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Erika Chin

dblp:48/7560 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2012
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-authorHuman-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 2 · 1 first-authorComputer networks · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Web and mobile security · 57% Systems and software security · 24% Authentication and access control · 19%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security
mobile security
0.222011
Analyzing inter-application communication in Android · MobiSys 2011
Android permissions demystified · CCS 2011
Web and mobile security › mobile security
android permission analysis
0.112011
Android permissions demystified · CCS 2011
Authentication and access control › access control › permission management
permission systems
0.112011
Android permissions demystified · CCS 2011
Operating systems › system security › operating system security
access control
0.012011
Permission Re-Delegation: Attacks and Defenses · USENIX Security Symposium 2011

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

static analysis of inter-application communication · 0.1static analysis · 0.1API-permission mapping · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2012 Measuring user confidence in smartphone security and privacy
abstract
In order to direct and build an effective, secure mobile ecosystem, we must first understand user attitudes toward security and privacy for smartphones and how they may differ from attitudes toward more traditional computing systems. What are users' comfort levels in performing different tasks? How do users select applications? What are their overall perceptions of the platform? This understanding will help inform the design of more secure smartphones that will enable users to safely and confidently benefit from the potential and convenience offered by mobile platforms.
Erika Chin, Adrienne Porter Felt, Vyas Sekar, David A. Wagner 0001
SOUPS1
2012 Android permissions: user attention, comprehension, and behavior
abstract
Android's permission system is intended to inform users about the risks of installing applications. When a user installs an application, he or she has the opportunity to review the application's permission requests and cancel the installation if the permissions are excessive or objectionable. We examine whether the Android permission system is effective at warning users. In particular, we evaluate whether Android users pay attention to, understand, and act on permission information during installation. We performed two usability studies: an Internet survey of 308 Android users, and a laboratory study wherein we interviewed and observed 25 Android users. Study participants displayed low attention and comprehension rates: both the Internet survey and laboratory study found that 17% of participants paid attention to permissions during installation, and only 3% of Internet survey respondents could correctly answer all three permission comprehension questions. This indicates that current Android permission warnings do not help most users make correct security decisions. However, a notable minority of users demonstrated both awareness of permission warnings and reasonable rates of comprehension. We present recommendations for improving user attention and comprehension, as well as identify open challenges.
Adrienne Porter Felt, Elizabeth Ha, Serge Egelman, Ariel Haney, Erika Chin, David A. Wagner 0001
SOUPS5
2011 Android permissions demystified
abstract
Android provides third-party applications with an extensive API that includes access to phone hardware, settings, and user data. Access to privacy- and security-relevant parts of the API is controlled with an install-time application permission system. We study Android applications to determine whether Android developers follow least privilege with their permission requests. We built Stowaway, a tool that detects overprivilege in compiled Android applications. Stowaway determines the set of API calls that an application uses and then maps those API calls to permissions. We used automated testing tools on the Android API in order to build the permission map that is necessary for detecting overprivilege. We apply Stowaway to a set of 940 applications and find that about one-third are overprivileged. We investigate the causes of overprivilege and find evidence that developers are trying to follow least privilege but sometimes fail due to insufficient API documentation.
Adrienne Porter Felt, Erika Chin, Steve Hanna, Dawn Song, David A. Wagner 0001
CCS2
2011 Analyzing inter-application communication in Android
abstract
Modern smartphone operating systems support the development of third-party applications with open system APIs. In addition to an open API, the Android operating system also provides a rich inter-application message passing system. This encourages inter-application collaboration and reduces developer burden by facilitating component reuse. Unfortunately, message passing is also an application attack surface. The content of messages can be sniffed, modified, stolen, or replaced, which can compromise user privacy. Also, a malicious application can inject forged or otherwise malicious messages, which can lead to breaches of user data and violate application security policies.
Erika Chin, Adrienne Porter Felt, Kate Greenwood, David A. Wagner 0001
MobiSys1
2011 Permission Re-Delegation: Attacks and Defenses
Adrienne Porter Felt, Helen J. Wang, Alexander Moshchuk, Steve Hanna, Erika Chin
USENIX Security Symposium5