Abstract New methods of dissident surveillance employed by repressive nation-states increasingly involve socially engineering targets into unwitting cooperation (e.g., by convincing them to open a malicious attachment or link). While a fair amount is understood about the nature of these threat actors and the types of tools they use, there is comparatively little understood about targets’ perceptions of the risks associated with their online activity, and their security posture. We conducted in-depth interviews of 30 potential targets of Middle Eastern and Horn of Africa-based governments, also examining settings and software on their computers and phones. Our engagement illuminates the ways that likely targets are vulnerable to the types of social engineering employed by nation-states.

Abstract In the Declarative Networking paradigm, Datalog-like languages are used to express distributed computations. Whereas recently formal operational semantics for these languages have been developed, a corresponding declarative semantics has been lacking so far. The challenge is to capture precisely the amount of nondeterminism that is inherent to distributed computations due to concurrency, networking delays, and asynchronous communication. This paper shows how a declarative, model-based semantics can be obtained by simply using the well-known stable model semantics for Datalog with negation. We show that the model-based semantics matches previously proposed formal operational semantics.

In recent years there has been interest in achieving application-level consistency criteria without the latency and availability costs of strongly consistent storage infrastructure. A standard technique is to adopt a vocabulary of commutative operations; this avoids the risk of inconsistency due to message reordering. Another approach was recently captured by the CALM theorem, which proves that logically monotonic programs are guaranteed to be eventually consistent. In logic languages such as Bloom, CALM analysis can automatically verify that programs achieve consistency without coordination.

We present SecureBlox, a declarative system that unifies a distributed query processor with a security policy framework. SecureBlox decouples security concerns from system specification, allowing easy reconfiguration of a system's security properties to suit a given execution environment. Our implementation of SecureBlox is a series of extensions to LogicBlox, an emerging commercial Datalog-based platform for enterprise software systems. SecureBlox enhances LogicBlox to enable distribution and static meta-programmability, and makes novel use of existing LogicBlox features such as integrity constraints. SecureBlox allows meta-programmability via BloxGenerics - a language extension for compile-time code generation based on the security requirements and trust policies of the deployed environment. We present and evaluate detailed use-cases in which SecureBlox enables diverse applications, including an authenticated declarative routing protocol with encrypted advertisements and an authenticated and encrypted parallel hash join operation. Our results demonstrate SecureBlox's abilities to specify and implement a wide range of different security constructs for distributed systems as well as to enable tradeoffs between performance and security.