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Gabriel Sherman

dblp:409/1437 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0000-5569-3535ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.912025
No Harness, No Problem: Oracle-guided Harnessing for Auto-generating C API Fuzzing Harnesses · ICSE 2025
Software testing › fuzzing
API fuzzing
0.912025
No Harness, No Problem: Oracle-guided Harnessing for Auto-generating C API Fuzzing Harnesses · ICSE 2025
Software testing › fuzzing
fuzz driver generation
0.912025
No Harness, No Problem: Oracle-guided Harnessing for Auto-generating C API Fuzzing Harnesses · ICSE 2025
Software testing
fuzzing
0.912025
No Harness, No Problem: Oracle-guided Harnessing for Auto-generating C API Fuzzing Harnesses · ICSE 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

mutation · 1.7coverage-guided fuzzing · 1.7correctness oracles · 1.7
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 No Harness, No Problem: Oracle-guided Harnessing for Auto-generating C API Fuzzing Harnesses
abstract
Library APIs are used by virtually every modern application and system, making them among today's most security-critical software. In recent years, library bug-finding efforts have overwhelmingly adopted the powerful testing strategy of coverage-guided fuzzing. At its core, API fuzzing operates on harnesses: wrapper programs that initialize an API before feeding random inputs to its functions. Successful fuzzing demands correct and thorough harnesses, making manual harnessing challenging without sufficient domain expertise. To overcome this, recent strategies propose “learning” libraries' intended usage to automatically generate their fuzzing harnesses. Yet, despite their high code coverage, resulting harnesses frequently miss key API semantics-bringing with them invalid, unrealistic, or otherwise-impossible data and call sequences-derailing fuzzing with false-positive crashes. Thus, without a precise, semantically-correct harnessing, many critical APIs will remain beyond fuzzing's reach-leaving their hidden vulnerabilities ripe for attackers. This paper introduces Oracle-guided Harnessing: a technique for fully-automatic, semantics-aware API fuzzing har-ness synthesis. At a high level, Oracle-guided Harnessing mimics the trial-and-error process of manual harness creation-yet au-tomates it via fuzzing. Specifically, we leverage information from API headers to mutationally stitch-together candidate harnesses; and evaluate their validity via a set of Correctness Oracles: compilation, execution, and changes in coverage. By keeping-and further mutating-only correct candidates, our approach produces a diverse set of semantically-correct harnesses for complex, real-world libraries in as little as one hour. We integrate Oracle-guided Harnessing as a prototype, OG HARN; and evaluate it alongside today's leading fully-automatic harnessing approach, Hopper, and a plethora of developer-written harnesses from OSS-Fuzz. Across 20 real-world APIs, OGHARN outperforms developer-written harnesses by a median 14% code coverage, while uncovering 31 and 30 more vulnerabilities than both Hopper and developer-written harnesses, respectively-with zero false-positive crashes. Of the 41 new vulnerabilities found by OGHARN, all 41 are confirmed by developers-40 of which are since fixed-with many found in APIs that, until now, lacked harnesses whatsoever.
Gabriel Sherman, Stefan Nagy
ICSE1