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Nadja Betzler

dblp:50/4920 · DBLP profile ↗
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22ranked-venue papers
21as first author
0since 2021 · last 2014
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Theory of computation · 13 · 13 first-authorArtificial intelligence and machine learning · 6 · 5 first-authorGraphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 4 · 3 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 2 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
4 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 61% Computational complexity · 37% Algorithms and data structures · 2%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice
computational social choice
0.442011
Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard · IJCAI 2011
Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections · Inf. Comput. 2010
Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination · AAAI 2010
Computational complexity
parameterized complexity
0.222010
Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections · Inf. Comput. 2010
A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Determining Possible Winners Given Incomplete Votes · IJCAI 2009
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice
possible winner problem
0.222010
Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination · AAAI 2010
A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Determining Possible Winners Given Incomplete Votes · IJCAI 2009
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice › voting manipulation
coalitional manipulation
0.112011
Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard · IJCAI 2011
Computational complexity
counting complexity
0.112010
Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination · AAAI 2010
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice
voting manipulation
0.112010
Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination · AAAI 2010
Computational complexity › parameterized complexity
multivariate complexity analysis
0.112009
A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Determining Possible Winners Given Incomplete Votes · IJCAI 2009
Algorithms and data structures
polynomial-time algorithms
0.012010
Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination · AAAI 2010

