Demonstration venue · read-only. Every page can be browsed; the buttons that would change it are switched off. Create an account to run TaxoReview on your own data. A simulation from public publication records: the people listed were not invited and did not agree to review.
? Tutorial for this page

Hongrui Pan

dblp:430/1752 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0006-3863-2240ORCID · reported

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Internet of things and sensor networks · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack › acoustic side channel
acoustic eavesdropping
1.012026
Sound Eavesdropping on Mobile Device Via Audio-Induced EMR · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
electromagnetic side channel
1.012026
Sound Eavesdropping on Mobile Device Via Audio-Induced EMR · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
1.012026
Sound Eavesdropping on Mobile Device Via Audio-Induced EMR · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Internet of things and sensor networks › mobile sensing
mobile device sensing
0.312026
Sound Eavesdropping on Mobile Device Via Audio-Induced EMR · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

signal processing · 2.0electromagnetic radiation analysis · 2.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Sound Eavesdropping on Mobile Device Via Audio-Induced EMR
abstract
Sound eavesdropping poses serious threats to user privacy in daily mobile usage scenarios such as phone calls, voice messaging, and confidential meetings. Headphones are thus favored by mobile users as they provide physical sound isolation to protect audio privacy. However, our paper presents the first proof-of-concept system,Periscope, that demonstrates the vulnerabilities of headphone-plugged mobile devices. The system shows that audio-induced electromagnetic radiations (EMRs) from mobile devices' audio circuits can be exploited as an effective side channel in recovering the victim's audio sounds. Our theoretical analysis and feasibility studies further reveal that audio-induced EMRs are highly correlated with the device's audio inputs but suffer from signal distortions and ambient noises, making recovering audio sounds extremely challenging. To address this challenge, we develop signal processing techniques to clear noises and distortions, enabling EMRs to be converted back to audio sounds. Our attack prototype, comparable in size to hidden voice recorders, successfully recovers victims' private audio sounds with a word error rate (WER) as low as 7.44% across 12 mobile devices and 6 headphones. The recovery results are recognizable to natural human hearing and online speech-to-text tools. We also propose a software-based defense solution that mitigates this audio eavesdropping threat without requiring hardware modification.
Yupeng Hu 0004, Hongrui Pan, Wenqiang Jin, Zhenyu Ye, Chenxi Liu 0003
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.3