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Henning Perl

dblp:52/10782 · DBLP profile ↗
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10ranked-venue papers
4as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 8 · 2 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-authorApplied, interdisciplinary, general and emerging computing · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
5 papers
Systems and software security · 28% Web and mobile security · 24% Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis · 17%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers
Empirical software engineering · 49% Requirements engineering and software design · 37% Software maintenance and evolution · 15%

Topics — the 9 heaviest of 13, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure messaging
0.212015
SoK: Secure Messaging · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2015
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.212015
VCCFinder: Finding Potential Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Projects to Assist Code Audits · CCS 2015
Empirical software engineering
mining software repositories
0.212015
VCCFinder: Finding Potential Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Projects to Assist Code Audits · CCS 2015
Systems and software security
software supply chain security
0.212014
Hey, NSA: Stay Away from my Market! Future Proofing App Markets against Powerful Attackers · CCS 2014
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis › homomorphic encryption
fully homomorphic encryption
0.112011
Poster: an implementation of the fully homomorphic smart-vercauteren crypto-system · CCS 2011
Cryptographic primitives and cryptanalysis
homomorphic encryption
0.112011
Poster: an implementation of the fully homomorphic smart-vercauteren crypto-system · CCS 2011
Network security
anonymity networks
0.112015
SoK: Secure Messaging · IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2015
Software maintenance and evolution
code review
0.112015
VCCFinder: Finding Potential Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Projects to Assist Code Audits · CCS 2015
Usable security
developer-centered security
0.012013
Rethinking SSL development in an appified world · CCS 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

