EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Hongqiong Zhong
dblp:408/8503
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 73% Vision and language · 27% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 7 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Computer vision › Vision and language › vision-language model
multimodal large language model |
1.2 | 2 | 2026 | Towards Visualization-of-Thought Jailbreak Attack against Large Visual Language Models · NeurIPS 2025 USB: A Comprehensive and Unified Safety Evaluation Benchmark for Multimodal Large Language Models · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › generative model safety
multimodal large language model safety |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | USB: A Comprehensive and Unified Safety Evaluation Benchmark for Multimodal Large Language Models · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
safety evaluation |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | USB: A Comprehensive and Unified Safety Evaluation Benchmark for Multimodal Large Language Models · ACL (1) 2026 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety
safety alignment |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Towards Visualization-of-Thought Jailbreak Attack against Large Visual Language Models · NeurIPS 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Towards Visualization-of-Thought Jailbreak Attack against Large Visual Language Models · NeurIPS 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Towards Visualization-of-Thought Jailbreak Attack against Large Visual Language Models · NeurIPS 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
robustness |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Towards Visualization-of-Thought Jailbreak Attack against Large Visual Language Models · NeurIPS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
visualization-of-thought · 1.7chain-of-thought · 1.7safety benchmarking · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | USB: A Comprehensive and Unified Safety Evaluation Benchmark for Multimodal Large Language ModelsabstractBaolin Zheng, Guanlin Chen, Qingyang Teng, Hongqiong Zhong, Yingshui Tan, Zhendong Liu, Weixun Wang, Jiaheng Liu, Jian Yang, Huiyun Jing, Jincheng Wei, Wenbo Su, Xiaoyong Zhu, Bo Zheng, Kaifu Zhang. Proceedings of the 64th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (Volume 1: Long Papers). 2026. Baolin Zheng, Qingyang Teng, Hongqiong Zhong, Yingshui Tan, Weixun Wang, Jian Yang 0037, Huiyun Jing, Jincheng Wei, Wenbo Su, Xiaoyong Zhu, Bo Zheng 0007, Kaifu Zhang |
ACL (1) | 4 |
| 2025 | Towards Visualization-of-Thought Jailbreak Attack against Large Visual Language ModelsabstractAs Visual Language Models (VLMs) continue to evolve, they have demonstrated increasingly sophisticated logical reasoning capabilities and multimodal thought generation, opening doors to widespread applications. However, this advancement raises serious concerns about content security, particularly when these models process complex multimodal inputs requiring intricate reasoning. When faced with these safety challenges, the critical competition between logical reasoning and safety objectives of VLMs is often overlooked in previous works. In this paper, we introduce Visualization-of-Thought Attack (\textbf{VoTA}), a novel and automated attack framework that strategically constructs chains of images with risky visual thoughts to challenge victim models. Our attack provokes the inherent conflict between the model's logical processing and safety protocols, ultimately leading to the generation of unsafe content. Through comprehensive experiments, VoTA achieves remarkable effectiveness, improving the average attack success rate (ASR) by 26.71\% (from 63.70\% to 90.41\%) on 9 open-source and 6 commercial VLMs, compared to the state-of-the-art methods. These results expose a critical vulnerability: current VLMs struggle to maintain safety guarantees when processing insecure multimodal visualization-of-thought inputs, highlighting the urgency and necessity of enhancing safety alignment. Our code and dataset are available at
https://github.com/Hongqiong12/VoTA.
Content Warning: This paper contains harmful contents that may be offensive. Hongqiong Zhong, Qingyang Teng, Baolin Zheng, Yingshui Tan, Wenbo Su, Xiaoyong Zhu, Bo Zheng 0007, Kaifu Zhang |
NeurIPS | 1 |