Smartphones, tablets and other mobile platforms typically accommodate bulk data storage with low-cost, FAT-formatted Secure Digital cards. When one uses a mobile device to run a full-system virtual machine (VM), there can be a mismatch between 1) the VM's I/O mixture, security and reliability requirements and 2) the properties of the storage media available for VM block storage and checkpoint images. To resolve this mismatch, this paper presents a new VM disk image format called the Logging Block Store (LBS). After motivating the need for a new format, LBS is described in detail with experimental results demonstrating its efficacy. As a result of this work, recommendations are made for future optimizations throughout the stack that may simplify and improve the performance of storage virtualization systems on mobile platforms.

Complete formal verification is the only known way to guarantee that a system is free of programming errors.We present our experience in performing the formal, machine-checked verification of the seL4 microkernel from an abstract specification down to its C implementation. We assume correctness of compiler, assembly code, and hardware, and we used a unique design approach that fuses formal and operating systems techniques. To our knowledge, this is the first formal proof of functional correctness of a complete, general-purpose operating-system kernel. Functional correctness means here that the implementation always strictly follows our high-level abstract specification of kernel behaviour. This encompasses traditional design and implementation safety properties such as the kernel will never crash, and it will never perform an unsafe operation. It also proves much more: we can predict precisely how the kernel will behave in every possible situation.seL4, a third-generation microkernel of L4 provenance, comprises 8,700 lines of C code and 600 lines of assembler. Its performance is comparable to other high-performance L4 kernels.

We present a formal model of memory that both captures the low-level features of C's pointers and memory, and that forms the basis for an expressive implementation of separation logic. At the low level, we do not commit common oversimplifications, but correctly deal with C's model of programming language values and the heap. At the level of separation logic, we are still able to reason abstractly and efficiently. We implement this framework in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL and demonstrate it on two case studies. We show that the divide between detailed and abstract does not impose undue verification overhead, and that simple programs remain easy to verify. We also show that the framework is applicable to real, security- and safety-critical code by formally verifying the memory allocator of the L4 microkernel.