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Xiao Wang 0036

dblp:49/67-36 · DBLP profile ↗
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12ranked-venue papers
1as first author
8since 2021 · last 2025
—ORCID · unresolved

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 12 · 1 first-author · 8 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
8 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 45% Mathematical optimization · 44% Algorithms and data structures · 6%
Artificial intelligence
4 papers
Optimization for machine learning · 57% Deep learning architectures and training · 18% Learning theory · 18%

Topics — the 29 heaviest of 31, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium computation
1.322023
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails · NeurIPS 2023
Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees · ICML 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
zero-sum game
1.022024
Prediction Accuracy of Learning in Games : Follow-the-Regularized-Leader meets Heisenberg · ICML 2024
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails · NeurIPS 2023
Mathematical optimization
multiplicative weights update
1.022022
Accelerated Multiplicative Weights Update Avoids Saddle Points Almost Always · IJCAI 2022
Multiplicative Weights Updates as a distributed constrained optimization algorithm: Convergence to second-order stationary points almost always · ICML 2019
Mathematical optimization
nonconvex optimization
1.022022
Accelerated Multiplicative Weights Update Avoids Saddle Points Almost Always · IJCAI 2022
Multiplicative Weights Updates as a distributed constrained optimization algorithm: Convergence to second-order stationary points almost always · ICML 2019
Mathematical optimization › nonconvex optimization
saddle point escape
1.022022
Accelerated Multiplicative Weights Update Avoids Saddle Points Almost Always · IJCAI 2022
First-order methods almost always avoid saddle points: The case of vanishing step-sizes · NeurIPS 2019
Machine learning › Learning theory › generalization bounds
algorithmic stability
0.912025
Continuous-Time Analysis of Heavy Ball Momentum in Min-Max Games · ICML 2025
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning
continuous-time analysis
0.912025
Continuous-Time Analysis of Heavy Ball Momentum in Min-Max Games · ICML 2025
Mathematical optimization
minimax optimization
0.912025
Continuous-Time Analysis of Heavy Ball Momentum in Min-Max Games · ICML 2025
Mathematical optimization › online optimization
follow the regularized leader
0.812024
Prediction Accuracy of Learning in Games : Follow-the-Regularized-Leader meets Heisenberg · ICML 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › learning in games
learning dynamics
0.812024
Prediction Accuracy of Learning in Games : Follow-the-Regularized-Leader meets Heisenberg · ICML 2024
Approximation and online algorithms
online learning
0.812024
Prediction Accuracy of Learning in Games : Follow-the-Regularized-Leader meets Heisenberg · ICML 2024
Mathematical optimization
gradient descent
0.712023
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails · NeurIPS 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › game dynamics › equilibrium convergence
last-iterate convergence
0.712023
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails · NeurIPS 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › game dynamics › equilibrium convergence
nash equilibrium convergence
0.712023
Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees · ICML 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › learning in games
online learning in games
0.712023
Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees · ICML 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
regret minimization
0.712023
Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees · ICML 2023
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › stochastic optimization › adaptive gradient methods
adagrad
0.612022
AdaGrad Avoids Saddle Points · ICML 2022
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › stochastic optimization
adaptive gradient methods
0.612022
AdaGrad Avoids Saddle Points · ICML 2022
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › non-convex optimization
saddle point escape
0.612022
AdaGrad Avoids Saddle Points · ICML 2022
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
learning in games
0.622022
Multiplicative Weights Updates as a distributed constrained optimization algorithm: Convergence to second-order stationary points almost always · ICML 2019
Accelerated Multiplicative Weights Update Avoids Saddle Points Almost Always · IJCAI 2022
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training › scaling laws
depth-width trade-offs
0.412020
Depth-Width Trade-offs for ReLU Networks via Sharkovsky's Theorem · ICLR 2020
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training
neural network expressivity
0.412020
Depth-Width Trade-offs for ReLU Networks via Sharkovsky's Theorem · ICLR 2020
Mathematical optimization
langevin dynamics
0.412020
Fast Convergence of Langevin Dynamics on Manifold: Geodesics meet Log-Sobolev · NeurIPS 2020
Algorithms and data structures › markov chains › mixing time
log-sobolev inequality
0.412020
