The Tor network offers network anonymity to its users by routing their traffic through a sequence of relays. A group of nine directory authorities maintains information about all available relay nodes using a distributed directory protocol. We observe that the current protocol makes a strong synchrony assumption, which makes it vulnerable to natural as well as adversarial non-synchronous communication scenarios over the Internet. In this paper, we show that it is possible to cause a failure in the Tor directory protocol by targeting a majority of the authorities for only five minutes using a well-executed distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack. We demonstrate this attack in a controlled environment and show that it is cost-effective for as little as $53.28 per month to disrupt the protocol and to effectively bring down the entire Tor network. To mitigate this problem, we consider the popular partial synchrony assumption that ensures protocol security even when the network delays are large and unknown initially. We design a new Tor directory protocol that leverages a standard partial-synchronous consensus protocol to solve this problem, while also proving its security. We have implemented a prototype in Rust, demonstrating comparable performance to the current protocol.