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Tanya Korelsky

dblp:48/1583 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1998
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 67% Program verification · 33%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Operating systems › system security › operating system security › secure operating system
multilevel secure operating system
0.011984
Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System · S&P 1984
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
secure operating system
0.011984
Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System · S&P 1984
Systems and software security › security engineering
security requirements specification
0.011984
Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System · S&P 1984

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

formal verification · 0.0formal specification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1998 A New Approach To Expert System Explanations
Regina Barzilay, Daryl McCullough, Owen Rambow, Jonathan D. DeCristofaro, Tanya Korelsky, Benoit Lavoie
INLG5
1984 Formal Specification of a Multi-Level Secure Operating System
abstract
The experiences of Odyssey Research Associates (0RA) in formally specifying and verifying a multi-level secure operating system for the Military Computer Family are described. ORA'S approach to linking system requirements to system functionality is explained, and certain deficiencies in the tools currently available for formal specification and verification are discussed.
Tanya Korelsky, David Sutherland
S&P1