System software is often complex and hides exploitable security vulnerabilities. Formal verification promises bug-free software but comes with a prohibitive proof cost. We present Spoq2, the first verification framework to highly automate security verification of unmodified system software. Spoq2 is based on the observation that many security properties, such as noninterference, can be reduced to establishing inductive invariants on individual transitions of a transition system that models system software. However, directly verifying such invariants for real system code overwhelms existing SMT solvers. Spoq2 makes this possible by automatically reducing verification complexity. It decomposes transitions into individual execution paths, extends cone-of-influence analysis to the individual transition level, and eliminates irrelevant machine states, clauses, and control-flow paths before invoking the SMT solver. Spoq2 further optimizes how pointer operations are modeled and verified through pointer abstractions that eliminate expensive bit-wise operations from SMT queries. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Spoq2 by verifying security properties of four unmodified, real-world system codebases with minimal manual effort.

The urban expressway system model based on hybrid petri nets is proposed. With the traffic detecting cameras and coils, the strategies of traffic signal lights and warning lights are enforced with the aim to prevent the large-scale congestion in emergencies (e.g. accidents). The simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed model and the warning light strategy is demonstrated to be suitable for traffic accidents and congestion in the accident-prone weaving sections in the urban expressways.