We study the proportional dynamics in exchange economies, where each player starts with some amount of money and a good. Every day, players bring one unit of their good and submit bids on goods they like, each good gets allocated in proportion to the bid amounts, and each seller collects the bids received. Then every player updates their bids proportionally to the contribution of each good in their utility. This dynamic models a process of learning how to bid and has been studied in a series of papers on Fisher and production markets, but not in exchange economies. Our main results are as follows: 1). For all linear utilities, the dynamic converges to market equilibrium utilities and allocations, while the bids and prices may cycle. We give a combinatorial characterization of limit cycles for prices and bids. 2). We introduce a lazy version of the dynamic, where players may save money for later, and show this converges in everything: utilities, allocations, and prices. This answers an open question about exchange markets with linear utilities, where tatonnement does not converge to market equilibria, and no natural process leading to equilibria was known for all additive utilities. We also note this dynamics represents a process where the players exchange goods throughout time (in out-of-equilibrium states), while tatonnement only explains how exchange happens in the limit.

Financial options are contracts that specify the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at a strike price by an expiration date. Standard exchanges offer options of predetermined strike values and trade options of different strikes independently, even for those written on the same underlying asset. Such independent market design can introduce arbitrage opportunities and lead to the thin market problem. The paper first proposes a mechanism that consolidates and matches orders on standard options related to the same underlying asset, while providing agents the flexibility to specify any custom strike value. The mechanism generalizes the classic double auction, runs in time polynomial to the number of orders, and poses no risk to the exchange, regardless of the value of the underlying asset at expiration. Empirical analysis on real-market options data shows that the mechanism can find new matches for options of different strike prices and reduce bid-ask spreads. Extending standard options written on a single asset, we propose and define a new derivative instrument ---combinatorial financial options that offer contract holders the right to buy or sell any linear combination of multiple underlying assets. We generalize our single-asset mechanism to match options written on different combinations of assets, and prove that optimal clearing of combinatorial financial options is coNP-hard. To facilitate market operations, we propose an algorithm that finds the exact optimal match through iterative constraint generation, and evaluate its performance on synthetically generated combinatorial options markets of different scales. As option prices reveal the market's collective belief of an underlying asset's future value, a combinatorial options market enables the expression of aggregate belief about future correlations among assets.

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg [in Proceedings of the 54th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, 2013], simple auctions for additive buyers [S. Hart and N. Nisan, in Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2012], and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand buyers [S. Chawla, J. D. Hartline, and R. D. Kleinberg, in Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2007, pp. 243--251]. Additionally, we show that viewing these three previously disjoint lines of work through the same lens leads to new developments as well. First, we provide a duality framework for Bayesian mechanism design, which naturally accommodates multiple agents and arbitrary objectives/feasibility constraints. Using this, we prove that either a posted-price mechanism or the Vickrey--Clarke--Groves auction with per-bidder entry fees achieves a constant factor of the optimal revenue achievable by a Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanism whenever buyers are unit-demand or additive, unifying previous breakthroughs of Chawla et al. [in Proceedings of the 42nd ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, 2010] and Yao [in Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, 2015, pp. 92--109], and improving both approximation ratios (from 30 to 24 and 69 to 8, respectively). Finally, we show that this view also leads to improved structural characterizations in the framework of Cai, Daskalakis, and Weinberg.

Modern machine learning workloads use large models, with complex structures, that are very expensive to execute. The devices that execute complex models are becoming increasingly heterogeneous as we see a flourishing of Domain Specific Architectures (DSAs) being offered as hardware accelerators in addition to CPUs. These trends necessitate distributing the workload across multiple devices. Recent work has shown that significant gains can be obtained with model parallelism, i.e, partitioning a neural network's computational graph onto multiple devices. In particular, this form of parallelism assumes a pipeline of devices, which is fed a stream of samples and yields high throughput for training and inference of DNNs. However, for such settings (large models and multiple heterogeneous devices), we require automated algorithms and toolchains that can partition the ML workload across devices. In this paper, we identify and isolate the structured optimization problem at the core of device placement of DNN operators, for both inference and training, especially in modern pipelined settings. We then provide algorithms that solve this problem to optimality. We demonstrate the applicability and efficiency of our approaches using several contemporary DNN computation graphs.

We consider optimal (revenue maximizing) mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the 'value' of the buyer, and the other is a 'type' that captures some auxiliary information. A prototypical example of this is the FedEx Problem, for which Fiat et al. [2016] characterize the optimal mechanism for a single agent. Another example of this is when the type encodes the buyer's budget [DW17]. The question we address is how far can such characterizations goIn particular, we consider the setting of single-minded agents. A seller has heterogenous items. A buyer has a valuation vfor a specific subset of items S, and obtains value vif and only if he gets all the items in S(and potentially some others too).

We consider a generalization of the third degree price discrimination problem studied in [4](Bergemann et al., 2015), where an intermediary between the buyer and the seller can design market segments to maximize any linear combination of consumer surplus and seller revenue. Unlike in [4], we assume that the intermediary only has partial information about the buyer's value. We consider three different models of information, with increasing order of difficulty. In the first model, we assume that the intermediary's information allows him to construct a probability distribution of the buyer's value. Next we consider the sample complexity model, where we assume that the intermediary only sees samples from this distribution. Finally, we consider a bandit online learning model, where the intermediary can only observe past purchasing decisions of the buyer, rather than her exact value. For each of these models, we present algorithms to compute optimal or near optimal market segmentation.

DNN training is extremely time-consuming, necessitating efficient multi-accelerator parallelization. Current approaches to parallelizing training primarily use intra-batch parallelization, where a single iteration of training is split over the available workers, but suffer from diminishing returns at higher worker counts. We present PipeDream, a system that adds inter-batch pipelining to intra-batch parallelism to further improve parallel training throughput, helping to better overlap computation with communication and reduce the amount of communication when possible. Unlike traditional pipelining, DNN training is bi-directional, where a forward pass through the computation graph is followed by a backward pass that uses state and intermediate data computed during the forward pass. Naïve pipelining can thus result in mismatches in state versions used in the forward and backward passes, or excessive pipeline flushes and lower hardware efficiency. To address these challenges, PipeDream versions model parameters for numerically correct gradient computations, and schedules forward and backward passes of different minibatches concurrently on different workers with minimal pipeline stalls. PipeDream also automatically partitions DNN layers among workers to balance work and minimize communication. Extensive experimentation with a range of DNN tasks, models, and hardware configurations shows that PipeDream trains models to high accuracy up to 5.3X faster than commonly used intra-batch parallelism techniques.

