Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

Recent work has found that sparse autoencoders (SAEs) are an effective technique for unsupervised discovery of interpretable features in language models' (LMs) activations, by finding sparse, linear reconstructions of those activations. We introduce the Gated Sparse Autoencoder (Gated SAE), which achieves a Pareto improvement over training with prevailing methods. In SAEs, the L1 penalty used to encourage sparsity introduces many undesirable biases, such as shrinkage -- systematic underestimation of feature activations. The key insight of Gated SAEs is to separate the functionality of (a) determining which directions to use and (b) estimating the magnitudes of those directions: this enables us to apply the L1 penalty only to the former, limiting the scope of undesirable side effects. Through training SAEs on LMs of up to 7B parameters we find that, in typical hyper-parameter ranges, Gated SAEs solve shrinkage, are similarly interpretable, and require half as many firing features to achieve comparable reconstruction fidelity.

We show how to "compile" human-readable programs into standard decoder-only transformer models. Our compiler, Tracr, generates models with known structure. This structure can be used to design experiments. For example, we use it to study "superposition" in transformers that execute multi-step algorithms. Additionally, the known structure of Tracr-compiled models can serve as _ground-truth_ for evaluating interpretability methods. Commonly, because the "programs" learned by transformers are unknown it is unclear whether an interpretation succeeded. We demonstrate our approach by implementing and examining programs including computing token frequencies, sorting, and parenthesis checking. We provide an open-source implementation of Tracr at https://github.com/google-deepmind/tracr.

We propose a system for conducting an auction over locations in a continuous space. It enables participants to express their preferences over possible choices of location in the space, selecting the location that maximizes the total utility of all agents. We prevent agents from tricking the system into selecting a location that improves their individual utility at the expense of others by using a pricing rule that gives agents no incentive to misreport their true preferences. The system queries participants for their utility in many random locations, then trains a neural network to approximate the preference function of each participant. The parameters of these neural network models are transmitted and processed by the auction mechanism, which composes these into differentiable models that are optimized through gradient ascent to compute the final chosen location and charged prices.

Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled application of RL methods. However real-world settings are many-agent, and agent interactions are complex mixtures of common-interest and competitive aspects. We consider Diplomacy, a 7-player board game designed to accentuate dilemmas resulting from many-agent interactions. It also features a large combinatorial action space and simultaneous moves, which are challenging for RL algorithms. We propose a simple yet effective approximate best response operator, designed to handle large combinatorial action spaces and simultaneous moves. We also introduce a family of policy iteration methods that approximate fictitious play. With these methods, we successfully apply RL to Diplomacy: we show that our agents convincingly outperform the previous state-of-the-art, and game theoretic equilibrium analysis shows that the new process yields consistent improvements.