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Udayan Vaidya

dblp:410/2365 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0009-5586-8142ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 87% Algorithms and data structures · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
contract design
0.912025
Robust Contracting for Sequential Search · EC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › contract theory
moral hazard
0.912025
Robust Contracting for Sequential Search · EC 2025
Algorithms and data structures › search algorithms
sequential search
0.312025
Robust Contracting for Sequential Search · EC 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

worst-case analysis · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Robust Contracting for Sequential Search
abstract
How should a principal incentivize an agent to explore risky alternatives when the principal has limited knowledge of these alternatives? We study this question in a robust moral hazard model in which the agent sequentially searches over projects to generate a prize. At the outset, the principal only knows one of these projects, and evaluates contracts by their worst-case performance.
Théo Durandard, Udayan Vaidya, Boli Xu
EC2