Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have become widely deployed, yet their safety alignment remains fragile under adversarial inputs. Previous work has shown that increasing inference steps can disrupt safety mechanisms and lead MLLMs to generate attacker-desired harmful content. However, most existing attacks focus on increasing the complexity of the modified visual task itself and do not explicitly leverage the model’s own reasoning incentives. This leads to them underperforming on reasoning models (Models with Chain-of-Thoughts) compared to non-reasoning ones (Models without Chain-of-Thoughts). If a model can think like a human, can we influence its cognitive-stage decisions so that it proactively completes a jailbreak? To validate this idea, we propose GAMBIT (Gamified Adversarial Multimodal Breakout via Instructional Traps), a novel multimodal jailbreak framework that decomposes and reassembles harmful visual semantics, then constructs a gamified scene that drives the model to explore, reconstruct intent, and answer as part of winning the game. The resulting structured reasoning chain increases task complexity in both vision and text, positioning the model as a participant whose goal pursuit reduces safety attention and induces it to answer the reconstructed malicious query. Extensive experiments on popular reasoning and non-reasoning MLLMs demonstrate that GAMBIT achieves high Attack Success Rates (ASR), reaching 92.13% on Gemini 2.5 Flash, 91.20% on QvQ-MAX, and 85.87% on GPT-4o, significantly outperforming baselines. Warning: This paper contains unsafe and offensive examples.

Bitcoin has witnessed a prevailing transition that employing transaction fees paid by users rather than subsidy assigned by the system as the main incentive for mining. The adjustability of reward in the transaction fee-incentivized regime makes room for the mining gap, a period of time in which miners turn mining rigs off until transaction fees are sufficient. Obviously, the mining gap aggressively weakens the security of Bitcoin, and is further extended by the selfishness of rational users who tend to provide low transaction fees. The phenomena of mining gap traps Bitcoin system into the egoistic dilemma which is a challenging problem since it involves games not only between users and miners bilaterally, but also among miners and users internally. Hence, in this paper, we first derive the property of strategic complementarity among users/miners, which enables us to reasonably untangle the antagonism among the homogenous players. Based on this, an incentive mechanism leveraging the zero-determinant theory is designed to get rid of the dilemma. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first work to cap the mining gap and solve the egoistic dilemma in Bitcoin. Both theoretical analyses and numerical simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism.

Facilitated by mobile edge computing, client-edge-cloud hierarchical federated learning (HFL) enables communication-efficient model training in a widespread area but also incurs additional security and privacy challenges from intermediate model aggregations and remains vulnerable to the single point of failure issue. To tackle these challenges, we propose a blockchain-based HFL (BHFL) system that operates a permissioned blockchain among edge servers for model aggregation without the need for a centralized cloud server. The employment of blockchain, however, introduces additional overhead. To enable a compact and efficient workflow, we design a novel lightweight consensus algorithm, named Proof of Federated Edge Learning (PoFEL), to reuse computational work performed for local model training. Specifically, the leader node is selected by evaluating the intermediate FEL models from all edge servers instead of other additional mechanisms used solely for leader elections. This design thus improves the system efficiency compared with traditional BHFL frameworks. To prevent model plagiarism and bribery voting during the consensus process, we propose Hash-based Commitment and Digital Signature (HCDS) and Bayesian Truth Serum-based Voting (BTSV) schemes. Finally, we devise an incentive mechanism to motivate continuous contributions from clients to the learning task. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed BHFL system with the corresponding consensus protocol and incentive mechanism achieves effectiveness, low computational cost, and fairness.

Is it secure to measure the reliability of local models by similarity in federated learning (FL)? This paper delves into an unexplored security threat concerning applying similarity metrics, such as the$L_{2}$norm, Euclidean distance, and cosine similarity, in protecting FL. We first uncover the deficiencies of similarity metrics that high-dimensional local models, including benign and poisoned models, may be evaluated to have the same similarity while being significantly different in the parameter values. We then leverage this finding to devise a novel untargeted model poisoning attack, Faker, which launches the attack by simultaneously maximizing the evaluated similarity of the poisoned local model and the difference in the parameter values. Experimental results based on seven datasets and eight defenses show that Faker outperforms the state-of-the-art benchmark attacks by1.1-9.0Xin reducing accuracy and1.2-8.0Xin saving time cost, which even holds for the case of a single malicious client with limited knowledge about the FL system. Moreover, Faker can degrade the performance of the global model by attacking only once. We also preliminarily explore extending Faker to other attacks, such as backdoor attacks and Sybil attacks. Lastly, we provide a model evaluation strategy, called the similarity of partial parameters (SPP), to defend against Faker. Given that numerous mechanisms in FL utilize similarity metrics to assess local models, this work suggests that we should be vigilant regarding the potential risks of using these metrics. The code will be released soon.

