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Martin Hlavác

dblp:51/414 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2009
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 56% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 44%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › cryptanalysis
known-plaintext attack
0.112009
Known-Plaintext-Only Attack on RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplication · CHES 2009
Hardware security and side channels
side-channel attack
0.112009
Known-Plaintext-Only Attack on RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplication · CHES 2009
Hardware security and side channels › hardware attacks
side-channel and fault attacks
0.012009
Known-Plaintext-Only Attack on RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplication · CHES 2009
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2009 Known-Plaintext-Only Attack on RSA-CRT with Montgomery Multiplication
Martin Hlavác
CHES1
2008 When AES blinks: introducing optical side channel
abstract
The authors present a short note describing the newly emerging optical side channel. The basic idea of the channel is very simple – many parts of the integrated circuits consist of transistors that represent one of the two logical states 0 or 1. When the state changes, there is some light that is emitted in the form of a few photons. A device employing the method which is able to detect these photons (called picosecond imaging circuit analysis) is available in several laboratories, for example, in the French space agency CNES. From the point of view of the cryptanalyst, once the optical side channel information is available for a specific cipher on a device, it is possible to identify deep inner states that should not be revealed. In fact, it turns out that for an outdated and unprotected 0.8 µm PIC16F84A microcontroller it is possible to recover the AES secret key directly during the initial AddRoundKey operation as the side channel can distinguish the individual key bits being XORed to the plaintext.
Julie Ferrigno, Martin Hlavác
IET Inf. Secur.2