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D. E. Britton

dblp:50/1249 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 1984
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 50% Network security · 50%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Requirements engineering and software design · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure messaging
end-to-end encryption
0.011984
Formal Verification of a Secure Network with End-to-End Encryption · S&P 1984
Network security › secure communication
secure communication protocol
0.011984
Formal Verification of a Secure Network with End-to-End Encryption · S&P 1984
Requirements engineering and software design
formal specification
0.011984
Formal Verification of a Secure Network with End-to-End Encryption · S&P 1984
Requirements engineering and software design › software modeling
state machine models
0.011984
Formal Verification of a Secure Network with End-to-End Encryption · S&P 1984

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

verus · 0.0model checking · 0.0formal specification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
1984 Formal Verification of a Secure Network with End-to-End Encryption
abstract
A formal specification and verification of a simple secure communications network using end-to-end encryption is presented. It is shown that all data sent over the network is encrypted and all heats on the network exchange messages only if they are authorized to do so. The network and its hosts are modelled by a set of concurrent processes that communicate via unidirectional buffers. Each process is viewed as a state machine. The specification has been formally verified using the commercially-available VERUS verification system.
D. E. Britton
S&P1