Modern scientific software stacks have become extremely complex, using many programming models and libraries to exploit a growing variety of GPUs and accelerators. Package managers can mitigate this complexity using dependency solvers, but they are reaching their limits. Finding compatible dependency versions is NP-complete, and modeling the semantics of package compatibility modulo build-time options, GPU runtimes, flags, and other parameters is extremely difficult. Within this enormous configuration space, defining a “good” configuration is daunting. We tackle this problem using Answer Set Programming (ASP), a declarative model for combinatorial search problems. We show, using the Spack package manager, that ASP programs can concisely express the compatibility rules of HPC software stacks and provide strong quality-of-solution guarantees. Using ASP, we can mix new builds with preinstalled binaries, and solver performance is acceptable even when considering tens of thousands of packages.

Many libraries in the HPC field use sophisticated algorithms with clear theoretical scalability expectations. However, hardware constraints or programming bugs may sometimes render these expectations inaccurate or even plainly wrong. While algorithm and performance engineers have already been advocating the systematic combination of analytical performance models with practical measurements for a very long time, we go one step further and show how this comparison can become part of automated testing procedures. The most important applications of our method include initial validation, regression testing, and benchmarking to compare implementation and platform alternatives. Advancing the concept of performance assertions, we verify asymptotic scaling trends rather than precise analytical expressions, relieving the developer from the burden of having to specify and maintain very fine-grained and potentially non-portable expectations. In this way, scalability validation can be continuously applied throughout the whole development cycle with very little effort. Using MPI and parallel sorting algorithms as examples, we show how our method can help uncover non-obvious limitations of both libraries and underlying platforms.

Task-based programming offers an elegant way to express units of computation and the dependencies among them, making it easier to distribute the computational load evenly across multiple cores. However, this separation of problem decomposition and parallelism requires a sufficiently large input problem to achieve satisfactory efficiency on a given number of cores. Unfortunately, finding a good match between input size and core count usually requires significant experimentation, which is expensive and sometimes even impractical. In this paper, we propose an automated empirical method for finding the isoefficiency function of a task-based program, binding efficiency, core count, and the input size in one analytical expression. This allows the latter two to be adjusted according to given (realistic) efficiency objectives. Moreover, we not only find (i) the actual isoefficiency function but also (ii) the function one would yield if the program execution was free of resource contention and (iii) an upper bound that could only be reached if the program was able to maintain its average parallelism throughout its execution. The difference between the three helps to explain low efficiency, and in particular, it helps to differentiate between resource contention and structural conflicts related to task dependencies or scheduling. The insights gained can be used to co-design programs and shared system resources.

Many libraries in the HPC field encapsulate sophisticated algorithms with clear theoretical scalability expectations. However, hardware constraints or programming bugs may sometimes render these expectations inaccurate or even plainly wrong. While algorithm engineers have already been advocating the systematic combination of analytical performance models with practical measurements for a very long time, we go one step further and show how this comparison can become part of automated testing procedures. The most important applications of our method include initial validation, regression testing, and benchmarking to compare implementation and platform alternatives. Advancing the concept of performance assertions, we verify asymptotic scaling trends rather than precise analytical expressions, relieving the developer from the burden of having to specify and maintain very fine grained and potentially non-portable expectations. In this way, scalability validation can be continuously applied throughout the whole development cycle with very little effort. Using MPI as an example, we show how our method can help uncover non-obvious limitations of both libraries and underlying platforms.

Markets of computing resources typically consist of a cluster (or a multi-cluster) and jobs that arrive over time and request computing resources in exchange for payment. In this paper we study a real system that is capable of preemptive process migration (i.e. moving jobs across nodes) and that uses a market-based resource allocation mechanism for job allocation. Specifically, we formalize our system into a market model and employ simulation-based analysis (performed on real data) to study the effects of users' behavior on performance and utility. Typically online settings are characterized by a large amount of uncertainty, therefore it is reasonable to assume that users will consider simple strategies to game the system. We thus suggest a novel approach to modeling users' behavior called the Small Risk-aggressive Group model. We show that under this model untruthful users experience degraded performance. The main result and the contribution of this paper is that using the k-th price payment scheme, which is a natural adaptation of the classical second-price scheme, discourages these users from attempting to game the market. The preemptive capability makes it possible not only to use the k-th price scheme, but also makes our scheduling algorithm superior to other non-preemptive algorithms. Finally, we design a simple one-shot game to model the interaction between the provider and the consumers. We then show (using the same simulation-based analysis) that market stability in the form of (symmetric) Nash-equilibrium is likely to be achieved in several cases.