Fast Convergence of Langevin Dynamics on Manifold: Geodesics meet Log-Sobolev · NeurIPS 2020
Algorithms and data structures › randomized algorithms
sampling
0.412020
Fast Convergence of Langevin Dynamics on Manifold: Geodesics meet Log-Sobolev · NeurIPS 2020
Mathematical optimization › continuous optimization › convex optimization
first-order methods
0.412019
First-order methods almost always avoid saddle points: The case of vanishing step-sizes · NeurIPS 2019
Mathematical optimization › stochastic optimization
stochastic nonconvex optimization
0.212023
Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees · ICML 2023
Mathematical optimization
stochastic optimization
0.212023
Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees · ICML 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game › dynamic games
time-varying games
0.212023
On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails · NeurIPS 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

continuous-time analysis · 1.7dynamical systems · 1.1heavy-ball momentum · 0.9heavy ball momentum · 0.9symplectic discretization · 0.8heisenberg uncertainty principle · 0.8covariance analysis · 0.8optimistic gradient descent ascent · 0.7online stochastic gradient descent · 0.7momentum methods · 0.7caratheodory's theorem · 0.7step-size stabilization · 0.6center-stable manifold theory · 0.6sharkovsky's theorem · 0.4proximal point · 0.4mirror descent · 0.4gradient descent · 0.4center-stable manifold theorem · 0.4
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Continuous-Time Analysis of Heavy Ball Momentum in Min-Max Games
abstract
Since Polyak’s pioneering work, heavy ball (HB) momentum has been widely studied in minimization. However, its role in min-max games remains largely unexplored. As a key component of practical min-max algorithms like Adam, this gap limits their effectiveness. In this paper, we present a continuous-time analysis for HB with simultaneous and alternating update schemes in min-max games. Locally, we prove smaller momentum enhances algorithmic stability by enabling local convergence across a wider range of step sizes, with alternating updates generally converging faster. Globally, we study the implicit regularization of HB, and find smaller momentum guides algorithms trajectories towards shallower slope regions of the loss landscapes, with alternating updates amplifying this effect. Surprisingly, all these phenomena differ from those observed in minimization, where larger momentum yields similar effects. Our results reveal fundamental differences between HB in min-max games and minimization, and numerical experiments further validate our theoretical results.
Kaito Fujii, Stratis Skoulakis, Xiao Wang 0036, Volkan Cevher
ICML4
2024 Prediction Accuracy of Learning in Games : Follow-the-Regularized-Leader meets Heisenberg
abstract
We investigate the accuracy of prediction in deterministic learning dynamics of zero-sum games with random initializations, specifically focusing on observer uncertainty and its relationship to the evolution of covariances. Zero-sum games are a prominent field of interest in machine learning due to their various applications. Concurrently, the accuracy of prediction in dynamical systems from mechanics has long been a classic subject of investigation since the discovery of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. This principle employs covariance and standard deviation of particle states to measure prediction accuracy. In this study, we bring these two approaches together to analyze the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm in two-player zero-sum games. We provide growth rates of covariance information for continuous-time FTRL, as well as its two canonical discretization methods (Euler and Symplectic). A Heisenberg-type inequality is established for FTRL. Our analysis and experiments also show that employing Symplectic discretization enhances the accuracy of prediction in learning dynamics.
Georgios Piliouras, Xiao Wang 0036
ICML3
2024 Last-iterate Convergence Separation between Extra-gradient and Optimism in Constrained Periodic Games
abstract
Last-iterate behaviors of learning algorithms in repeated two-player zero-sum games have been extensively studied due to their wide applications in machine learning and related tasks. Typical algorithms that exhibit the last-iterate convergence property include optimistic and extra-gradient methods. However, most existing results establish these properties under the assumption that the game is time-independent. Recently, (Feng et al., 2023) studied the last-iterate behaviors of optimistic and extra-gradient methods in games with a time-varying payoff matrix, and proved that in an unconstrained periodic game, extra-gradient method converges to the equilibrium while optimistic method diverges. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom that these two methods are expected to behave similarly as they do in time-independent games. However, compared to unconstrained games, games with constrains are more common both in practical and theoretical studies. In this paper, we investigate the last-iterate behaviors of optimistic and extra-gradient methods in the constrained periodic games, demonstrating that similar separation results for last-iterate convergence also hold in this setting.
