EDBT 2026 Demo / reviewers in the wild / expert
Katharina Miesch
dblp:420/7869
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-3965-7132ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Routing and switching · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security
routing security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility · CCS 2025 |
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing
BGP |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility · CCS 2025 |
Routing and switching › inter-domain routing › BGP
prefix hijacking |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm Agility · CCS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
elliptic curve cryptography · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Poster: The Rocky Road Towards RPKI Algorithm AgilityabstractThe Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) already protects around 50% of announced BGP prefixes, and around 28% of systems enforce RPKI validity in routing. RPKI binds ownership of prefixes to public keys inside certificates, which are signed by the respective issuer. For signatures and keys, RPKI currently exclusively supports RSA-2048, forbidding other algorithms and key sizes. In this work, we practically show that RPKI efficiency could significantly benefit from algorithm agility, allowing for smaller more efficient algorithms like Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). We further illustrate that current plans for shifting algorithms, which will eventually become necessary to shift towards quantum-secure algorithms, are infeasible due to bandwidth limitations, validation overhead, and issues with patch management. From our observations, we derive a new agility procedure that uses separate repository versions additional to two separate trees (a mixed tree and a legacy tree) to enable incremental deployment of a new algorithm. In contrast to existing approaches, our procedure provides benefits also for early adopters, facilitating deployment. Katharina Miesch, Haya Schulmann, Niklas Vogel |
CCS | 1 |