We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at every step. We design a single algorithm that, for every possible underlying distribution, obtains a 1−ϵ fraction of the profit obtained by an algorithm that knows the entire request sequence ahead of time. The factor ϵ approaches 0 when no single request consumes/contributes a significant fraction of the global consumption/contribution by all requests together. We show that the tradeoff we obtain here that determines how fast ϵ approaches 0, is near optimal: We give a nearly matching lower bound showing that the tradeoff cannot be improved much beyond what we obtain. Going beyond the model of a static underlying distribution, we introduce the adversarial stochastic input model, where an adversary, possibly in an adaptive manner, controls the distributions from which the requests are drawn at each step. Placing no restriction on the adversary, we design an algorithm that obtains a 1−ϵ fraction of the optimal profit obtainable w.r.t. the worst distribution in the adversarial sequence. Further, if the algorithm is given one number per distribution, namely the optimal profit possible for each of the adversary’s distribution, then we design an algorithm that achieves a 1−ϵ fraction of the weighted average of the optimal profit of each distribution the adversary picks. In the offline setting we give a fast algorithm to solve very large linear programs (LPs) with both packing and covering constraints. We give algorithms to approximately solve (within a factor of 1+ϵ) the mixed packing-covering problem with O (γ m log ( n /δ)/ϵ 2 ) oracle calls where the constraint matrix of this LP has dimension n × m , the success probability of the algorithm is 1−δ, and γ quantifies how significant a single request is when compared to the sum total of all requests. We discuss implications of our results to several special cases including online combinatorial auctions, network routing, and the adwords problem.

We consider revenue maximization in online auction/pricing problems. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online pricing problem, both when the arriving buyer bids or only responds to the posted price, we design algorithms whose regret bounds scale with the best fixed price in-hindsight, rather than the range of the values. Under the bidding model, we further show our algorithms achieve a revenue convergence rate that matches the offline sample complexity of the single-item single-buyer auction. We also show regret bounds that are scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. We further expand our results beyond pricing to multi-buyer auctions, and obtain online learning algorithms for auctions, with convergence rates matching the known sample complexity upper bound of online single-item multi-buyer auctions. These results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a different range, and the regret with respect to a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range. We obtain almost optimal multi-scale regret bounds by introducing a new Online Mirror Descent (OMD) algorithm whose mirror map is the multi-scale version of the negative entropy function. We further generalize to the bandit setting by introducing the stochastic variant of this OMD algorithm.

We introduce a new class of combinatorial markets in which agents have covering constraints over resources required and are interested in delay minimization. Our market model is applicable to several settings including scheduling and communicating over a network. This model is quite different from the traditional models, to the extent that neither do the classical equilibrium existence results seem to apply to it nor do any of the efficient algorithmic techniques developed to compute equilibria. In particular, our model does not satisfy the condition of non-satiation, which is used critically to show the existence of equilibria in traditional market models and we observe that our set of equilibrium prices could be a connected, nonconvex set. We give a proof of the existence of equilibria and a polynomial time algorithm for finding one, drawing heavily on techniques from LP duality and submodular minimization. Finally, we show that our model inherits many of the fairness properties of traditional equilibrium models as well as new models, such as CEEI.

We study a basic auction design problem with online supply. There are two unit-demand bidders and two types of items. The first item type will arrive first for sure, and the second item type may or may not arrive. The auctioneer has to decide the allocation of an item immediately after each item arrives, but is allowed to compute payments after knowing how many items arrived. For this problem we show that there is no deterministic truthful and individually rational mechanism that, even with unbounded computational resources, gets any finite approximation factor to the optimal social welfare.

The rise of cloud computing platforms has led to the study of many scheduling problems. Towards this, general algorithmic techniques that are applicable to a wide range of problems are highly valuable. We develop one such technique by a temporal generalization of the rounding algorithm of \citetShmoysT93 for the generalized assignment problem. Our algorithm gives a bi-criteria approximation algorithm for a problem we introduce, called the generalized interval scheduling problem, on unrelated machines. The problem allows for each job, a specification of a collection of intervals on each machine, with the constraint that the job must be completely processed in one of the given intervals on a single machine. The assignment costs and the processing lengths are interval dependent. Next we show how to get improved approximation factors for several classical scheduling problems, involving energy, $\ell_p$-norms of completion time, tardiness, and general delay costs by giving a reduction from these problems to the generalized interval scheduling problem with an appropriately defined assignment cost.

Enabling interactive data exploration at cloud scale requires minimizing end-to-end query execution latency, while guaranteeing fault tolerance, and query execution under resource-constraints. Typically, such a query execution involves orchestrating the execution of hundreds or thousands of related tasks on cloud scale clusters. Without any resource constraints, all query tasks can be scheduled to execute simultaneously (gang scheduling) while connected tasks stream data between them. When the data size referenced by a query increases, gang scheduling may be resource-wasteful or un-satisfiable with a limited, per-query resource budget. This paper introduces B ubble E xecution , a new query processing framework for interactive workloads at cloud scale, that balances cost-based query optimization, fault tolerance, optimal resource management, and execution orchestration. Bubble execution involves dividing a query execution graph into a collection of query sub-graphs (bubbles), and scheduling them within a per-query resource budget. The query operators (tasks) inside a bubble stream data between them while fault tolerance is handled by persisting temporary results at bubble boundaries. Our implementation enhances our JetScope service, for interactive workloads, deployed in production clusters at Microsoft. Experiments with TPC-H queries show that bubble execution can reduce resource usage significantly in the presence of failures while maintaining performance competitive with gang execution.

We consider the problem of online scheduling of jobs on unrelated machines with dynamic speed scaling to minimize the sum of energy and weighted flow-time. We give an algorithm with an almost optimal competitive ratio for arbitrary power functions. (No earlier results handled arbitrary power functions for unrelated machines.) For power functions of the form f ( s ) = s α for some constant α > 1, we get a competitive ratio of O (α / log α), improving upon a previous competitive ratio of O (α 2 ) by Anand et al. (2012), along with a matching lower bound of Ω(α / log α). Further, in the resource augmentation model, with a 1+ ϵ speed up, we give a 2(1/ϵ + 1) competitive algorithm, with essentially the same techniques, improving the bound of 1 + O (1/ϵ 2 ) by Gupta et al. (2010) and matching the bound of Anand et al. (2012) for the special case of fixed speed unrelated machines. Unlike the previous results most of which used an amortized local competitiveness argument or dual fitting methods, we use a primal-dual method, which is useful not only to analyze the algorithms but also to design the algorithm itself.