Ioannis Panageas, Xiao Wang 0036
UAI4
2023 Semi Bandit dynamics in Congestion Games: Convergence to Nash Equilibrium and No-Regret Guarantees
abstract
In this work, we propose introduce a variant of online stochastic gradient descent and prove it converges to Nash equilibria and simultaneously it has sublinear regret for the class of congestion games in the semi-bandit feedback setting. Our proposed method admits convergence rates depending only polynomially on the number of players and the number of facilities, but not on the size of the action set, which can be exponentially large in terms of the number of facilities. Moreover, the running time of our method has polynomial-time dependence on the implicit description of the game. Our analysis exploits techniques from convex geometry, in particular Caratheodory's theorem and recent advances in non-convex stochastic optimization. This work improves upon and answers an open question from (Cui et al 2022).
Ioannis Panageas, Stratis Skoulakis, Luca Viano, Xiao Wang 0036, Volkan Cevher
ICML4
2023 On the Last-iterate Convergence in Time-varying Zero-sum Games: Extra Gradient Succeeds where Optimism Fails
abstract
Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the aforementioned games include extra-gradient (EG) and optimistic gradient descent ascent (OGDA). However, all the established last-iterate convergence results hold for the restrictive setting where the underlying repeated game does not change over time. Recently, a line of research has focused on regret analysis of OGDA in time-varying games, i.e., games where payoffs evolve with time; the last-iterate behavior of OGDA and EG in time-varying environments remains unclear though. In this paper, we study the last-iterate behavior of various algorithms in two types of unconstrained, time-varying, bilinear zero-sum games: periodic and convergent perturbed games. These models expand upon the usual repeated game formulation and incorporate external environmental factors, such as the seasonal effects on species competition and vanishing external noise. In periodic games, we prove that EG will converge while OGDA and momentum method will diverge. This is quite surprising, as to the best of our knowledge, it is the first result that indicates EG and OGDA have qualitatively different last-iterate behaviors and do not exhibit similar behavior. In convergent perturbed games, we prove all these algorithms converge as long as the game itself stabilizes with a faster rate than $1/t$.
Hu Fu 0001, Qun Hu, Ioannis Panageas, Xiao Wang 0036
NeurIPS7
2022 AdaGrad Avoids Saddle Points
abstract
Adaptive first-order methods in optimization have widespread ML applications due to their ability to adapt to non-convex landscapes. However, their convergence guarantees are typically stated in terms of vanishing gradient norms, which leaves open the issue of converging to undesirable saddle points (or even local maxima). In this paper, we focus on the AdaGrad family of algorithms - from scalar to full-matrix preconditioning - and we examine the question of whether the method’s trajectories avoid saddle points. A major challenge that arises here is that AdaGrad’s step-size (or, more accurately, the method’s preconditioner) evolves over time in a filtration-dependent way, i.e., as a function of all gradients observed in earlier iterations; as a result, avoidance results for methods with a constant or vanishing step-size do not apply. We resolve this challenge by combining a series of step-size stabilization arguments with a recursive representation of the AdaGrad preconditioner that allows us to employ center-stable techniques and ultimately show that the induced trajectories avoid saddle points from almost any initial condition.
Kimon Antonakopoulos, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Georgios Piliouras, Xiao Wang 0036
ICML4
2022 Accelerated Multiplicative Weights Update Avoids Saddle Points Almost Always
abstract
We consider nonconvex optimization problem with constraint that is a product of simplices. A commonly used algorithm in solving this type of problem is the Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU), an algorithm that is widely used in game theory, machine learning and multi agent systems. Despite it has been known that MWU avoids saddle points, there is a question that remains unaddressed: ``Is there an accelerated version of MWU that avoids saddle points provably?'' In this paper we provide a positive answer to above question. We provide an accelerated MWU based on Riemannian Accelerated Gradient Descent, and prove that the Riemannian Accelerated Gradient Descent, thus the accelerated MWU, avoid saddle points.
Ioannis Panageas, Xiao Wang 0036
IJCAI3
2021 Last iterate convergence in no-regret learning: constrained min-max optimization for convex-concave landscapes
abstract
In a recent series of papers it has been established that variants of Gradient Descent/Ascent and Mirror Descent exhibit last iterate convergence in convex-concave zero-sum games. Specifically, Daskalakis et al 2018, Liang-Stokes 2019, show last iterate convergence of the so called “Optimistic Gradient Descent/Ascent" for the case of \textit{unconstrained} min-max optimization. Moreover, in Mertikopoulos et al 2019 the authors show that Mirror Descent with an extra gradient step displays last iterate convergence for convex-concave problems (both constrained and unconstrained), though their algorithm uses \textit{vanishing stepsizes}. In this work, we show that "Optimistic Multiplicative-Weights Update (OMWU)" with \textit{constant stepsize}, exhibits last iterate convergence locally for convex-concave games, generalizing the results of Daskalakis and Panageas 2019 where last iterate convergence of OMWU was shown only for the \textit{bilinear case}. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result about last-iterate convergence for constrained zero sum games (beyond the bilinear case) in which the dynamics use constant step-sizes.