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

randomized algorithm · 0.1parameterized complexity · 0.1#p-hardness reduction · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2014 Theoretical and empirical evaluation of data reduction for exact Kemeny Rank Aggregation
Nadja Betzler, Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier
Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst.1
2014 On Making a Distinguished Vertex of Minimum Degree by Vertex Deletion
Nadja Betzler, Hans L. Bodlaender, Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier, Johannes Uhlmann
Algorithmica1
2013 On the Computation of Fully Proportional Representation
abstract
We investigate two systems of fully proportional representation suggested by Chamberlin Courant and Monroe. Both systems assign a representative to each voter so that the "sum of misrepresentations" is minimized. The winner determination problem for both systems is known to be NP-hard, hence this work aims at investigating whether there are variants of the proposed rules and/or specific electorates for which these problems can be solved efficiently. As a variation of these rules, instead of minimizing the sum of misrepresentations, we considered minimizing the maximal misrepresentation introducing effectively two new rules. In the general case these "minimax" versions of classical rules appeared to be still NP-hard. We investigated the parameterized complexity of winner determination of the two classical and two new rules with respect to several parameters. Here we have a mixture of positive and negative results: e.g., we proved fixed-parameter tractability for the parameter the number of candidates but fixed-parameter intractability for the number of winners. For single-peaked electorates our results are overwhelmingly positive: we provide polynomial-time algorithms for most of the considered problems. The only rule that remains NP-hard for single-peaked electorates is the classical Monroe rule.
Nadja Betzler, Arkadii M. Slinko, Johannes Uhlmann
J. Artif. Intell. Res.1
2012 On Bounded-Degree Vertex Deletion parameterized by treewidth
Nadja Betzler, Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier, Johannes Uhlmann
Discret. Appl. Math.1
2011 Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard
abstract
The Borda voting rule is a positional scoring rule where, for m candidates, for every vote the first candidate receives m-1 points, the second m-2 points and so on. A Borda winner is a candidate with highest total score. It has been a prominent open problem to determine the computational complexity of UNWEIGHTED COALITIONAL MANIPULATION UNDER BORDA: Can one add a certain number of additional votes (called manipulators) to an election such that a distinguished candidate becomes a winner? We settle this open problem by showing NP-hardness even for two manipulators and three input votes. Moreover, we discuss extensions and limitations of this hardness result.
Nadja Betzler, Rolf Niedermeier, Gerhard J. Woeginger
IJCAI1
2011 On Making a Distinguished Vertex Minimum Degree by Vertex Deletion
Nadja Betzler, Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier, Johannes Uhlmann
SOFSEM1
2011 Average parameterization and partial kernelization for computing medians
Nadja Betzler, Jiong Guo, Christian Komusiewicz, Rolf Niedermeier
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.1
2011 Parameterized Algorithmics for Finding Connected Motifs in Biological Networks
abstract
We study the NP-hard LIST-COLORED GRAPH MOTIF problem which, given an undirected list-colored graph G = (V, E) and a multiset M of colors, asks for maximum-cardinality sets S ⊆ V and M' ⊆ M such that G[S] is connected and contains exactly (with respect to multiplicity) the colors in M'. LIST-COLORED GRAPH MOTIF has applications in the analysis of biological networks. We study LIST-COLORED GRAPH MOTIF with respect to three different parameterizations. For the parameters motif size |M| and solution size |S|, we present fixed-parameter algorithms, whereas for the parameter |V| - |M|, we show W[1]-hardness for general instances and achieve fixed-parameter tractability for a special case of LIST-COLORED GRAPH MOTIF. We implemented the fixed-parameter algorithms for parameters |M| and |S|, developed further speed-up heuristics for these algorithms, and applied them in the context of querying protein-interaction networks, demonstrating their usefulness for realistic instances. Furthermore, we show that extending the request for motif connectedness to stronger demands, such as biconnectedness or bridge-connectedness leads to W[1]-hard problems when the parameter is the motif size |M|.
Nadja Betzler, René van Bevern, Michael R. Fellows, Christian Komusiewicz, Rolf Niedermeier
IEEE ACM Trans. Comput. Biol. Bioinform.1
2010 Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination
abstract
We study the computational complexity of the counting version of the Possible-Winner problem for elections. In the Possible-Winner problem we are given a profile of voters, each with a partial preference order, and ask if there are linear extensions of the votes such that a designated candidate wins. We also analyze a special case of Possible-Winner, the Manipulation problem. We provide polynomial-time algorithms for counting manipulations in a class of scoring protocols and in several other voting rules. We show #P-hardness of the counting variant of Possible-Winner for plurality and veto and give a simple yet general and practically useful randomized algorithm for a variant of Possible-Winner for all voting rules for which a winner can be computed in polynomial time.
Yoram Bachrach, Nadja Betzler, Piotr Faliszewski
AAAI2
2010 Partial Kernelization for Rank Aggregation: Theory and Experiments
Nadja Betzler, Robert Bredereck, Rolf Niedermeier
IPEC1
2010 Average Parameterization and Partial Kernelization for Computing Medians
Nadja Betzler, Jiong Guo, Christian Komusiewicz, Rolf Niedermeier
LATIN1
2010 On Problem Kernels for Possible Winner Determination under the k-Approval Protocol
Nadja Betzler
MFCS1
2010 Parameterized computational complexity of Dodgson and Young elections
Nadja Betzler, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier
Inf. Comput.1
2010 Towards a dichotomy for the Possible Winner problem in elections based on scoring rules
Nadja Betzler, Britta Dorn
J. Comput. Syst. Sci.1
2009 A Multivariate Complexity Analysis of Determining Possible Winners Given Incomplete Votes
Nadja Betzler, Susanne Hemmann, Rolf Niedermeier
IJCAI1
2009 Towards a Dichotomy of Finding Possible Winners in Elections Based on Scoring Rules
Nadja Betzler, Britta Dorn
MFCS1
2009 Fixed-parameter algorithms for Kemeny rankings
Nadja Betzler, Michael R. Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier, Frances A. Rosamond
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2009 Parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections and related digraph problems
Nadja Betzler, Johannes Uhlmann
Theor. Comput. Sci.1
2008 Fixed-Parameter Algorithms for Kemeny Scores
Nadja Betzler, Michael R. Fellows, Jiong Guo, Rolf Niedermeier, Frances A. Rosamond
AAIM1
2008 Parameterized Complexity of Candidate Control in Elections and Related Digraph Problems
Nadja Betzler, Johannes Uhlmann
COCOA1
2008 Parameterized Algorithms and Hardness Results for Some Graph Motif Problems
Nadja Betzler, Michael R. Fellows, Christian Komusiewicz, Rolf Niedermeier
CPM1
2004 Tree Decompositions of Graphs: Saving Memory in Dynamic Programming
Nadja Betzler, Rolf Niedermeier, Johannes Uhlmann
CTW1