No abstract available.

We consider revenue maximization in online auctions and pricing. A seller sells an identical item in each period to a new buyer, or a new set of buyers. For the online posted pricing problem, we show regret bounds that scale with the best fixed price, rather than the range of the values. We also show regret bounds that are almost scale free, and match the offline sample complexity, when comparing to a benchmark that requires a lower bound on the market share. These results are obtained by generalizing the classical learning from experts and multi-armed bandit problems to their multi-scale versions. In this version, the reward of each action is in a different range, and the regret w.r.t. a given action scales with its own range, rather than the maximum range.

We consider a scheduling problem where a cloud service provider has multiple units of a resource available over time. Selfish clients submit jobs, each with an arrival time, deadline, length, and value. The service provider's goal is to implement a truthful online mechanism for scheduling jobs so as to maximize the social welfare of the schedule. Recent work shows that under a stochastic assumption on job arrivals, there is a single-parameter family of mechanisms that achieves near-optimal social welfare. We show that given any such family of near-optimal online mechanisms, there exists an online mechanism that in the worst case performs nearly as well as the best of the given mechanisms. Our mechanism is truthful whenever the mechanisms in the given family are truthful and prompt, and achieves optimal (within constant factors) regret.

We study a pricing problem that is motivated by the following examples. A cloud computing platform such as Amazon EC2 sells virtual machines to clients, each of who needs a different number of virtual machine hours. Similarly, cloud storage providers such as Dropbox have customers that require different amounts of storage. Software companies such as Microsoft sell software subscriptions that can have different levels of service. The levels could be the number of different documents you are allowed to create, or the number of hours you are allowed to use the software. Companies like Google and Microsoft sell API calls to artificial intelligence software such as face recognition, to other software developers. Video and mobile games are increasingly designed in such a way that one can pay for better access to certain features. Spotify and iTunes sell music subscription, and different people listen to different number of songs in a month. Cellphone service providers like AT&T and Verizon offer cellular phone call minutes and data. People have widely varying amounts of data consumption.

We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item facing a single buyer with a private budget. The (value, budget) pair is drawn from an arbitrary and possibly correlated distribution. We characterize the optimal mechanism in such cases, and quantify the amount of price discrimination that might be present. For example, there could be up to 3·2k-1 -1 distinct non-trivial menu options in the optimal mechanism for such a buyer with k distinct possible budgets (compared to k if the marginal distribution of values conditioned on each budget has decreasing marginal revenue [CG00], or 2 if there is an arbitrary distribution and one possible budget [CMM11]).

We consider time-of-use pricing as a technique for matching supply and demand of temporal resources with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Relevant examples include energy, computing resources on a cloud computing platform, and charging stations for electric vehicles, among many others. A client/job in this setting has a window of time during which he needs service, and a particular value for obtaining it. We assume a stochastic model for demand, where each job materializes with some probability via an independent Bernoulli trial. Given a per-time-unit pricing of resources, any realized job will first try to get served by the cheapest available resource in its window and, failing that, will try to find service at the next cheapest available resource, and so on. Thus, the natural stochastic fluctuations in demand have the potential to lead to cascading overload events. Our main result shows that setting prices so as to optimally handle the expected demand works well: with high probability, when the actual demand is instantiated, the system is stable and the expected value of the jobs served is very close to that of the optimal offline algorithm.

We consider a contextual version of multi-armed bandit problem with global knapsack constraints. In each round, the outcome of pulling an arm is a scalar reward and a resource consumption vector, both dependent on the context, and the global knapsack constraints require the total consumption for each resource to be below some pre-fixed budget. The learning agent competes with an arbitrary set of context-dependent policies. This problem was introduced by Badanidiyuru et al., who gave a computationally inefficient algorithm with near-optimal regret bounds for it. We give a \emphcomputationally efficient algorithm for this problem with slightly better regret bounds, by generalizing the approach of Dudik et al. for the non-constrained version of the problem. The computational time of our algorithm scales \emphlogarithmically in the size of the policy space. This answers the main open question of Badanidiyuru et al. We also extend our results to a variant where there are no knapsack constraints but the objective is an arbitrary Lipschitz concave function of the sum of outcome vectors.

We consider the linear contextual bandit problem with resource consumption, in addition to reward generation. In each round, the outcome of pulling an arm is a reward as well as a vector of resource consumptions. The expected values of these outcomes depend linearly on the context of that arm. The budget/capacity constraints require that the sum of these vectors doesn't exceed the budget in each dimension. The objective is once again to maximize the total reward. This problem turns out to be a common generalization of classic linear contextual bandits (linContextual), bandits with knapsacks (BwK), and the online stochastic packing problem (OSPP). We present algorithms with near-optimal regret bounds for this problem. Our bounds compare favorably to results on the unstructured version of the problem, where the relation between the contexts and the outcomes could be arbitrary, but the algorithm only competes against a fixed set of policies accessible through an optimization oracle. We combine techniques from the work on linContextual, BwK and OSPP in a nontrivial manner while also tackling new difficulties that are not present in any of these special cases.

We explore a novel, free-space optics based approach for building data center interconnects. It uses a digital micromirror device (DMD) and mirror assembly combination as a transmitter and a photodetector on top of the rack as a receiver (Figure 1). Our approach enables all pairs of racks to establish direct links, and we can reconfigure such links (i.e., connect different rack pairs) within 12 us. To carry traffic from a source to a destination rack, transmitters and receivers in our interconnect can be dynamically linked in millions of ways. We develop topology construction and routing methods to exploit this flexibility, including a flow scheduling algorithm that is a constant factor approximation to the offline optimal solution. Experiments with a small prototype point to the feasibility of our approach. Simulations using realistic data center workloads show that, compared to the conventional folded-Clos interconnect, our approach can improve mean flow completion time by 30-95% and reduce cost by 25-40%.