Sai Ganesh Nagarajan, Ioannis Panageas, Xiao Wang 0036
AISTATS4
2020 Depth-Width Trade-offs for ReLU Networks via Sharkovsky's Theorem
Vaggos Chatziafratis, Sai Ganesh Nagarajan, Ioannis Panageas, Xiao Wang 0036
ICLR4
2020 Fast Convergence of Langevin Dynamics on Manifold: Geodesics meet Log-Sobolev
abstract
Sampling is a fundamental and arguably very important task with numerous applications in Machine Learning. One approach to sample from a high dimensional distribution $e^{-f}$ for some function $f$ is the Langevin Algorithm (LA). Recently, there has been a lot of progress in showing fast convergence of LA even in cases where $f$ is non-convex, notably \cite{VW19}, \cite{MoritaRisteski} in which the former paper focuses on functions $f$ defined in $\mathbb{R}^n$ and the latter paper focuses on functions with symmetries (like matrix completion type objectives) with manifold structure. Our work generalizes the results of \cite{VW19} where $f$ is defined on a manifold $M$ rather than $\mathbb{R}^n$. From technical point of view, we show that KL decreases in a geometric rate whenever the distribution $e^{-f}$ satisfies a log-Sobolev inequality on $M$.
Xiao Wang 0036, Ioannis Panageas
NeurIPS1
2019 Multiplicative Weights Updates as a distributed constrained optimization algorithm: Convergence to second-order stationary points almost always
abstract
Non-concave maximization has been the subject of much recent study in the optimization and machine learning communities, specifically in deep learning. Recent papers ([Ge et al. 2015, Lee et al 2017] and references therein) indicate that first order methods work well and avoid saddles points. Results as in [Lee \etal 2017], however, are limited to the unconstrained case or for cases where the critical points are in the interior of the feasibility set, which fail to capture some of the most interesting applications. In this paper we focus on constrained non-concave maximization. We analyze a variant of a well-established algorithm in machine learning called Multiplicative Weights Update (MWU) for the maximization problem $\max_{\mathbf{x} \in D} P(\mathbf{x})$, where $P$ is non-concave, twice continuously differentiable and $D$ is a product of simplices. We show that MWU converges almost always for small enough stepsizes to critical points that satisfy the second order KKT conditions, by combining techniques from dynamical systems as well as taking advantage of a recent connection between Baum Eagon inequality and MWU [Palaiopanos et al 2017].
Ioannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras, Xiao Wang 0036
ICML3
2019 First-order methods almost always avoid saddle points: The case of vanishing step-sizes
abstract
In a series of papers [Lee et al 2016], [Panageas and Piliouras 2017], [Lee et al 2019], it was established that some of the most commonly used first order methods almost surely (under random initializations) and with step-size being small enough, avoid strict saddle points, as long as the objective function $f$ is $C^2$ and has Lipschitz gradient. The key observation was that first order methods can be studied from a dynamical systems perspective, in which instantiations of Center-Stable manifold theorem allow for a global analysis. The results of the aforementioned papers were limited to the case where the step-size $\alpha$ is constant, i.e., does not depend on time (and typically bounded from the inverse of the Lipschitz constant of the gradient of $f$). It remains an open question whether or not the results still hold when the step-size is time dependent and vanishes with time. In this paper, we resolve this question on the affirmative for gradient descent, mirror descent, manifold descent and proximal point. The main technical challenge is that the induced (from each first order method) dynamical system is time non-homogeneous and the stable manifold theorem is not applicable in its classic form. By exploiting the dynamical systems structure of the aforementioned first order methods, we are able to prove a stable manifold theorem that is applicable to time non-homogeneous dynamical systems and generalize the results in [Lee et al 2019] for time dependent step-sizes.
Ioannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras, Xiao Wang 0036
NeurIPS3