Judy H. Moore

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6ranked-venue papers

4as first author

0since 2021 · last 1988

—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 2 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security 6 papers		Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 78% Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 22%
Theoretical computer science 1 paper		Coding theory · 100%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 10, each with the papers that count most for it

Topic	Papers	Last	Evidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher DES	3	1987	Cycle Structure of the DES for Keys Having Palindromic (or Antipalindromic) Sequences of Round Keys · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987 Cycle Structures of the DES with Weak and Semi-Weak Keys · CRYPTO 1986 Structure in the S-boxes of the DES · CRYPTO 1986
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis block cipher	2	1986	Cycle Structures of the DES with Weak and Semi-Weak Keys · CRYPTO 1986 Structure in the S-boxes of the DES · CRYPTO 1986
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › security protocol analysis protocol failures	1	1988	Protocol failures in cryptosystems · Proc. IEEE 1988
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis block cipher cryptanalysis	1	1987	Cycle Structure of the DES for Keys Having Palindromic (or Antipalindromic) Sequences of Round Keys · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › block cipher weak keys	1	1986	Cycle Structures of the DES with Weak and Semi-Weak Keys · CRYPTO 1986
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis discrete logarithm	1	1982	Some Remarks on the Herlestam-Johannesson Algorithm for Computing Logarithms over GF(2p) · CRYPTO 1982
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis symmetric cryptography	1	1987	Cycle Structure of the DES for Keys Having Palindromic (or Antipalindromic) Sequences of Round Keys · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 1987
Coding theory › finite fields finite field arithmetic	1	1982	Some Remarks on the Herlestam-Johannesson Algorithm for Computing Logarithms over GF(2p) · CRYPTO 1982

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

protocol analysis · 0.0cycle structure analysis · 0.0

Year	Publication	Venue	Position
1988	Protocol failures in cryptosystems abstract When a cryptoalgorithm is used to solve data security or authentication problems, it is implemented within the context of a protocol that specifies the appropriate procedures for data handling. The purpose of the protocol is to ensure that when the cryptosystem is applied, the level of security or authentication required by the system is actually attained. The author surveys a collection of protocols in which this goal has not been met, not because of a failure of the cryptoalgorithm used, but rather because of shortcomings in the design of the protocol. Guidelines for the development of sound protocols are extracted from an analysis of these failures.> Judy H. Moore	Proc. IEEE	1
1987	Strong Practical Protocols Judy H. Moore	CRYPTO	1
1987	Cycle Structure of the DES for Keys Having Palindromic (or Antipalindromic) Sequences of Round Keys abstract Certain DES keys have been called weak or semiweak based upon the number of distinct round keys which they produce. For the weak keys, all 16 round keys are identical and encryption is the same as decryption. For the semiweak keys, there are only two distinct round keys but no specific weakness of the DES with these keys has been demonstrated. Judy H. Moore, Gustavus J. Simmons	IEEE Trans. Software Eng.	1
1986	Structure in the S-boxes of the DES Ernie Brickell, Judy H. Moore, M. R. Purtill	CRYPTO	2
1986	Cycle Structures of the DES with Weak and Semi-Weak Keys Judy H. Moore, Gustavus J. Simmons	CRYPTO	1
1982	Some Remarks on the Herlestam-Johannesson Algorithm for Computing Logarithms over GF(2p) Ernie Brickell, Judy H. Moore	CRYPTO	2