Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Micha Nowak
dblp:413/7153
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
1 paper |
Language models and text generation · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation › LLM agents
agent security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition · NeurIPS 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition · NeurIPS 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
red teaming |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public Competition · NeurIPS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
benchmark construction · 1.7red-teaming · 0.9red teaming · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Security Challenges in AI Agent Deployment: Insights from a Large Scale Public CompetitionabstractAI agents are rapidly being deployed across diverse industries, but can they adhere to deployment policies under attacks? We organized a one-month red teaming challenge---the largest of its kind to date---involving expert red teamers attempting to elicit policy violations from AI agents powered by $22$ frontier LLMs. Our challenge collected $1.8$ million prompt injection attacks, resulting in over $60,000$ documented successful policy violations, revealing critical vulnerabilities. Utilizing this extensive data, we construct a challenging AI agent red teaming benchmark, currently achieving near $100\%$ attack success rates across all tested agents and associated policies. Our further analysis reveals high transferability and universality of successful attacks, underscoring the scale and criticality of existing AI agent vulnerabilities. We also observe minimal correlation between agent robustness and factors such as model capability, size, or inference compute budget, highlighting the necessity of substantial improvements in defense. We hope our benchmark and insights drive further research toward more secure and reliable AI agents. Andy Zou, Maxwell Lin, Eliot Krzysztof Jones, Micha Nowak, Mateusz Dziemian, Nick Winter, Valent Nathanael, Ayla Croft, Xander Davies, Jai Patel, Robert Kirk, Yarin Gal, Dan Hendrycks, J. Zico Kolter, Matt Fredrikson |
NeurIPS | 4 |