We consider a pricing problem where a buyer is interested in purchasing/using a good, such as an app or music or software, repeatedly over time. The consumer discovers his value for the good only as he uses it, and the value evolves with each use. Optimizing for the seller's revenue in such dynamic settings is a complex problem and requires assumptions about how the buyer behaves before learning his future value(s), and in particular, how he reacts to risk. We explore the performance of a class of pricing mechanisms that are extremely simple for both the buyer and the seller to use: the buyer reacts to prices myopically without worrying about how his value evolves in the future; the seller needs to optimize for revenue over a space of only two parameters, and can do so without knowing the buyer's risk profile or fine details of the value evolution process. We present simple-versus-optimal type results, namely that under certain assumptions, simple pricing mechanisms of the above form are approximately optimal regardless of the buyer's risk profile. Our results assume that the buyer's value per usage evolves as a martingale. For our main result, we consider pricing mechanisms in which the seller offers the product for free for a certain number of uses, and then charges an appropriate fixed price per usage. We assume that the buyer responds by buying the product for as long as his value exceeds the fixed price. Importantly, the buyer does not need to know anything about how his future value will evolve, only how much he wants to use the product right now. Regardless of the buyers' initial value, our pricing captures as revenue a constant fraction of the total value that the buyers accumulate in expectation over time.

We provide a unified view of many recent developments in Bayesian mechanism design, including the black-box reductions of Cai et. al., simple auctions for additive buyers, and posted-price mechanisms for unit-demand buyers. Additionally, we show that viewing these three previously disjoint lines of work through the same lens leads to new developments as well. First, we provide a duality framework for Bayesian mechanism design, which naturally accommodates multiple agents and arbitrary objectives/feasibility constraints. Using this, we prove that either a posted-price mechanism or the VCG auction with per-bidder entry fees achieves a constant-factor of the optimal Bayesian IC revenue whenever buyers are unit-demand or additive, unifying previous breakthroughs of Chawla et. al. and Yao, and improving both approximation ratios (from 33.75 to 24 and 69 to 8). Finally, we show that this view also leads to improved structural characterizations in the Cai et. al. framework.

Traditionally, the Bayesian optimal auction design problem has been considered either when the bidder values are i.i.d, or when each bidder is individually identifiable via her value distribution. The latter is a reasonable approach when the bidders can be classified into a few categories, but there are many instances where the classification of bidders is a continuum. For example, the classification of the bidders may be based on their annual income, their propensity to buy an item based on past behavior, or in the case of ad auctions, the click through rate of their ads. We introduce an alternate model that captures this aspect, where bidders are a priori identical, but can be distinguished based (only) on some side information the auctioneer obtains at the time of the auction. We extend the sample complexity approach of Dhangwatnotai et al. and Cole and Roughgarden to this model and obtain almost matching upper and lower bounds. As an aside, we obtain a revenue monotonicity lemma which may be of independent interest. We also show how to use Empirical Risk Minimization techniques to improve the sample complexity bound of Cole and Roughgarden for the non-identical but independent value distribution case.

In this paper we propose a general family of position auctions used in paid search, which we call multi-score position auctions. These auctions contain the GSP auction and the GSP auction with squashing as special cases. We show experimentally that these auctions contain special cases that perform better than the GSP auction with squashing, in terms of revenue, and the number of clicks on ads. In particular, we study in detail the special case that squashes the first slot alone and show that this beats pure squashing (which squashes all slots uniformly). We study the equilibria that arise in this special case to examine both the first order and the second order effect of moving from the squashing-all-slots auction to the squash-only-the-top-slot auction. For studying the second order effect, we simulate auctions using the value-relevance correlated distribution suggested in Lahaie and Pennock [2007]. Since this distribution is derived from a study of value and relevance distributions in Yahoo! we believe the insights derived from this simulation to be valuable. For measuring the first order effect, in addition to the said simulation, we also conduct experiments using auction data from Bing over several weeks that includes a random sample of all auctions.

We consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing seller with $m$ items for sale to $n$ additive bidders with hard budget constraints, assuming that the seller has some prior distribution over bidder values and budgets. The prior may be correlated across items and budgets of the same bidder, but is assumed independent across bidders. We target mechanisms that are Bayesian Incentive Compatible, but that are ex-post Individually Rational and ex-post budget respecting. Virtually no such mechanisms are known that satisfy all these conditions and guarantee any revenue approximation, even with just a single item. We provide a computationally efficient mechanism that is a 3-approximation with respect to all BIC, ex-post IR, and ex-post budget respecting mechanisms. Note that the problem is NP-hard to approximate better than a factor of 16/15, even in the case where the prior is a point mass [Chakrabarty and Goel 2010]. We further characterize the optimal mechanism in this setting, showing that it can be interpreted as a distribution over virtual welfare maximizers. We prove our results by making use of a black-box reduction from mechanism to algorithm design developed by [Cai et al. 2013]. Our main technical contribution is a computationally efficient 3-approximation algorithm for the algorithmic problem that results by an application of their framework to this problem. The algorithmic problem has a mixed-sign objective and is NP-hard to optimize exactly, so it is surprising that a computationally efficient approximation is possible at all. In the case of a single item (m=1), the algorithmic problem can be solved exactly via exhaustive search, leading to a computationally efficient exact algorithm and a stronger characterization of the optimal mechanism as a distribution over virtual value maximizers.

We introduce single-bid auctions as a new format for combinatorial auctions. In single-bid auctions, each bidder submits a single real-valued bid for the right to buy items at a fixed price. Contrary to other simple auction formats, such as simultaneous or sequential single-item auctions, bidders can implement no-regret learning strategies for single-bid auctions in polynomial time. Price of anarchy bounds for correlated equilibria concepts in single-bid auctions therefore have more bite than their counterparts for auctions and equilibria for which learning is not known to be computationally tractable (or worse, known to be computationally intractable [Cai and Papadimitriou 2014; Dobzinski et al. 2015] this end, we show that for any subadditive valuations the social welfare at equilibrium is an O(log m)-approximation to the optimal social welfare, where $m$ is the number of items. We also provide tighter approximation results for several subclasses. Our welfare guarantees hold for Nash equilibria and no-regret learning outcomes in both Bayesian and complete information settings via the smooth-mechanism framework. Of independent interest, our techniques show that in a combinatorial auction setting, efficiency guarantees of a mechanism via smoothness for a very restricted class of cardinality valuations extend, with a small degradation, to subadditive valuations, the largest complement-free class of valuations.

