Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Jiyeon Yang

dblp:429/2947 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0008-7061-6085ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Storage systems · 100%
Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments
1.012026
Trust-V: Toward Secure and Reliable Storage for Trusted Execution Environments · ASPLOS (2) 2026
Storage systems › storage reliability
storage integrity
1.012026
Trust-V: Toward Secure and Reliable Storage for Trusted Execution Environments · ASPLOS (2) 2026
Storage systems
storage reliability
1.012026
Trust-V: Toward Secure and Reliable Storage for Trusted Execution Environments · ASPLOS (2) 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

block i/o monitoring · 3.0MMIO region locking · 3.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Trust-V: Toward Secure and Reliable Storage for Trusted Execution Environments
abstract
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide strong isolation for security-critical applications (enclaves) and their runtime data from potentially malicious operating systems. While TEEs also support secure storage by sealing data and storing it persistently on media, they do not ensure the integrity of sealed data, leaving it vulnerable to deletion or manipulation by an untrusted OS. In this work, we present Trusted Storage, a runtime storage isolation mechanism for TEEs that guarantees the integrity of TEE persistent data. The core design partitions storage into trusted and untrusted regions and enforces access control by locking MMIO regions and monitoring block I/O. To ensure portability, Trusted Storage requires no hardware modifications or additional hardware. We implemented a prototype, Trust-V, on the RISC-V platform. In particular, to support secure operation on legacy devices where security features are limited, Trust-V introduces a Virtual-M mode, a sandboxed privileged execution environment in machine mode, for securely hosting the monitor. Our evaluation demonstrates that, although Trust-V incurs up to 3.86× system overhead, it allows TEE software to reliably store and retrieve persistent data.
Seung-Kyun Han, Jiyeon Yang, Jin Soo Jang
ASPLOS (2)2