The Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet) is a recurring benchmark series that evaluates the effectiveness of software-based Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) algorithms in fingerprint recognition. LivDet2025 presents three challenges: (1) "Liveness Detection in Action", requiring the integration of PAD with user-specific recognition; (2) "Fingerprint Representation", evaluating the compactness and discriminability of feature vectors; and (3) "Adversarial Robustness", assessing the resilience of PADs to adversarially-crafted presentation attack instruments. This edition marks a significant milestone with the inclusion of contactless fingerprint data, promoting interoperability and robustness across acquisition technologies. Furthermore, no training data was provided; participants must select and declare external datasets for model development. The competition was open to academic and industrial research groups, with all submitted algorithms evaluated on common datasets and under standardized protocols. LivDet2025 aims to provide a comprehensive assessment of PAD performance under realistic, multi-sensor, and multi-attack scenarios. Results reveal important trade-offs between PAD accuracy, usability, and computational efficiency. For instance, some systems achieved high presentation attack rejection at the cost of extremely high false rejection rates, while others optimised speed and generalizability but exhibited limited attack resilience.

Abstract Nowadays, fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection systems (PADs) are primarily based on deep learning architectures subjected to massive training. However, their performance decreases to never-seen-before attacks. With the goal of contributing to explaining this issue, we hypothesized that this limited ability to generalize is due to the lack of "representativeness" of the samples available for the PAD training. "Representativeness" is treated here from a geometrical perspective: the spread of samples into the feature space, especially near the decision boundaries. In particular, we explored the possibility of adopting three-dimensionality reduction methods to make the problem affordable through visual inspection. These methods enable visual inspection and interpretation by projecting data into two-dimensional spaces, facilitating the identification of weak areas in the decision regions estimated after the training phase. Our analysis delineates the benefits and drawbacks of each dimensionality reduction method and leads us to make substantial recommendations in the crucial phase of the training design.

Modern Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection (FPAD) modules have been particularly successful in avoiding attacks exploiting artificial fingerprint replicas against Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFISs). As for several other domains, Machine and Deep Learning strongly contributed to this success, with all recent state-of-the-art detectors leveraging learning-based approaches. An insidious flip side is represented by adversarial attacks, namely, procedures intended to mislead a target detector. Indeed, despite this type of attack has been considered unrealistic, as it presupposes access to the communication channel between the sensor and the detector, in a recent work, we have highlighted the possibility of transferring a fingerprint adversarial attack from the digital domain to the physical one. In this work, we take a step further by introducing a new procedure designed to make the physical adversarial presentation attack i) more robust to the physical crafting of the PAI by exploiting explainability techniques, ii) easier to adapt to different fingerprint scanners and adversarial algorithms, and iii) usable in a black-box scenario. To quantify the impact of these novel adversarial presentation attacks family, designed to be robust to the physical crafting process, we assess the performance of both state-of-the-art PAD modules alone and integrated AFISs. Results highlight the approach’s feasibility, opening a new series of threats in the context of fingerprint PAD.

The International Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition (LivDet) is a biennial event that invites academic and industry participants to prove their advancements in Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection (PAD). This edition, LivDet2023, proposed two challenges, “Liveness Detection in Action” and “Fingerprint Representation”, to evaluate the efficacy of PAD embedded in verification systems and the effectiveness and compactness of feature sets. A third, “hidden” challenge is the inclusion of two subsets in the training set whose sensor information is unknown, testing participants’ ability to generalize their models. Only bona fide fingerprint samples were provided to participants, and the competition reports and assesses the performance of their algorithms suffering from this limitation in data availability.

The International Fingerprint Liveness Detection Competition is an international biennial competition open to academia and industry with the aim to assess and report advances in Fingerprint Presentation Attack Detection. The proposed "Liveness Detection in Action" and "Fingerprint representation" challenges were aimed to evaluate the impact of a PAD embedded into a verification system, and the effectiveness and compactness of feature sets for mobile applications. Furthermore, we experimented a new spoof fabrication method that has particularly affected the final results. Twenty-three algorithms were submitted to the competition, the maximum number ever achieved by LivDet.

We investigated the threat level of realistic attacks using latent fingerprints against sensors equipped with state-of-art liveness detectors and fingerprint verification systems which integrate such liveness algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, only a previous investigation was done with spoofs from latent prints. In this paper, we focus on using snapshot pictures of latent fingerprints. These pictures provide molds, that allows, after some digital processing, to fabricate high-quality spoofs. Taking a snapshot picture is much simpler than developing fingerprints left on a surface by magnetic powders and lifting the trace by a tape. What we are interested here is to evaluate preliminary at which extent attacks of the kind can be considered a real threat for state-of-art fingerprint liveness detectors and verification systems. To this aim, we collected a novel data set of live and spoof images fabricated with snapshot pictures of latent fingerprints. This data set provide a set of attacks at the most favourable conditions. We refer to this method and the related data set as “ScreenSpoof”. Then, we tested with it the performances of the best liveness detection algorithms, namely, the three winners of the LivDet competition. Reported results point out that the ScreenSpoof method is a threat of the same level, in terms of detection and verification errors, than that of attacks using spoofs fabricated with the full consensus of the victim. We think that this is a notable result, never reported in previous work.