Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Georgios Kalantzis 0002
dblp:43/8075-2
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
1as first author
4since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 4 · 1 first-author · 4 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
3 papers |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 86% Algorithms and data structures · 11% Approximation and online algorithms · 4% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
social choice |
1.9 | 2 | 2026 | Utilitarian distortion with predictions · Artif. Intell. 2026 Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › algorithmic mechanism design
learning-augmented mechanism |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
matching |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › matching
one-sided matching |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees · IJCAI 2024 |
Algorithms and data structures
randomized algorithms |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees · IJCAI 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › revenue maximization
revenue guarantee |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees · IJCAI 2024 |
Approximation and online algorithms › learning-augmented algorithms
consistency and robustness |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions · EC 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
learning-augmented framework · 0.9learning-augmented algorithm design · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Utilitarian distortion with predictions
Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis 0002, Alexandros A. Voudouris |
Artif. Intell. | 2 |
| 2025 | Utilitarian Distortion with PredictionsabstractWe study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In particular, we consider two fundamental social choice problems: single-winner voting and one-sided matching. In these settings, the ordinal preferences of the agents over the alternatives (either candidates or items) is known, and some prediction about their underlying cardinal values is also provided. The goal is to leverage the prediction to achieve improved distortion guarantees when it is accurate, while simultaneously still achieving reasonable worst-case bounds when it is not. This leads to the notions of consistency and robustness, and the quest to achieve the best possible tradeoffs between the two. We show tight tradeoffs between the consistency and robustness of ordinal mechanisms for single-winner voting and one-sided matching, for different levels of information provided as prediction. Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis 0002, Alexandros A. Voudouris |
EC | 2 |
| 2024 | Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees
Ioannis Caragiannis, Georgios Kalantzis 0002 |
IJCAI | 2 |
| 2022 | A Heuristic Approach towards Continuous Implicit AuthenticationabstractSmartphones nowadays handle large amounts of sensitive user information, since users exchange undisclosed information on an everyday basis. This generates the need for more effective authentication mechanisms, deviating from the traditional ones. In this direction, many research approaches are targeted towards continuous implicit authentication, on the basis of modelling the constant interaction of the user with the device. These approaches yield promising results, however certain improvements can be made by exploiting the sequential order of the predictions and the known performance metrics. In this work, we propose a heuristics algorithm, which, given a series of predictions from any continuous implicit authentication model, can ex-ploit the sequential order in order to fix any false predictions and improve the accuracy of the smartphone security system. Preliminary evaluation on several axes indicates that our approach can effectively improve any CIA model and achieve significantly better results. Georgios Kalantzis 0002, Gerasimos Papakostas, Thomas Karanikiotis, Michail Papamichail, Andreas L. Symeonidis |
IJCB | 1 |