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Daniil M. Utin

dblp:53/3480 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
1as first author
0since 2021 · last 2018
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 77% Hardware security and side channels · 23%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
key management
0.212013
SHAMROCK: self contained cryptography and key management processor · CCS 2013
Hardware security and side channels
cryptographic hardware
0.012013
SHAMROCK: self contained cryptography and key management processor · CCS 2013

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

streaming encryption · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2018 Leveraging Intel SGX Technology to Protect Security-Sensitive Applications
abstract
This paper explains the process by which Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX) can be leveraged into an existing codebase to protect a security-sensitive application. Intel SGX provides user-level applications with hardware-enforced confidentiality and integrity protections and incurs manageable impact on performance. These protections apply to all three phases of the operational data lifecycle: at rest, in use, and in transit. SGX shrinks the trusted computing base (and therefore the attack surface) of the application to only the hardware on the CPU chip and the portion of the application's software that is executed within the protected enclave. The SDK enables SGX integration into existing C/C++ codebases while still ensuring program support for legacy and non-Intel platforms. This paper is the first published work to walk through the step-by-step process of Intel SGX integration with examples and performance results from an actual cryptographic application produced in a standard Linux development environment.
Joseph Sobchuk, Sean R. O'Melia, Daniil M. Utin, Roger I. Khazan
NCA3
2013 SHAMROCK: self contained cryptography and key management processor
abstract
In this poster, we describe a one-size-fits-many Intellectual Property (IP) core which integrates advanced key management technology and streaming encryption into a single component to protect data in-transit.
Daniil M. Utin, Roger I. Khazan, Joshua Kramer, Michael Vai, David Whelihan
CCS1
2010 ASE: Authenticated Statement Exchange
abstract
Applications often re-transmit the same data, such as digital certificates, during repeated communication instances. Avoiding such superfluous transmissions with caching, while complicated, may be necessary in order to operate in low-bandwidth, high-latency wireless networks or in order to reduce communication load in shared, mobile networks. This paper presents a general framework and an accompanying software library, called "Authenticated Statement Exchange'' (ASE), for helping applications implement persistent caching of application-specific data. ASE supports secure caching of a number of pre-defined data types common to secure communication protocols and allows applications to define new data types to be handled by ASE. ASE is applicable to many applications. The paper describes the use of ASE in one such application, secure group chat. In a recent real-use deployment, ASE was instrumental in allowing secure group chat to operate over low-bandwidth satellite links.
Benjamin Fuller 0001, Roger I. Khazan, Joseph A. Cooley, Galen E. Pickard, Daniil M. Utin
NCA5