Estimating player utilities from observed equilibria is crucial for many applications. Existing approaches to tackle this problem are either limited to specific games or do not scale well with the number of players. Our work addresses these issues by proposing a novel utility estimation method for general multi-player non-cooperative games. Our main idea consists in reformulating the inverse game problem as an inverse variational inequality problem and in selecting among all utility parameters consistent with the data, the so-called incenter. We show that the choice of the incenter can produce parameters that are most robust to the observed equilibrium behaviors. However, its computation is challenging, as the number of constraints in the corresponding optimization problem increases with the number of players and the behavior space size. To tackle this challenge, we propose a loss function-based algorithm, making our method scalable to games with many players or a continuous action space. Furthermore, we show that our method can be extended to incorporate prior knowledge of player utilities, and that it can handle inconsistent data, i.e., data where players do not play exact equilibria. Numerical experiments on three game applications demonstrate that our methods outperform the state of the art. The code, datasets, and supplementary material are available at https://github.com/cuilvye/Incenter-Project.

We describe an architecture for a decentralised data market for applications in which agents are incentivised to collaborate to crowd-source their data. The architecture is designed to reward data that furthers the market's collective goal, and distributes reward fairly to all those that contribute with their data. We show that the architecture is resilient to Sybil , wormhole , and data poisoning attacks. In order to evaluate the resilience of the architecture, we characterise its breakdown points for various adversarial threat models in an automotive use case.

Data markets facilitate decentralized data exchange for applications such as prediction, learning, or inference. The design of these markets is challenged by varying privacy preferences and data similarity among data owners. Related works have often overlooked how data similarity impacts pricing and data value through statistical information leakage. We demonstrate that data similarity and privacy preferences are integral to market design and propose a query-response protocol using local differential privacy (LDP) for a two-party data acquisition mechanism. In our regression data market model, we analyze strategic interactions between privacy-aware owners and the learner as a Stackelberg game over the asked price and privacy factor. Finally, we numerically evaluate how data similarity affects market participation and traded data value.

This article establishes a market for trading Internet of Things (IoT) data that is used to train machine learning (ML) models. The data, either raw or processed, is supplied to the market platform through a network, and the price of such data is controlled based on the value it brings to the ML model under the adversity of the correlation property of data. Eventually, a simplified distributed solution for a data trading mechanism is derived that improves the mutual benefit of devices and the market. Our key proposal is an efficient algorithm for data markets that jointly addresses the challenges of availability and heterogeneity in participation, as well as the transfer of trust and the economic value of data exchange in IoT networks. The proposed approach establishes the data market by reinforcing collaboration opportunities between devices with correlated data to limit information leakage. Therein, we develop a network-wide optimization problem that maximizes the social value of coalition among the IoT devices of similar data types; at the same time, it minimizes the cost due to network externalities, i.e., the impact of information leakage due to data correlation, as well as the opportunity costs. Finally, we reveal the structure of the formulated problem as a distributed coalition game and solve it following the simplified split-and-merge algorithm. Simulation results show the efficacy of our proposed mechanism design toward a trusted IoT data market, with up to 32.72% gain in the average payoff for each seller.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

The increasing penetration of electric vehicles brings a consequent increase in charging facilities in the low-voltage electricity network. Serving all charging requests on-demand can endanger the safety of the electrical power distribution network. This creates the issue of fairly allocating the charging energy among electric vehicles while maintaining the system within safe operational margins. However, calculating efficient charging schedules for the charging stations bears a high computational burden due to the non-convexities of charging stations’ models. In this paper, we consider a tri-level system with electric vehicles, charging stations, and a power distribution system operator. The objective of each station is formulated as a max-min fairness, mixed-integer linear optimization problem, while the network constraints are modeled using a second-order conic formulation. In order to tackle the computational complexity of the problem, we decompose it and use a novel approximation method tailored to this problem. We compare the performance of the proposed method with that of the popular alternating direction method of multipliers. Our simulation results indicate that the proposed method achieves a near-optimal solution along with promising scalability properties.

International audience

The aim of this Special Section is to attract and report the latest advances toward the trend of applying advanced informatics techniques resolving complex problems facing power system operation and planning in the new era of smart grids. Special interests are given to the new methods that can handle various tasks of risk hedging and decision making appeared in eleven system operation and planning, though the scope has been slightly expanded to other topical issues in smart grids as well. The accepted eleven high-quality papers represent how the newadvances and solutions toward resolving complex problems facing power system operation and planning can be brought forward by continuously leveraging emerging techniques in the field of data analytics and informatics. It should be highlighted that with the increased penetration of various emerging technologies such as renewables and electric vehicles (EVs), secure and economic system operation and planning deserve continuous research efforts in producing the most up-to-date methods and solutions dealing with issues of diversified natures and complexities in future power grids. Specifically, the covered topics in this Special Section are topical and broad, concerning mainly power system security analysis and electricity market planning and operation under risks and uncertainties, which are briefly summarized.