Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Johannes Blaser
dblp:441/0763
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2026
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Systems and software security · 92% Hardware security and side channels · 8% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Systems and software security › vulnerability patching
automatic patch generation |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | QuickSafe: Targeted Hardening Against Memory Corruption · SP 2026 |
Systems and software security
exploitation |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | QuickSafe: Targeted Hardening Against Memory Corruption · SP 2026 |
Systems and software security
memory safety |
1.0 | 1 | 2026 | QuickSafe: Targeted Hardening Against Memory Corruption · SP 2026 |
Systems and software security › memory safety › hardware-enforced memory safety
memory tagging |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | QuickSafe: Targeted Hardening Against Memory Corruption · SP 2026 |
Hardware security and side channels
trusted execution environments |
0.3 | 1 | 2026 | QuickSafe: Targeted Hardening Against Memory Corruption · SP 2026 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
tagged pointers · 1.0memory tagging extension · 1.0guard pages · 1.0addresssanitizer · 1.0
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | QuickSafe: Targeted Hardening Against Memory CorruptionabstractDespite decades of research, memory safety solutions see limited adoption, as they often incur high overheads, are complex to deploy, or cover only a narrow scope of bugs. In this paper, we present QuickSafe - a targeted approach to harden programs against exploitation of known but unresolved memory errors with minimal overhead. QuickSafe yields a stopgap patch that is immediately available, while the bug awaits eventual resolution. Where most existing automatic patch generators rely on inserting runtime constraint checks in the code to stop exploits, QuickSafe instead isolates memory objects associated with a known bug from the rest of the program. Object isolation can be implemented in different ways, depending on hardware support and desired security guarantees. To assess the viability, we present two such implementations. On traditional architectures, we allocate vulnerable objects on dedicated pages flanked by inaccessible guard pages. On platforms that support Memory Tagging Extensions (MTE), we offer stronger guarantees by enforcing disjoint tag domains. To reliably identify the objects associated with a given memory error, we introduce TagASan - an extension of AddressSanitizer (ASan) that uses tagged pointers to trace faulting accesses back to their originating allocation sites. As an additional contribution, we present a new dataset of 223 real-world memory errors across ten prominent projects to measure the performance of automatic patch generators. We evaluate QuickSafe on (1) this new benchmark suite, (2) the Juliet Test Suite, and (3) buggy benchmarks from SPEC CPU2006/2017. Using the guard-page-based isolation backend, QuickSafe protects against the exploitation of all evaluated bugs, incurring a geomean memory overhead of 2.46 % and a geomean runtime overhead of 2.67 % - with the vast majority of applications slowing down by only around 1 %. We apply the MTE-based isolation strategy to a representative subset of the dataset, confirming its effectiveness and showing negligible runtime overhead of ≈ 0.12%. Johannes Blaser, Floris Gorter, Klaus von Gleissenthall, Herbert Bos |
SP | 1 |