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Tommy M. McGuire

dblp:45/5937 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2002
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2Systems, architecture and hardware · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer networks
2 papers
Internet architecture and protocols · 50% Routing and switching · 50%
Network and information security
2 papers
Network security · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Network security › attack resilience › attack mitigation
denial-of-service defense
0.012002
Hop integrity in computer networks · IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2002
Routing and switching › routing
secure routing
0.012000
Hop Integrity in Computer Networks · ICNP 2000
Network security › protocol security
network protocol security
0.012000
Hop Integrity in Computer Networks · ICNP 2000
Routing and switching
inter-domain routing
0.012000
Hop Integrity in Computer Networks · ICNP 2000

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

weak integrity protocol · 0.1strong integrity protocol · 0.1secret exchange protocol · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2002 Hop integrity in computer networks
abstract
A computer network is said to provide hop integrity if, when any router, p, in the network receives a message, m, supposedly from an adjacent router, q, then p can check that m was indeed sent by q, was not modified after it was sent and was not a replay of an old message sent from q to p. We describe three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are a secret exchange protocol, a weak integrity protocol and a strong integrity protocol. All three protocols are stateless, require small overhead and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.
Mohamed G. Gouda, E. N. Elnozahy, Chin-Tser Huang, Tommy M. McGuire
IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.4
2000 Hop Integrity in Computer Networks
abstract
A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff when any router p in the network receives a message m supposedly from an adjacent router q, then p can check that m was indeed sent by q, was not modified after it was sent, and was not a replay of an old message sent from q to p. We describe three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity. These three protocols are a secret exchange protocol, a weak integrity protocol, and a strong integrity protocol. All three protocols are stateless, require small overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.
Mohamed G. Gouda, E. N. Elnozahy, Chin-Tser Huang, Tommy M. McGuire
ICNP4
1998 Accelerated Heartbeat Protocols
abstract
Heartbeat protocols are used by distributed programs to ensure that if a process in a program terminates or fails, then the remaining processes in the program terminate. We present a class of heartbeat protocols that tolerate message loss. In these protocols, a root process periodically sends a beat message to every other process then waits to receive a reply beat message from every other process. If the root process does not receive a reply (possibly due to message loss), the root process reduces by half the period for sending beat messages. We show that in practical situations, the parameters of these protocols can be chosen to achieve a good compromise between three contradictory objectives: reduce the rate of sending beat messages, reduce the detection delay, and still keep the probability of premature termination small.
Mohamed G. Gouda, Tommy M. McGuire
ICDCS2