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Bao-di Liu

dblp:425/9251 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Trustworthy machine learning · 62% Representation and self-supervised learning · 38%
Network and information security
1 paper
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.012026
Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Exploiting Reparameterization Invariance · ACL (1) 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack
1.012026
Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Exploiting Reparameterization Invariance · ACL (1) 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning › adversarial defense
adversarial text defense
0.912025
Disentangled Information Bottleneck for Adversarial Text Defense · EMNLP 2025
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning
information bottleneck
0.912025
Disentangled Information Bottleneck for Adversarial Text Defense · EMNLP 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › AI safety › safety alignment
LLM safety alignment
0.312026
Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Exploiting Reparameterization Invariance · ACL (1) 2026
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
model robustness
0.312025
Disentangled Information Bottleneck for Adversarial Text Defense · EMNLP 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

natural gradient · 2.0gradient-based token optimization · 2.0information bottleneck · 0.9disentangled representation learning · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Enhancing the Transferability of Jailbreak Attacks on Large Language Models via Exploiting Reparameterization Invariance
abstract
Jailbreak attacks serve as a pivotal technique for evaluating the safety alignment of Large language models.Current token-level attacks have shown remarkable efficacy on open-source models by leveraging gradient-based optimization.However, these attacks suffer from poor cross-model transferability, severely limiting their utility on proprietary ones.To address this limitation, we propose Reparameterization Invariance Gradient-based Jailbreak (RIGJ), a natural gradient based framework designed to improve cross-model transferability.Unlike prior token-level methods whose optimization paths are constrained by model-specific Euclidean geometry, RIGJ defines update directions according to differences in output distributions rather than parameter-space distances.Since language models are trained to capture similar dependency structures of natural language, their output distributions share common geometry across architectures, yielding intrinsically model-agnostic optimization trajectories and substantially stronger jailbreak transferability.Extensive experiments demonstrate superior performance, increasing the cross-model Attack Success Rate and Average Harmfulness Score by 14.9% and 1.23, respectively.Our code is provided in https://github.com/nohuma/AISafety_ transfer_jailbreak_RIGJ_2026.
Xinghao Yang, Yongshun Gong, Wei Liu 0007, Bao-di Liu, Weifeng Liu 0001
ACL (1)5
2025 Disentangled Information Bottleneck for Adversarial Text Defense
abstract
Adversarial text defense is a significant strategy to protect modern NLP models from being attacked.Typical text defense methods usually enhance the model's robustness by model retraining or equipping it with a data preprocessing step, aiming to eliminate the non-robust features and preserve the robust ones.Although some efforts have been made to recognize the robust features, e.g., by the information bottleneck (IB) technique, how to fully disentangle the robust and non-robust representation remains a big challenge.To alleviate this problem, we propose a novel text defense method, named Disentangled Information Bottleneck (DisIB), with two major merits.Firstly, we separate the robust features and non-robust features with a disentangled two-line framework rather than the one-line compression network in IB.This prevents the loss of robust features caused by information compression and produces complete robust features.Secondly, we design a discriminator network to approximate the minimum mutual information of the two lines, which sufficiently disentangles robust and non-robust features.To validate the effectiveness of our DisIB, we conduct a total of 96 defense experiments on four datasets by defending four popular attack methods.Experimental results elaborate that our method significantly outperforms six baselines, with accuracy improvements ranging from 3.8% to 20.7%.
Yidan Xu, Xinghao Yang, Bao-di Liu, Weifeng Liu 0001
EMNLP4