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Xiecheng Tang

dblp:430/2644 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 77% Privacy and data protection · 8% Network security · 8%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
acoustic side channel
1.012026
ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel attack
power analysis
1.012026
ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
1.012026
ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Authentication and access control › password guessing
PIN inference
0.312026
ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Privacy and data protection › information leakage
privacy leakage
0.312026
ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026
Network security › traffic analysis
website fingerprinting
0.312026
ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger · IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput. 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

deep learning · 1.0acoustic signal analysis · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 ChargerWhisper: Acoustic Side-Channel Attack Exploiting Fast Charger
abstract
Mobile devices have penetrated our daily life, and so have the fast chargers. However, while improving users' charging efficiency, fast chargers may pose severe security threats. In this work, we present a novel side-channel attack called ChargerWhisper, which exploits the acoustic signals generated by fast chargers to infer users' private information in an on-charging mobile device. In particular, when users perform different activities on the charging device, the fast charger will supply distinct amounts of power outputs to the mobile device. By conducting a deep investigation of the fast charger circuits, we find that the electronic components, i.e., inductors, capacitors, and transformers, vibrate at certain frequencies and generate high-frequency inaudible sounds. Meanwhile, the leaked sound frequencies are highly correlated with electric intensity flowing through these electronic components (charger's output power). To demonstrate the acoustic side-channel attack leveraging fast chargers, we present two specific exploitation scenarios: a website fingerprinting attack to identify users' on-browsing websites, and a PIN inference attack to infers the device's unlock PIN. Extensive evaluations are performed on off-the-shelf devices. The results show that both attacks are robust under diverse usage settings and achieve good performance in inferring users' privacy information. These findings highlight the essential need to address unnoticed privacy leakage risks associated with fast chargers.
Yu Liu 0021, Bin Deng 0015, Xiecheng Tang, Zheng Qin 0001, Wenqiang Jin, Ningchao Ge
IEEE Trans. Dependable Secur. Comput.3