Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Trevor Smith 0002
dblp:42/8668-2
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2020
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 43% Usable security · 32% Authentication and access control · 25% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management › public key infrastructure
certificate revocation |
0.4 | 1 | 2020 | Let's Revoke: Scalable Global Certificate Revocation · NDSS 2020 |
Usable security
authentication usability |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | A Tale of Two Studies: The Best and Worst of YubiKey Usability · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Authentication and access control › multi-factor authentication
two-factor authentication |
0.3 | 1 | 2018 | A Tale of Two Studies: The Best and Worst of YubiKey Usability · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2018 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management
public key infrastructure |
0.1 | 1 | 2020 | Let's Revoke: Scalable Global Certificate Revocation · NDSS 2020 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
longitudinal study · 0.3laboratory study · 0.3
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | Let's Revoke: Scalable Global Certificate Revocation
Trevor Smith 0002, Luke Dickenson, Kent E. Seamons |
NDSS | 1 |
| 2019 | Leveraging locality of reference for certificate revocationabstractX.509 certificate revocation defends against man-in-the-middle attacks involving a compromised certificate. Certificate revocation strategies face scalability, effectiveness, and deployment challenges as HTTPS adoption rates have soared. We propose Certificate Revocation Table (CRT), a new revocation strategy that is competitive with or exceeds alternative state-of-the-art solutions in effectiveness, efficiency, certificate growth scalability, mass revocation event scalability, revocation timeliness, privacy, and deployment requirements. The CRT design assumes that locality of reference applies to the certificates accessed by an organization. The CRT periodically checks the revocation status of X.509 certificates recently used by the organization. Pre-checking the revocation status of certificates the clients are likely to use avoids the security problems of on-demand certificate revocation checking. Luke Dickinson, Trevor Smith 0002, Kent E. Seamons |
ACSAC | 2 |
| 2018 | A Tale of Two Studies: The Best and Worst of YubiKey UsabilityabstractTwo-factor authentication (2FA) significantly improves the security of password-based authentication. Recently, there has been increased interest in Universal 2nd Factor (U2F) security keys-small hardware devices that require users to press a button on the security key to authenticate. To examine the usability of security keys in non-enterprise usage, we conducted two user studies of the YubiKey, a popular line of U2F security keys. The first study tasked 31 participants with configuring a Windows, Google, and Facebook account to authenticate using a YubiKey. This study revealed problems with setup instructions and workflow including users locking themselves out of their operating system or thinking they had successfully enabled 2FA when they had not. In contrast, the second study had 25 participants use a YubiKey in their daily lives over a period of four weeks, revealing that participants generally enjoyed the experience. Conducting both a laboratory and longitudinal study yielded insights into the usability of security keys that would not have been evident from either study in isolation. Based on our analysis, we recommend standardizing the setup process, enabling verification of success, allowing shared accounts, integrating with operating systems, and preventing lockouts. Joshua Reynolds, Trevor Smith 0002, Ken Reese, Luke Dickinson, Scott Ruoti, Kent E. Seamons |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy | 2 |
| 2017 | Augmenting Centralized Password Management with Application-Specific Passwords
Trevor Smith 0002, Scott Ruoti, Kent E. Seamons |
SOUPS | 1 |