We introduce the online stochastic Convex Programming (CP) problem, a very general version of stochastic online problems which allows arbitrary concave objectives and convex feasibility constraints. Many well-studied problems like online stochastic packing and covering, online stochastic matching with concave returns, etc. form a special case of online stochastic CP. We present fast algorithms for these problems, which achieve near-optimal regret guarantees for both the i.i.d. and the random permutation models of stochastic inputs. When applied to the special case online packing, our ideas yield a simpler and faster primal-dual algorithm for this well studied problem, which achieves the optimal competitive ratio. Our techniques make explicit the connection of primal-dual paradigm and online learning to online stochastic CP.

A special case of Myerson's classic result describes the revenue-optimal equilibrium when a seller offers a single item to a buyer. We study a natural repeated sales extension of this model: a seller offers to sell a single fresh copy of an item to the same buyer every day via a posted price. The buyer's value for the item is unknown to the seller but is drawn initially from a publicly known distribution F and remains the same throughout. One key aspect of this game is revelation of the buyer's type through his actions: while the seller might try to learn this value to extract more revenue, the buyer is motivated to hide it to induce lower prices. If the seller is able to commit to future prices, then it is known that the best he can do is extract the Myerson optimal revenue each day. In a more realistic scenario, the seller is unable to commit and must play a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. It is known that not committing to future prices does not help the seller. Thus extracting Myerson optimal revenue each day is a natural upper bound and revenue benchmark in a setting without commitment. We study this setting without commitment and find several suprises. First, if the horizon is fixed, previous work showed that an equilibrium always exists, and all equilibria yield a very low revenue, often times only a constant amount of revenue. This is unintuitive and a far cry from the linearly growing benchmark of obtaining Myerson optimal revenue each day. Our first result shows that this is because the buyer strategies in these equilibria are necessarily unnatural. We restrict to a natural class of buyer strategies, which we call threshold strategies, and show that pure strategy threshold equilibria rarely exist. This offers an explanation for the non-prevalence of bizarre outcomes predicted by previous results. Second, if the seller can commit not to raise prices upon purchase, while still retaining the possibility of lowering prices in future, we recover the natural threshold equilibria by showing that they exist for a large class of distributions including the power law family of distributions. As an example, if the distribution F is uniform in [0,1], the seller can extract revenue of order in n rounds as opposed to the constant revenue obtainable when he is unable to make any commitments. Finally, we consider the infinite horizon game with partial commitment, where both the seller and the buyer discount the future utility by a factor of 1 – δ ∊ [0,1). When the value distribution is uniform in [0, 1], there exists a threshold equilibrium with expected revenue at least of the Myerson optimal revenue benchmark. Under some mild assumptions, this equilibrium is also unique.

In recent years, there has been a growing interest in speed scaling algorithms, where a set of jobs need to be scheduled on a machine with variable speed so as to optimize the flow-times of the jobs and the energy consumed by the machine. A series of results have culminated in constant-competitive algorithms for this problem in the clairvoyant model, i.e., when job parameters are revealed on releasing a job (Bansal, Pruhs, and Stein, SODA 2007; Bansal, Chan, and Pruhs, SODA 2009). Our main contribution in this paper is the first constant-competitive speed scaling algorithm in the non-clairvoyant model, which is typically used in the scheduling literature to model practical settings where job volume is revealed only after the job has been completely processed. Unlike in the clairvoyant model, the speed scaling problem in the non-clairvoyant model is non-trivial even for a single job. Our non-clairvoyant algorithm is defined by using the existing clairvoyant algorithm in a novel inductive way, which then leads to an inductive analytical tool that may be of independent interest for other online optimization problems. We also give additional algorithmic results and lower bounds for speed scaling on multiple identical parallel machines.

In this paper, we consider a very general model for exploration-exploitation tradeoff which allows arbitrary concave rewards and convex constraints on the decisions across time, in addition to the customary limitation on the time horizon. This model subsumes the classic multi-armed bandit (MAB) model, and the Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK) model of Badanidiyuru et al.[2013]. We also consider an extension of this model to allow linear contexts, similar to the linear contextual extension of the MAB model. We demonstrate that a natural and simple extension of the UCB family of algorithms for MAB provides a polynomial time algorithm that has near-optimal regret guarantees for this substantially more general model, and matches the bounds provided by Badanidiyuru et al.[2013] for the special case of BwK, which is quite surprising. We also provide computationally more efficient algorithms by establishing interesting connections between this problem and other well studied problems/algorithms such as the Blackwell approachability problem, online convex optimization, and the Frank-Wolfe technique for convex optimization.

We observe that Lambert et al.'s [2008] family of weighted score wagering mechanisms admit arbitrage: participants can extract a guaranteed positive payoff by betting on any prediction within a certain range. In essence, participants leave free money on the table when they ``agree to disagree,'' and as a result, rewards don't necessarily go to the most informed and accurate participants. This observation suggests that when participants have immutable beliefs, it may be possible to design alternative mechanisms in which the center can make a profit by removing this arbitrage opportunity without sacrificing incentive properties such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and sybilproofness. We introduce a new family of wagering mechanisms called no-arbitrage wagering mechanisms that retain many of the positive properties of weighted score wagering mechanisms, but with the arbitrage opportunity removed. We show several structural results about the class of mechanisms that satisfy no-arbitrage in conjunction with other properties, and provide examples of no-arbitrage wagering mechanisms with interesting properties.

We consider the problem of online scheduling of jobs on unrelated machines with dynamic speed scaling to minimize the sum of energy and weighted flow time. We give an algorithm with an almost optimal competitive ratio for arbitrary power functions. (No earlier results handled arbitrary power functions for minimizing flow time plus energy with unrelated machines.) For power functions of the form f(s) = s^alpha for some constant alpha > 1, we get a competitive ratio of O(alpha/log(alpha)), improving upon a previous competitive ratio of O(alpha^2) by Anand et al., along with a matching lower bound of . Further, in the resource augmentation model, with a 1+epsilon speed up, we give a O(1/epsilon) competitive algorithm, with essentially the same techniques, improving the bound of O(1/epsilon^2) by Gupta et al. and matching the bound of Anand et al. [3] for the special case of fixed speed unrelated machines. Unlike the previous results most of which used an amortized local competitiveness argument or dual fitting methods, we use a primal-dual method, which is useful not only to analyze the algorithms but also to design the algorithm itself. Copyright © 2014 by the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics.

