Jingfeng Yang 0002

dblp:50/371-2 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-3682-1666ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Trustworthy machine learning · 75% Efficient and distributed learning · 25%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › privacy
differential privacy
0.912025
UDFed: A Universal Defense Scheme for Various Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Machine learning › Efficient and distributed learning › federated learning
federated learning security
0.912025
UDFed: A Universal Defense Scheme for Various Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
poisoning attack defense
0.912025
UDFed: A Universal Defense Scheme for Various Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning
privacy and data protection
0.912025
UDFed: A Universal Defense Scheme for Various Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2025

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

low-rank approximation · 0.9joint similarity-based detection · 0.9differential privacy · 0.9anonymous obfuscation · 0.9
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 UDFed: A Universal Defense Scheme for Various Poisoning Attacks on Federated Learning
abstract
Federated learning (FL), as a distributed machine learning paradigm with privacy protection, has garnered significant attention since it prevents the exchange of raw local data. However, FL remains vulnerable to poisoning attacks, including data contamination and gradient manipulation. Moreover, attackers may launch individual or collusive attacks, complicating the identification of malicious clients. To address these challenges, we propose a universal poisoning defense framework incorporating three key strategies. First, we decouple client identities from gradients through anonymous obfuscation and enhance privacy with differential noise injection. Second, we detect potential detect potential collusive attackers via a joint similarity-based approach. Third, we apply an iterative low rank approximation-based anomaly detection to amplify discrepancies between benign and malicious clients and progressively filter out attackers. We theoretically demonstrate that anonymous obfuscation can enhance the privacy protection capability of differential privacy. Additionally, experimental results further validate that our scheme is comparable to or outperforms state-of-the-art defense methods against a variety of data and model poisoning attacks.
Jieyi Deng, Congduan Li, Nanfeng Zhang, Jingfeng Yang 0002
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.4