Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Junchi Zeng
dblp:420/7872
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0009-3181-9362ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Authentication and access control · 77% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 23% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Cellular and mobile networks · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cellular and mobile networks › cellular network security
5g security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | 5G-RNAKA : A Random Number-based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 5G Systems · CCS 2025 |
Authentication and access control › user authentication
authentication and key agreement |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | 5G-RNAKA : A Random Number-based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 5G Systems · CCS 2025 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › security protocol analysis
formal analysis of cryptographic protocols |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | 5G-RNAKA : A Random Number-based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 5G Systems · CCS 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
tamarin prover · 1.7formal verification · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | 5G-RNAKA : A Random Number-based Authentication and Key Agreement Protocol for 5G SystemsabstractThe 5G-AKA protocol, defined by 3GPP for authentication and key agreement in 5G networks, remains vulnerable to linkability, synchronization failure, and Sequence Number (SQN) exposure attacks. These issues threaten user privacy and service availability. Existing improvements often retain these flaws or cause high overhead due to continued use of the legacy SQN mechanism from 3G. In this paper, we propose 5G-RNAKA, a secure and efficient AKA protocol for 5G systems. Unlike 5G-AKA, 5G-RNAKA eliminates SQN counters and instead utilizes random numbers generated by the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) in 5G User Equipment (UE) for session identification. This random number is embedded in the reply message from the service network (SN) to prevent replay attacks against the UE. Additionally, by removing the SQN mechanism, 5G-RNAKA enhances user privacy by preventing attackers from linking challenge-response sessions. It also enables the UE to authenticate the SN, effectively mitigating the risk of SN impersonation. We formally verify that 5G-RNAKA achieves its security goals of privacy, authentication, and secrecy using the state-of-the-art formal verification tool, Tamarin Prover. Our implementation and evaluation further demonstrate that 5G-RNAKA improves communication efficiency and reduces storage overhead. While primarily designed for 5G, 5G-RNAKA's features align with emerging trends in 6G authentication, suggesting its potential for adaptation to future 6G architectures. Hui Li 0070, Jingjing Guan, Junchi Zeng, Haonan Feng, Ziming Zhao 0001 |
CCS | 5 |