate, Context Robustness Score, and Judgment Robustness Index.The experiments reveal significant performance disparities, with no single model demonstrating consistent robustness across all attack types.Attack effectiveness is significantly influenced by the position of the malicious content, particularly when injected at the beginning of a sequence.Furthermore, our analysis uncovers a negative correlation between a model's instruction-following capability and its robustness: models that strictly adhere to instructions tend to be more susceptible, whereas safety-aligned models exhibit greater resistance.To facilitate future research, this work introduces a comprehensive benchmark framework.Our findings underscore the critical need for integrating robustness into training pipelines and developing multi-modal defenses, ultimately facilitating the secure deployment of LALMs.The dataset used in this work is available on Hugging Face.
Guanyu Hou, Jiaming He, Yinhang Zhou, Ji Guo, Yitong Qiao, Rui Zhang 0086, Wenbo Jiang 0001
EMNLP3