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Georg Walter

dblp:53/3993 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2003
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 77% Hardware security and side channels · 23%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 2, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
formal security model
0.012000
A Formal Security Model for Microprocessor Hardware · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2000
Hardware security and side channels
hardware security verification
0.012000
A Formal Security Model for Microprocessor Hardware · IEEE Trans. Software Eng. 2000

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

state transition automaton · 0.0formal verification · 0.0
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2003 A Formal Security Model of the Infineon SLE 88 Smart Card Memory Managment
David von Oheimb, Georg Walter, Volkmar Lotz
ESORICS2
2000 A Formal Security Model for Microprocessor Hardware
abstract
The paper introduces a formal security model for a microprocessor hardware system. The model has been developed as part of the evaluation process of the processor product according to ITSEC assurance level E4. Novel aspects of the model are the need for defining integrity and confidentiality objectives on the hardware level without the operating system or application specification and security policy being given, and the utilization of an abstract function and data space. The security model consists of a system model given as a state transition automaton on infinite structures and the formalization of security objectives by means of properties of automaton behaviors. Validity of the security properties is proved. The paper compares the model with published ones and summarizes the lessons learned throughout the modeling process.
Volkmar Lotz, Volker Kessler, Georg Walter
IEEE Trans. Software Eng.3