In Internet ad auctions, search engines often throttle budget constrained advertisers so as to spread their spends across the specified time period. Such policies are known as budget smoothing policies. In this paper, we perform a principled, game-theoretic study of what the outcome of an ideal budget smoothing algorithm should be. In particular, we propose the notion of regret-free budget smoothing policies whose outcomes throttle each advertiser optimally, given the participation of the other advertisers. We show that regret-free budget smoothing policies always exist, and in the case of single slot auctions we can give a polynomial time smoothing algorithm. Inspired by the existence proof, we design a heuristic for budget smoothing which performs considerably better than existing benchmark heuristics.

In the context of online ad serving, display ads may appear on different types of web-pages, where each page includes several ad slots and therefore multiple ads can be shown on each page. The set of ads that can be assigned to ad slots of the same page needs to satisfy various pre-specified constraints including exclusion constraints, diversity constraints, and the like. Upon arrival of a user, the ad serving system needs to allocate a set of ads to the current web-page respecting these per-page allocation constraints. Previous slot-based settings ignore the important concept of a page, and may lead to highly suboptimal results in general. In this paper, motivated by these applications in display advertising and inspired by the submodular welfare maximization problem with online bidders, we study a general class of page-based ad allocation problems, present the first (tight) constant-factor approximation algorithms for these problems, and confirm the performance of our algorithms experimentally on real-world data sets.

We consider prior-free auctions for revenue and welfare maximization when agents have a common budget. The abstract environments we consider are ones where there is a downward-closed and symmetric feasibility constraint on the probabilities of service of the agents. These environments include position auctions where slots with decreasing click-through rates are auctioned to advertisers. We generalize and characterize the envy-free benchmark from Hartline and Yan [2011] to settings with budgets and characterize the optimal envy-free outcomes for both welfare and revenue. We give prior-free mechanisms that approximate these benchmarks. A building block in our mechanism is a clinching auction for position auction environments. This auction is a generalization of the multi-unit clinching auction of Dobzinski et al. [2008] and a special case of the polyhedral clinching auction of Goel et al. [2012]. For welfare maximization, we show that this clinching auction is a good approximation to the envy-free optimal welfare for position auction environments. For profit maximization, we generalize the random sampling profit extraction auction from Fiat et al. [2002] for digital goods to give a 10.0-approximation to the envy-free optimal revenue in symmetric, downward-closed environments. Even without budgets this revenue maximization question is of interest and we obtain an improved approximation bound of 7.5 (from 30.4 by Ha and Hartline [2012]).

We give a simple proof that the ranking algorithm of Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [KVV90] is 1-1/e competitive for the online bipartite matching problem. The proof is via a randomized primal-dual argument. Primal-dual algorithms have been successfully used for many online algorithm problems, but the dual constraints are always satisfied deterministically. This is the first instance of a non-trivial randomized primal-dual algorithm in which the dual constraints only hold in expectation. The approach also generalizes easily to the vertex-weighted version considered by Agarwal et al. [AGKM11]. Further we show that the proof is very similar to the deterministic primal-dual argument for the online budgeted allocation problem with small bids (also called the AdWords problem) of Mehta et al. [MSVV05].

In this paper, we investigate the problem of online task scheduling of jobs such as MapReduce jobs, Monte Carlo simulations and generating search index from web documents, on cloud computing infrastructures. We consider the virtualized cloud computing setup comprising machines that host multiple identical virtual machines (VMs) under pay-as-you-go charging, and that booting a VM requires a constant setup time. The cost of job computation depends on the number of VMs activated, and the VMs can be activated and shutdown on demand. We propose a new bi-objective algorithm to minimize the maximum task delay, and the total cost of the computation. We study both the clairvoyant case, where the duration of each task is known upon its arrival, and the more realistic non-clairvoyant case.

Tatonnement is a simple and natural rule for updating prices in Exchange (Arrow-Debreu) markets. In this paper we define a class of markets for which tatonnement is equivalent to gradient descent. This is the class of markets for which there is a convex potential function whose gradient is always equal to the negative of the excess demand and we call it Convex Potential Function (CPF) markets. We show the following results. CPF markets contain the class of Eisenberg Gale (EG) markets, defined previously by Jain and Vazirani. The subclass of CPF markets for which the demand is a differentiable function contains exactly those markets whose demand function has a symmetric negative semi-definite Jacobian. We define a family of continuous versions of tatonnement based on gradient descent using a Bregman divergence. As we show, all processes in this family converge to an equilibrium for any CPF market. This is analogous to the classic result for markets satisfying the Weak Gross Substitutes property. A discrete version of tatonnement converges toward the equilibrium for the following markets of complementary goods; its convergence rate for these settings is analyzed using a common potential function. Fisher markets in which all buyers have Leontief utilities. The tatonnement process reduces the distance to the equilibrium, as measured by the potential function, to an ε fraction of its initial value in O(1/ε) rounds of price updates. Fisher markets in which all buyers have complementary CES utilities. Here, the distance to the equilibrium is reduced to an ε fraction of its initial value in O(log(1/ε)) rounds of price updates.

In this paper we consider the adwords problem in the unknown distribution model. We consider the case where the budget to bid ratio k is at least 2, and give improved competitive ratios. Earlier results had competitive ratios better than 1-1/e only for "large enough" k, while our competitive ratio increases continuously with k. For k=2 the competitive ratio we get is 0.729 and it is 0.9 for k=16. We also improve the asymptotic competitive ratio for large k from 1 - O(√log n/k) to 1 - O(√1/k), thus removing any dependence on n, the number of advertisers. This ratio is optimal, even with known distributions. That is, even if an algorithm is tailored to the distribution, it cannot get a competitive ratio of 1 - o(√1/k), whereas our algorithm does not depend on the distribution. The algorithm is rather simple, it computes a score for every advertiser based on his original budget, the remaining budget and the remaining number of steps in the algorithm and assigns a query to the advertiser with the highest bid plus his score. The analysis is based on a "hybrid argument" that considers algorithms that are part actual, part hypothetical, to prove that our (actual) algorithm is better than a completely hypothetical algorithm whose performance is easy to analyze.

