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Stephan Gerhold

dblp:429/1724 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0006-3956-266XORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures · 50% GPUs and heterogeneous computing · 50%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
heterogeneous TEE
1.012026
TEEM³: Core-Independent and Cooperating Trusted Execution Environments · ASPLOS (2) 2026
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
1.012026
TEEM³: Core-Independent and Cooperating Trusted Execution Environments · ASPLOS (2) 2026
GPUs and heterogeneous computing › heterogeneous architecture
heterogeneous processors
0.312026
TEEM³: Core-Independent and Cooperating Trusted Execution Environments · ASPLOS (2) 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

trusted execution environment · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 TEEM³: Core-Independent and Cooperating Trusted Execution Environments
abstract
Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) enable secure code execution on machines that are not fully trusted by the user who runs the workload. However, existing TEE solutions mostly target CPUs and are typically tied to one specific instruction set architecture. Although some accelerators also provide support for TEEs, this leads to multiple, different TEE implementations on the same system, increasing its complexity and trusted computing base (TCB). This challenge becomes particularly apparent when workloads span heterogeneous processing units, because the diversity of TEE implementations complicates the creation of secure communication channels between the individual TEEs.
Nils Asmussen, Sebastian Haas, Carsten Weinhold, Nicholas Gordon, Stephan Gerhold, Friedrich Pauls, Nilanjana Das, Michael Roitzsch
ASPLOS (2)5