Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Runyu Kang
dblp:433/8624
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0005-7669-4779ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper |
Computational finance and economics · 100% | |
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Data integration and cleaning · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Computational finance and economics › platform economics
data marketplace |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service Platforms · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2026 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › stackelberg game
pricing strategy |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service Platforms · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2026 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
stackelberg game |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service Platforms · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
stackelberg game · 3.0reputation-based prediction · 3.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | Pricing and Trading of Data Options on Data-as-a-Service PlatformsabstractIn current Data-as-a-Service (DaaS) platforms, data marketplaces are the primary mechanism by which data owners deliver data products and services to users. However, data owners incur substantial costs to collect or produce data before selling it, exposing them to economic risks due to market price fluctuations. Options trading, used in traditional commodity markets, can alleviate sellers' financial burdens with forward contracts at fixed option prices and pre-paid option premiums. To our knowledge, the application of option trading in data marketplaces has not been thoroughly studied or implemented. In this work, we advocate for the first data options marketplace on a DaaS platform that mitigates price fluctuation risks and reduces market entry barriers. Designing such a marketplace involves several key challenges, including the easy replication of data and the difficulty in assessing data quality before production. To address these challenges, we first design a data quality prediction method based on sellers' reputation. Following this, we model and quantify the competitive relationships among buyers. On this basis, we model the interactions between sellers and buyers in the data options market as a two-stage Stackelberg game, focusing on maximizing sellers' profit. We formally derive the perfect subgame equilibrium for option trading and derive each seller's optimal pricing strategy. Numerical experiments demonstrate the superiority of data options trading over conventional data trading methods in DaaS platforms. Cheng Zhang 0035, Yang Xu 0013, Runyu Kang, Hangfan Li, Shihao Xiao, Peng Sun 0003 |
IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. | 3 |