We consider a significant generalization of the Adwords problem by allowing arbitrary concave returns, and we characterize the optimal competitive ratio achievable. The problem considers a sequence of items arriving online that have to be allocated to agents, with different agents bidding different amounts. The objective function is the sum, over each agent i, of a monotonically non-decreasing concave function Mi : R+ -> R+ of the total amount allocated to i. All variants of online matching problems (including the Adwords problem) studied in the literature consider the special case of budgeted linear functions, that is, functions of the form Mi(ui) = min {ui,Bi} for some constant Bi. The distinguishing feature of this paper is in allowing arbitrary concave returns. The main result of this paper is that for each concave function M, there exists a constant F(M) ≤ 1 such that: there exists an algorithm with competitive ratio of miniF(Mi), independent of the sequence of items. No algorithm has a competitive ratio larger than F(M) over all instances with Mi= M for all i.

We describe a real-time bidding algorithm for performance-based display ad allocation. A central issue in performance display advertising is matching campaigns to ad impressions, which can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem that maximizes revenue subject to constraints such as budget limits and inventory availability. The current practice is to solve the optimization problem offline at a tractable level of impression granularity (e.g., the page level), and to serve ads online based on the precomputed static delivery scheme. Although this offline approach takes a global view to achieve optimality, it fails to scale to ad allocation at the individual impression level. Therefore, we propose a real-time bidding algorithm that enables fine-grained impression valuation (e.g., targeting users with real-time conversion data), and adjusts value-based bids according to real-time constraint snapshots (e.g., budget consumption levels). Theoretically, we show that under a linear programming (LP) primal-dual formulation, the simple real-time bidding algorithm is indeed an online solver to the original primal problem by taking the optimal solution to the dual problem as input. In other words, the online algorithm guarantees the offline optimality given the same level of knowledge an offline optimization would have. Empirically, we develop and experiment with two real-time bid adjustment approaches to adapting to the non-stationary nature of the marketplace: one adjusts bids against real-time constraint satisfaction levels using control-theoretic methods, and the other adjusts bids also based on the statistically modeled historical bidding landscape. Finally, we show experimental results with real-world ad delivery data that support our theoretical conclusions.

Designing distributed algorithms that converge quickly to an equilibrium is one of the foremost research goals in algorithmic game theory, and convex programs have played a crucial role in the design of algorithms for Fisher markets. In this paper we shed new light on both aspects for Fisher markets with linear and spending constraint utilities. We show fast convergence of the Proportional Response dynamics recently introduced by Wu and Zhang. The convergence is obtained from a new perspective: we show that the Proportional Response dynamics is equivalent to a gradient descent algorithm (with respect to a Bregman divergence instead of euclidean distance) on a convex program that captures the equilibria for linear utilities. We further show that the convex program program easily extends to the case of spending constraint utilities, thus resolving an open question raised by Vazirani. This also gives a way to extend the Proportional Response dynamics to spending constraint utilties. We also prove a technical result that is interesting in its own right: that the gradient descent algorithm based on a Bregman divergence converges with rate O(1/t) under a condition that is weaker than having Lipschitz continuous gradient (which is the usual assumption in the optimization literature for obtaining the same rate).

We present algorithms for a class of resource allocation problems both in the online setting with stochastic input and in the offline setting. This class of problems contains many interesting special cases such as the Adwords problem. In the online setting we introduce a new distributional model called the adversarial stochastic input model, which is a generalization of the i.i.d model with unknown distributions, where the distributions can change over time. In this model we give a 1-O(ε) approximation algorithm for the resource allocation problem, with almost the weakest possible assumption: the ratio of the maximum amount of resource consumed by any single request to the total capacity of the resource, and the ratio of the profit contributed by any single request to the optimal profit is at most (ε2/log(1/ε)2)/(log n + log (1/ε)) where n is the number of resources available. There are instances where this ratio is #949;2/log n such that no randomized algorithm can have a competitive ratio of 1-o(ε) even in the i.i.d model. The upper bound on ratio that we require improves on the previous upper-bound for the i.i.d case by a factor of n.

We derive efficient algorithms for both detecting and representing matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs; such graphs have so many nodes on one side that it is infeasible to represent them in memory or to identify matchings using standard approaches. Detecting and representing matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs is important for allocating and delivering guaranteed-placement display ads, where the corresponding bipartite graph of interest has nodes representing advertisers on one side and nodes representing web-page impressions on the other; real-world instances of such graphs can have billions of impression nodes. We provide theoretical guarantees for our algorithms, and in a real-world advertising application, we demonstrate the feasibility of our detection algorithms.

We study bargaining networks, discussed in a recent paper of Kleinberg and Tardos [KT08], from the perspective of cooperative game theory. In particular we examine three solution concepts, the nucleolus, the core center and the core median. All solution concepts define unique solutions, so they provide testable predictions. We define a new monotonicity property that is a natural axiom of any bargaining game solution, and we prove that all three of them satisfy this monotonicity property. This is actually in contrast to the conventional wisdom for general cooperative games that monotonicity and the core condition (which is a basic property that all three of them satisfy) are incompatible with each other. Our proofs are based on a primal-dual argument (for the nucleolus) and on the FKG inequality (for the core center and the core median). We further observe some qualitative differences between the solution concepts. In particular, there are cases where a strict version of our monotonicity property is a natural axiom, but only the core center and the core median satisfy it. On the other hand, the nucleolus is easy to compute, whereas computing the core center or the core median is #P-hard (yet it can be approximated in polynomial time).

Inspired by the convex program of Eisenberg and Gale which captures Fisher markets with linear utilities, Jain and Vazirani [K. Jain and V. V. Vazirani, Games and Economic Behavior, 70 (2010), pp. 84–106] introduced the class of Eisenberg–Gale (EG) markets. We study the structure of EG(2) markets, the class of EG markets with two agents. We prove that all markets in this class are rational, that is, they have rational equilibrium, and they admit strongly polynomial time algorithms whenever the polytope containing the set of feasible utilities of the two agents can be described via a combinatorial linear program (LP). This helps positively resolve the status of two markets left as open problems by Jain and Vazirani: the capacity allocation market in a directed graph with two source-sink pairs and the network coding market in a directed network with two sources. Our algorithms for solving the corresponding nonlinear convex programs are fundamentally different from those obtained by Jain and Vazirani; whereas they use the primal-dual schema, our main tool is binary search powered by the strong LP-duality theorem.