support vector machine · 0.4code-metric analysis · 0.4forum analysis · 0.3developer interviews · 0.3app analysis · 0.3transparency mechanism design · 0.2threat modeling · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 VCCFinder: Finding Potential Vulnerabilities in Open-Source Projects to Assist Code Audits
abstract
Despite the security community's best effort, the number of serious vulnerabilities discovered in software is increasing rapidly. In theory, security audits should find and remove the vulnerabilities before the code ever gets deployed. However, due to the enormous amount of code being produced, as well as a the lack of manpower and expertise, not all code is sufficiently audited. Thus, many vulnerabilities slip into production systems. A best-practice approach is to use a code metric analysis tool, such as Flawfinder, to flag potentially dangerous code so that it can receive special attention. However, because these tools have a very high false-positive rate, the manual effort needed to find vulnerabilities remains overwhelming. In this paper, we present a new method of finding potentially dangerous code in code repositories with a significantly lower false-positive rate than comparable systems. We combine code-metric analysis with metadata gathered from code repositories to help code review teams prioritize their work. The paper makes three contributions. First, we conducted the first large-scale mapping of CVEs to GitHub commits in order to create a vulnerable commit database. Second, based on this database, we trained a SVM classifier to flag suspicious commits. Compared to Flawfinder, our approach reduces the amount of false alarms by over 99 % at the same level of recall. Finally, we present a thorough quantitative and qualitative analysis of our approach and discuss lessons learned from the results. We will share the database as a benchmark for future research and will also provide our analysis tool as a web service.
Henning Perl, Sergej Dechand, Matthew Smith 0001, Daniel Arp, Fabian Yamaguchi, Konrad Rieck, Sascha Fahl, Yasemin Acar
CCS1
2015 SoK: Secure Messaging
abstract
Motivated by recent revelations of widespread state surveillance of personal communication, many solutions now claim to offer secure and private messaging. This includes both a large number of new projects and many widely adopted tools that have added security features. The intense pressure in the past two years to deliver solutions quickly has resulted in varying threat models, incomplete objectives, dubious security claims, and a lack of broad perspective on the existing cryptographic literature on secure communication. In this paper, we evaluate and systematize current secure messaging solutions and propose an evaluation framework for their security, usability, and ease-of-adoption properties. We consider solutions from academia, but also identify innovative and promising approaches used "in-the-wild" that are not considered by the academic literature. We identify three key challenges and map the design landscape for each: trust establishment, conversation security, and transport privacy. Trust establishment approaches offering strong security and privacy features perform poorly from a usability and adoption perspective, whereas some hybrid approaches that have not been well studied in the academic literature might provide better trade-offs in practice. In contrast, once trust is established, conversation security can be achieved without any user involvement in most two-party conversations, though conversations between larger groups still lack a good solution. Finally, transport privacy appears to be the most difficult problem to solve without paying significant performance penalties.
Nik Unger, Sergej Dechand, Joseph Bonneau, Sascha Fahl, Henning Perl, Ian Goldberg 0001, Matthew Smith 0001
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy5
2014 Why eve and mallory (also) love webmasters: a study on the root causes of SSL misconfigurations
abstract
Previous research showed that the SSL infrastructure is a fragile system: X.509 certificate validation fails for a non-trivial number of HTTPS-enabled websites resulting in SSL warning messages presented to users. Studies revealed that warning messages do not provide easy-to-understand information or are ignored by webbrowser users. SSL warning messages are a critical component in the HTTPS infrastructure and many attempts have been made to improve these warning messages. However, an important question has not received sufficient attention yet: Why do webmasters (deliberately) deploy non-validating, security-critical X.509 certificates on publicly available websites? In this paper, we conduct the first study with webmasters operating non-validating X.509 certificates to understand their motives behind deploying those certificates. We extracted the non-validating certificates from Google's webcrawler body of X.509 certificates, informed webmasters about the problem with the X.509 certificate configuration on their website and invited a random sample of the respective webmasters to participate in our study. 755 webmasters participated, allowing us insight into their motives. While one third of them admitted to having misconfigured their webserver accidentally, two thirds of them gave reasons for deliberately using a non-validating X.509 certificate.
Sascha Fahl, Yasemin Acar, Henning Perl, Matthew Smith 0001
AsiaCCS3
2014 Hey, NSA: Stay Away from my Market! Future Proofing App Markets against Powerful Attackers
abstract
Mobile devices are evolving as the dominant computing platform and consequently application repositories and app markets are becoming the prevalent paradigm for deploying software. Due to their central and trusted position in the software ecosystem, coerced, hacked or malicious app markets pose a serious threat to user security. Currently, there is little that hinders a nation state adversary (NSA) or other powerful attackers from using such central and trusted points of software distribution to deploy customized (malicious) versions of apps to specific users. Due to intransparencies in the current app installation paradigm, this kind of attack is extremely hard to detect.
Sascha Fahl, Sergej Dechand, Henning Perl, Felix Fischer 0001, Jaromir Smrcek, Matthew Smith 0001
CCS3
2014 Privacy/performance trade-off in private search on bio-medical data
Henning Perl, Yassene Mohammed, Michael Brenner 0003, Matthew Smith 0001
Future Gener. Comput. Syst.1
2013 Rethinking SSL development in an appified world
abstract
The Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is widely used to secure data transfers on the Internet. Previous studies have shown that the state of non-browser SSL code is catastrophic across a large variety of desktop applications and libraries as well as a large selection of Android apps, leaving users vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks (MITMAs). To determine possible causes of SSL problems on all major appified platforms, we extended the analysis to the walled-garden ecosystem of iOS, analyzed software developer forums and conducted interviews with developers of vulnerable apps. Our results show that the root causes are not simply careless developers, but also limitations and issues of the current SSL development paradigm. Based on our findings, we derive a proposal to rethink the handling of SSL in the appified world and present a set of countermeasures to improve the handling of SSL using Android as a blueprint for other platforms. Our countermeasures prevent developers from willfully or accidentally breaking SSL certificate validation, offer support for extended features such as SSL Pinning and different SSL validation infrastructures, and protect users. We evaluated our solution against 13,500 popular Android apps and conducted developer interviews to judge the acceptance of our approach and found that our solution works well for all investigated apps and developers.
Sascha Fahl, Marian Harbach, Henning Perl, Markus Koetter, Matthew Smith 0001
CCS3
2012 Fast confidential search for bio-medical data using Bloom filters and Homomorphic Cryptography
abstract
Data protection is a challenge when outsourcing medical analysis, especially if one is dealing with patient related data. While securing transfer channels is possible using encryption mechanisms, protecting the data during analyses is difficult as it usually involves processing steps on the plain data. A common use case in bioinformatics is when a scientist searches for a biological sequence of amino acids or DNA nucleotides in a library or database of sequences to identify similarities. Most such search algorithms are optimized for speed with less or no consideration for data protection. Fast algorithms are especially necessary because of the immense search space represented for instance by the genome or proteome of complex organisms. We propose a new secure exact term search algorithm based on Bloom filters. Our algorithm retains data privacy by using Obfuscated Bloom filters while maintaining the performance needed for real-life applications. The results can then be further aggregated using Homomorphic Cryptography to allow exact-match searching. The proposed system facilitates outsourcing exact term search of sensitive data to on-demand resources in a way which conforms to best practice of data protection.
Henning Perl, Yassene Mohammed, Michael Brenner 0003, Matthew Smith 0001
eScience1
2012 Practical Applications of Homomorphic Encryption
Michael Brenner 0003, Henning Perl, Matthew Smith 0001
SECRYPT2
2012 How Practical is Homomorphically Encrypted Program Execution? An Implementation and Performance Evaluation
abstract
Homomorphic cryptography has received a lot of attention due to potentially ground breaking advances in cryptography. However it is also surrounded by a lot of hyperbole such as "ground breaking advances", "this will solve all Cloud computing problems" to "it is completely impractical" and "it will never work for real world problems". In previous work we showed how homomorphic encryption can be used to execute arbitrary programs in encrypted space, showing that at least in theory real world problems can be computed protected by homomorphic cryptography without losing generality. In this paper we expand our work to evaluate how practical current homomorphic cryptography based on the Smart-Vercauteren system is for executing arbitrary programs on untrusted resources. For this we present the implementation of a method to compute non-linear secret programs on an untrusted resource using encrypted circuits embedded in an encrypted virtual machine. We successively show how a processor architecture using encrypted circuits can be implemented so it can support read and write memory access, dynamic parameters and non-linear programs that render branch-decisions at runtime. The system comprises the runtime environment for program execution and an assembler to generate the encrypted machine code. We present performance evaluation of the sub-components as well as the complete system. The system represents a flexible prototype for homomorphic program execution in software and system architecture.
Michael Brenner 0003, Henning Perl, Matthew Smith 0001
TrustCom2
2011 Poster: an implementation of the fully homomorphic smart-vercauteren crypto-system
Henning Perl, Michael Brenner 0003, Matthew Smith 0001
CCS1