Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Chengxuan Zhou
dblp:422/6122
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Applied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › large language model safety
audio jailbreak |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak · AAAI 2026 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
multimodal adversarial attack |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio Jailbreak · AAAI 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
style-aware transformation · 1.0policy network · 1.0adversarial search · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | StyleBreak: Revealing Alignment Vulnerabilities in Large Audio-Language Models via Style-Aware Audio JailbreakabstractLarge Audio-language Models (LAMs) have recently enabled powerful speech-based interactions by coupling audio encoders with Large Language Models (LLMs). However, the security of LAMs under adversarial attacks remains underexplored, especially through audio jailbreaks that craft malicious audio prompts to bypass alignment. Existing efforts primarily rely on converting text-based attacks into speech or applying shallow signal-level perturbations, overlooking the impact of human speech’s expressive variations on LAM alignment robustness. To address this gap, we propose StyleBreak, a novel style-aware audio jailbreak framework that systematically investigates how diverse human speech attributes affect LAM alignment robustness. Specifically, StyleBreak employs a two-stage style-aware transformation pipeline that perturbs both textual content and audio to control linguistic, paralinguistic, and extralinguistic attributes. Furthermore, we develop a query-adaptive policy network that automatically searches for adversarial styles to enhance the efficiency of LAM jailbreak exploration. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that LAMs exhibit critical vulnerabilities when exposed to diverse human speech attributes. Moreover, StyleBreak achieves substantial improvements in attack effectiveness and efficiency across multiple attack paradigms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust alignment in LAMs. Hongyi Li 0005, Chengxuan Zhou, Sicheng Liang, Qinlin Xie, Jiawei Ye, Jie Wu 0003 |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2026 | PolyF-EMG: Bridging Internal Load and External Motion for Fatigue-Aware Activity Recognition
Chengxuan Zhou, Fuhong Wang |
COMPSAC | 2 |