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Xiujun Chen

dblp:48/11039 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 2 since 2021Databases, data management, data science and information retrieval · 3 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Reinforcement learning · 100%
Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
1 paper
Computational finance and economics · 100%
Computer networks
1 paper
Network optimization and economics · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Reinforcement learning
multi-agent reinforcement learning
0.512021
Impression Allocation and Policy Search in Display Advertising · ICDM 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design
0.512021
Impression Allocation and Policy Search in Display Advertising · ICDM 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
display advertising auction
0.512021
Impression Allocation and Policy Search in Display Advertising · ICDM 2021
Computational finance and economics
online advertising
0.112021
A Unified Solution to Constrained Bidding in Online Display Advertising · KDD 2021
Computational finance and economics › online advertising
real-time bidding
0.112021
A Unified Solution to Constrained Bidding in Online Display Advertising · KDD 2021
Network optimization and economics
resource allocation
0.112021
Impression Allocation and Policy Search in Display Advertising · ICDM 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

multi-agent reinforcement learning · 1.5bidding function derivation · 1.5reinforcement learning · 1.0recursive optimization · 1.0optimal bidding function · 1.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Impression Allocation and Policy Search in Display Advertising
abstract
In online display advertising, guaranteed contracts and real-time bidding (RTB) are two major ways to sell impressions for a publisher. For large publishers, simultaneously selling impressions through both guaranteed contracts and in-house RTB has become a popular choice. Generally speaking, a publisher needs to derive an impression allocation strategy between guaranteed contracts and RTB to maximize its overall outcome (e.g., revenue and/or impression quality). However, deriving the optimal strategy is not a trivial task, e.g., the strategy should encourage incentive compatibility in RTB and tackle common challenges in real-world applications such as unstable traffic patterns (e.g., impression volume and bid landscape changing). In this paper, we formulate impression allocation as an auction problem where each guaranteed contract submits virtual bids for individual impressions. With this formulation, we derive the optimal bidding functions for the guaranteed contracts, which result in the optimal impression allocation. In order to address the unstable traffic pattern challenge and achieve the optimal overall outcome, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning method to adjust the bids from each guaranteed contract, which is simple, converging efficiently and scalable. The experiments conducted on real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
Di Wu 0035, Xiujun Chen, Junwei Pan, Xun Yang 0004, Qing Tan, Jian Xu 0015, Kuang-chih Lee
ICDM3
2021 A Unified Solution to Constrained Bidding in Online Display Advertising
abstract
In online display advertising, advertisers usually participate in real-time bidding to acquire ad impression opportunities. In most advertising platforms, a typical impression acquiring demand of advertisers is to maximize the sum value of winning impressions under budget and some key performance indicators constraints, (e.g. maximizing clicks with the constraints of budget and cost per click upper bound). The demand can be various in value type (e.g. ad exposure/click), constraint type (e.g. cost per unit value) and constraint number. Existing works usually focus on a specific demand or hardly achieve the optimum. In this paper, we formulate the demand as a constrained bidding problem, and deduce a unified optimal bidding function on behalf of an advertiser. The optimal bidding function facilitates an advertiser calculating bids for all impressions with only m parameters, where m is the constraint number. However, in real application, it is non-trivial to determine the parameters due to the non-stationary auction environment. We further propose a reinforcement learning (RL) method to dynamically adjust parameters to achieve the optimum, whose converging efficiency is significantly boosted by the recursive optimization property in our formulation. We name the formulation and the RL method, together, as Unified Solution to Constrained Bidding (USCB). USCB is verified to be effective on industrial datasets and is deployed in Alibaba display advertising platform.
Xiujun Chen, Di Wu 0035, Junwei Pan, Qing Tan, Chuan Yu 0002, Jian Xu 0015, Xiaoqiang Zhu
KDD2
2018 Budget Constrained Bidding by Model-free Reinforcement Learning in Display Advertising
abstract
Real-time bidding (RTB) is an important mechanism in online display advertising, where a proper bid for each page view plays an essential role for good marketing results. Budget constrained bidding is a typical scenario in RTB where the advertisers hope to maximize the total value of the winning impressions under a pre-set budget constraint. However, the optimal bidding strategy is hard to be derived due to the complexity and volatility of the auction environment. To address these challenges, in this paper, we formulate budget constrained bidding as a Markov Decision Process and propose a model-free reinforcement learning framework to resolve the optimization problem. Our analysis shows that the immediate reward from environment is misleading under a critical resource constraint. Therefore, we innovate a reward function design methodology for the reinforcement learning problems with constraints. Based on the new reward design, we employ a deep neural network to learn the appropriate reward so that the optimal policy can be learned effectively. Different from the prior model-based work, which suffers from the scalability problem, our framework is easy to be deployed in large-scale industrial applications. The experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework on large-scale real datasets.
Di Wu 0035, Xiujun Chen, Xun Yang 0004, Hao Wang 0003, Qing Tan, Xiaoxun Zhang, Jian Xu 0015, Kun Gai
CIKM2