Many protocol particulars developed for the wireless mesh networks, such as multi-path routing, channel assignment, topology control, assume that a network-wide collaboration is available to establish connections to the network outside. However, the collaboration can be easily discouraged in the presence of selfish behaviors, referred to as free-riding. In this paper, we propose a framework, PReSENt, to promote and make more secure the practices of collaboration among nodes by securing a compensation to the collaboration. When the PReSENt is enabled in wireless mesh networks, a node accumulates credits, an amount quantifying its resource provision when it provides its resource for other nodes. The nodes consuming the resource publish rewards, an amount quantifying their resource usage. The credits are used to guarantee the resource sharing for the provider from the customers in the future, whose amount is proportional to its relative contribution to the network-wide collaboration. The rewards are used to validate their corresponding credits in order to prevent false accumulations of the credits in selfish nodes. We formally define the underlying security model of the PReSENt and prove that the PReSENt is secure in the random oracle model. We then implement the PReSENt in J-Sim to illustrate its operational behaviors with respect to correct and secure resource sharing.

The current Internet has no secure way to validate the correctness of routing information. We propose a mechanism that supports secure validation of routing information in the interdomain routing protocol of the Internet. Our mechanism focuses on alleviating obstacles which previously prevent the complete and correct construction of the Internet routing information. In particular, we present a registry with authorized and verifiable search (RAVS) by which routing information can be constructed securely. We give an efficient RAVS scheme and prove its securities in the random oracle model. By our scheme, the routing information can be securely stored and tested without revealing contents of registry entries and search queries. Only legal autonomous systems (ASes) can construct valid registry entries and a single compromised AS can be detected. Our experiment shows that our RAVS scheme can be implemented efficiently and the incurred overhead, in terms of time and space, is acceptable in practice.

The current Internet has no secure way to validate the correctness of the routing information. We suggest a mechanism that supports secure validation of routing information in the interdomain routing protocol of the Internet. Our mechanism focuses on alleviating obstacles which previously prevent the complete and correct construction of the Internet routing information. In particular, we propose an identity-based Registry with Authorized and Verifiable Search (RAVS) so that routing information can be constructed securely. We construct an efficient RAVS scheme and prove its securities in the random oracle model. By our scheme, the routing information can be securely stored and tested without revealing contents of both the registry and the search query. Furthermore, our registry is verifiable and its correctness is guaranteed. Only the legal autonomous system (AS) can construct the valid registry and the single compromised AS can be detected. Our experiment shows that our RAVS scheme can be implemented efficiently and the incurred overhead, in terms of time and space, is acceptable in practice.