Bargaining games on exchange networks have been studied by both economists and sociologists. A Balanced Outcome for such a game is an equilibrium concept that combines notions of stability and fairness. In a recent paper, Kleinberg and Tardos introduced balanced outcomes to the computer science community and provided a polynomial-time algorithm to compute the set of such outcomes. Their work left open a pertinent question: are there natural, local dynamics that converge quickly to a balanced outcome? In this paper, we provide a partial answer to this question by showing that simple edge-balancing dynamics converge to a balanced outcome whenever one exists.

We study auctions for selling a limited supply of a single commodity in the case where the supply is known in advance and the case it is unknown and must be instead allocated in an online fashion. The latter variant was proposed by Mahdian and Saberi [12] as a model of an important phenomena in auctions for selling Internet advertising: advertising impressions must be allocated as they arrive and the total quantity available is unknown in advance. We describe the Bayesian optimal mechanism for these variants and extend the random sampling auction of Goldberg et al. [8] to address the prior-free case.

We analyze the problem of designing a truthful pay-per-click auction where the click-through-rates (CTR) of the bidders are unknown to the auction. Such an auction faces the classic explore/exploit dilemma: while gathering information about the click through rates of advertisers, the mechanism may loose revenue; however, this gleaned information may prove valuable in the future for a more profitable allocation. In this sense, such mechanisms are prime candidates to be designed using multi-armed bandit techniques. However, a naive application of multi-armed bandit algorithms would not take into account the strategic considerations of the players -- players might manipulate their bids (which determine the auction's revenue) in a way as to maximize their own utility. Hence, we consider the natural restriction that the auction be truthful.

We consider the problem of a search engine trying to assign a sequence of search keywords to a set of competing bidders, each with a daily spending limit. The goal is to maximize the revenue generated by these keyword sales, bearing in mind that, as some bidders may eventually exceed their budget, not all keywords should be sold to the highest bidder. We assume that the sequence of keywords (or equivalently, of bids) is revealed on-line. Our concern will be the competitive ratio for this problem versus the off-line optimum.

We exhibit a new computational-based definition of awareness, informally that our level of unawareness of an object is the amount of time needed to generate that object within a certain environment. We give several examples to show this notion matches our intuition in scenarios where one organizes, accesses and transfers information. We also give a formal process-independent definition of awareness based on Levin's universal enumeration.

We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he/she buys) and an initial bundle. At an ldquoequilibriumrdquo set of prices for goods, if each individual buyer separately ex-changes the initial bundle for an optimal bundle at the set prices, the market clears, i.e., all goods are exactly consumed. Classical theorems guarantee the existence of equilibria, but computing them has been the subject of much recent research. In the related area of Multi-Agent Games,much attention has been paid to the complexity as well as algorithms. While most general problems are hard, polynomial time algorithms have been developed for restricted classes of games, when one assumes the number of strategies is constant.For the Market Equilibrium problem, several important special cases of utility functions have been tackled. Here we begin a program for this problem similar to that for multi-agent games, where general utilities are considered. We begin by showing that if the utilities are separable piece-wise linear concave (PLC) functions, and the number of goods(or alternatively the number of buyers) is constant, then we can compute an exact equilibrium in polynomial time.Our technique for the constant number of goods is to de-compose the space of price vectors into cells using certain hyperplanes, so that in each cell, each buyerpsilas threshold marginal utility is known. Still, one needs to solve a linear optimization problem in each cell. We then show the main result - that for general (non-separable) PLC utilities, an exact equilibrium can be found in polynomial time provided the number of goods is constant. The starting point of the algorithm is a ldquocell-decompositionrdquo of the space of price vectors using polynomial surfaces (instead of hyperplanes).We use results from computational algebraic geometry to bound the number of such cells. For solving the problem inside each cell, we introduce and use a novel LP-duality based method. We note that if the number of buyers and agents both can vary, the problem is PPAD hard even for the very special case of PLC utilities - namely Leontief utilities.

We give the first polynomial time algorithm for exactly computing an equilibrium for the linear utilities case of the market model defined by Fisher. Our algorithm uses the primal--dual paradigm in the enhanced setting of KKT conditions and convex programs. We pinpoint the added difficulty raised by this setting and the manner in which our algorithm circumvents it.

A vertex k-labeling of graph G is distinguishing if the only automorphism that preserves the labels of G is the identity map. The distinguishing number of G, $D(G)$, is the smallest integer k for which G has a distinguishing k-labeling. In this paper, we apply the principle of inclusion-exclusion and develop recursive formulas to count the number of inequivalent distinguishing k-labelings of a graph. Along the way, we prove that the distinguishing number of a planar graph can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the graph.

Arora, Rao and Vazirani [2] showed that the standard semi-definite programming (SDP) relaxation of the Sparsest Cut problem with the triangle inequality constraints has an integrality gap of O(√log n). They conjectured that the gap is bounded from above by a constant. In this paper, we disprove this conjecture (referred to as the ARV-Conjecture) by constructing an Ω(log log n) integrality gap instance. Khot and Vishnoi [16] had earlier disproved the non-uniform version of the ARV-Conjecture.A simple "stretching" of the integrality gap instance for the Sparsest Cut problem serves as an Ω(log log n) integrality gap instance for the SDP relaxation of the Minimum Linear Arrangement problem. This SDP relaxation was considered in [6, 11], where it was shown that its integrality gap is bounded from above by O(√log n log log n).

The traditional model of market equilibrium supports impressive existence results, including the celebrated Arrow-Debreu Theorem. However, in this model, polynomial time algorithms for computing (or approximating) equilibria are known only for linear utility functions. We present a new, and natural, model of market equilibrium that not only admits existence and uniqueness results paralleling those for the traditional model but is also amenable to efficient algorithms.

Strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, lying in the core, that recover 1/α fraction of the cost, are presented for the set cover and facility location games; α = O(log n) for the former and 1.861 for the latter. Our mechanisms utilize approximation algorithms for these problems based on the method of dual-fitting.

No abstract available.

Although the study of market equilibria has occupied center stage within mathematical economics for over a century, polynomial time algorithms for such questions have so far evaded researchers. We provide the first such algorithm for the linear version of a problem defined by Irving Fisher in 1891. Our algorithm is modeled after Kuhn's (1995) primal-dual algorithm for bipartite matching.