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Georgios Kalantzis 0002

dblp:43/8075-2 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 1 first-author · 4 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
3 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 86% Algorithms and data structures · 11% Approximation and online algorithms · 4%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
social choice
1.922026
Utilitarian distortion with predictions · Artif. Intell. 2026
Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
learning-augmented mechanism
0.912025
Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
matching
0.912025
Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
one-sided matching
0.912025
Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.812024
Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees · IJCAI 2024
Algorithms and data structures
randomized algorithms
0.812024
Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees · IJCAI 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › revenue maximization
revenue guarantee
0.812024
Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees · IJCAI 2024
Approximation and online algorithms › learning-augmented algorithms
consistency and robustness
0.312025
Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

learning-augmented framework · 0.9learning-augmented algorithm design · 0.8
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Utilitarian distortion with predictions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis 0002, Alexandros A. Voudouris
Artif. Intell.2
2025 Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions
abstract
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In particular, we consider two fundamental social choice problems: single-winner voting and one-sided matching. In these settings, the ordinal preferences of the agents over the alternatives (either candidates or items) is known, and some prediction about their underlying cardinal values is also provided. The goal is to leverage the prediction to achieve improved distortion guarantees when it is accurate, while simultaneously still achieving reasonable worst-case bounds when it is not. This leads to the notions of consistency and robustness, and the quest to achieve the best possible tradeoffs between the two. We show tight tradeoffs between the consistency and robustness of ordinal mechanisms for single-winner voting and one-sided matching, for different levels of information provided as prediction.
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis 0002, Alexandros A. Voudouris
EC2
2024 Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees
Ioannis Caragiannis, Georgios Kalantzis 0002
IJCAI2
2022 A Heuristic Approach towards Continuous Implicit Authentication
abstract
Smartphones nowadays handle large amounts of sensitive user information, since users exchange undisclosed information on an everyday basis. This generates the need for more effective authentication mechanisms, deviating from the traditional ones. In this direction, many research approaches are targeted towards continuous implicit authentication, on the basis of modelling the constant interaction of the user with the device. These approaches yield promising results, however certain improvements can be made by exploiting the sequential order of the predictions and the known performance metrics. In this work, we propose a heuristics algorithm, which, given a series of predictions from any continuous implicit authentication model, can ex-ploit the sequential order in order to fix any false predictions and improve the accuracy of the smartphone security system. Preliminary evaluation on several axes indicates that our approach can effectively improve any CIA model and achieve significantly better results.
Georgios Kalantzis 0002, Gerasimos Papakostas, Thomas Karanikiotis, Michail Papamichail, Andreas L. Symeonidis
IJCB1