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Yuriy Kashnikov

dblp:44/9605 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 2Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 67% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 33%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › key management › distributed key generation
distributed RSA key generation
0.512021
Diogenes: Lightweight Scalable RSA Modulus Generation with a Dishonest Majority · SP 2021
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › public-key cryptography
RSA
0.512021
Diogenes: Lightweight Scalable RSA Modulus Generation with a Dishonest Majority · SP 2021
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation
0.512021
Diogenes: Lightweight Scalable RSA Modulus Generation with a Dishonest Majority · SP 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

zero-knowledge proofs · 0.5threshold additively homomorphic encryption · 0.5ring-LWE · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Diogenes: Lightweight Scalable RSA Modulus Generation with a Dishonest Majority
abstract
In this work, we design and implement the first protocol for distributed generation of an RSA modulus that can support thousands of parties and offers security against active corruption of an arbitrary number of parties. In a nutshell, we first design a highly optimized protocol for this scale that is secure against passive corruptions, and then amplify its security to withstand active corruptions using lightweight succinct zero-knowledge proofs. Our protocol achieves security with "identifiable abort," where a corrupted party is identified whenever the protocol aborts, and supports public verifiability.Our protocol against passive corruptions extends the recent work of Chen et al. (CRYPTO 2020) that, in turn, is based on the blueprint introduced in the original work of Boneh-Franklin protocol (CRYPTO 1997, J. ACM, 2001). Specifically, we reduce the task of sampling a modulus to secure distributed multiplication, which we implement via an efficient threshold additively homomorphic encryption scheme based on the Ring-LWE assumption. This results in a protocol where the (amortized) per-party communication cost grows logarithmically in the number of parties. In order to minimize the work done by the parties, we employ a "publicly verifiable" coordinator that is connected to all parties and only performs computations on public data.We implemented both the passive and the active variants of our protocol and ran experiments using 2 to 4,000 parties. This is the first implementation of any MPC protocol that can scale to more than 1,000 parties. For generating a 2048-bit modulus among 1,000 parties, our passive protocol executed in under 6 minutes and the active variant ran in under 25 minutes.
Megan Chen, Carmit Hazay, Yuval Ishai, Yuriy Kashnikov, Daniele Micciancio, Tarik Riviere, Abhi Shelat, Muthuramakrishnan Venkitasubramaniam
SP4
2014 Fine-grained Benchmark Subsetting for System Selection
Pablo de Oliveira Castro, Yuriy Kashnikov, Chadi Akel, Mihail Popov, William Jalby
CGO2
2013 Is Source-Code Isolation Viable for Performance Characterization?
abstract
Source-code isolation finds and extracts the hotspots of an application as independent isolated fragments of code, called codelets. Codelets can be modified, compiled, run, and measured independently from the original application. Source-code isolation reduces benchmarking cost and allows piece-wise optimization of an application. Source-code isolation is faster than whole-program benchmarking and optimization since the user can concentrate only on the bottlenecks. This paper examines the viability of using isolated codelets in place of the original application for performance characterization and optimization. On the NAS benchmarks, we show that codelets capture 92.3% of the original execution time. We present a set of techniques for keeping codelets as faithful as possible to the original hotspots: 63.6% of the codelets have the same assembly as the original hotspots and 81.6% of the codelets have the same run time performance as the original hotspots.
Chadi Akel, Yuriy Kashnikov, Pablo de Oliveira Castro, William Jalby
ICPP2