The widespread usage of Microsoft Windows has unfortunately led to a surge in malware, posing a serious threat to the security and privacy of millions of users. In response, the research community has mobilized, with numerous efforts dedicated to strengthening defenses against these threats. The primary goal of these techniques is to detect malicious software early, preventing attacks before any damage occurs. However, many of these methods either claim that packing has minimal impact on malware detection or fail to address the reliability of their approaches when applied to packed samples. Consequently, they are not capable of assisting victims in handling packed programs or recovering from the damages caused by untimely malware detection. To address these challenges, we proposeVisUnpac, a static analysis-based data visualization framework for bolstering attack prevention while aiding recovery post-attack by unveiling malware patterns and offering more detailed information including both malware class and family. Our method includes unpacking packed malware programs, calculating local similarity descriptors based on basic blocks, enhancing correlations between descriptors, and refining them by minimizing noises to obtain self-analysis descriptors. Moreover, we employ machine learning to learn the correlations of self-analysis descriptors through architectural learning for final classification. Our comprehensive evaluation ofVisUnpacbased on a freshly gathered dataset with over 27,106 samples confirms its capability in accurately classifying malware programs with a precision of 99.7%. Additionally,VisUnpacreveals that most antivirus products in VirusTotal can not handle packed samples properly or provide precise malware classification information. We also achieve over 97% space savings compared to existing data visualization based methods.

Federated learning (FL) is a distributed learning framework that allows clients to jointly train a model by uploading parameter updates rather than sharing local data. FL deployed on a client-edge-cloud hierarchical architecture, named Hierarchical Federated Learning (HFL), can accelerate model training and accommodate more clients with reduced communication cost via edge aggregation. Unfortunately, HFL suffers from privacy risks since the submitted parameters from clients are vulnerable to privacy attacks. To address this issue, we propose a novel Differential Privacy (DP) definition tailored for HFL, i.e., Group Local Differential Privacy (GLDP). We design the Sampling-Randomizing-Shuffling (SRS) mechanism to implement GLDP in HFL, where the sampling process is employed to achieve a stronger level of privacy protection with less noise added. By combining the randomized response and the shuffling mechanism, our proposed SRS mechanism can achieve client-level personalization within$\rho _{k}$-GLDP for privacy preservation while balancing model performance and privacy protection in HFL. Privacy analysis and convergence analysis are conducted to provide theoretical performance guarantees. Experimental results based on real-world datasets verify the effectiveness of SRS.

Decentralized Storage Network (DSN) is an emerging technology that challenges traditional cloud-based storage systems by consolidating storage capacities from independent providers and coordinating to provide decentralized storage and retrieval services. However, current DSNs face several challenges associated with data privacy and efficiency of the proof systems. To address these issues, we propose FileDES ( Decentralized Encrypted Storage), which incorporates three essential elements: privacy preservation, scalable storage proof, and batch verification. FileDES provides encrypted data storage while maintaining data availability, with a scalable Proof of Encrypted Storage (PoES) algorithm that is resilient to Sybil and Generation attacks. Additionally, we introduce a rollup-based batch verification approach to simultaneously verify multiple files using publicly verifiable succinct proofs. We conducted a comparative evaluation on FileDES, Filecoin, Storj and Sia under various conditions, including a WAN composed of up to 120 geographically dispersed nodes. Our protocol outperforms the others in terms of proof generation/verification efficiency, storage costs, and scalability.

With the booming of mobile edge computing (MEC) and blockchain-based blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL), more studies suggest deploying BCFL on edge servers. In this case, edge servers with restricted resources face the dilemma of serving both mobile devices for their offloading tasks and the BCFL system for model training and blockchain consensus without sacrificing the service quality to any side. To address this challenge, this article proposes a resource allocation scheme for edge servers to provide optimal services at the minimum cost. Specifically, we first analyze the energy consumption of the MEC and BCFL tasks, considering the completion time of each task as the service quality constraint. Then, we model the resource allocation challenge into a multivariate, multiconstraint, and convex optimization problem. While solving the problem in a progressive manner, we design two algorithms based on the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMMs) in both homogeneous and heterogeneous situations, where equal and on-demand resource distribution strategies are, respectively, adopted. The validity of our proposed algorithms is proved via rigorous theoretical analysis. Moreover, the convergence and efficiency of our proposed resource allocation schemes are evaluated through extensive experiments.

A metaverse breaks the boundaries of time and space between people, realizing a more realistic virtual experience, improving work efficiency, and creating a new business model. Blockchain, as one of the key supporting technologies for a metaverse design, provides a trusted interactive environment. However, the rich and varied scenes of a metaverse have led to excessive consumption of on-chain resources, raising the threshold for ordinary users to join, thereby losing the human-centered design. Therefore, we propose an adaptive and modular blockchain-enabled architecture for a decentralized metaverse to address these issues. The solution includes an adaptive consensus/ledger protocol based on a modular blockchain, which can effectively adapt to the ever-changing scenarios of the metaverse, reduce resource consumption, and provide a secure and reliable interactive environment. In addition, we propose the concept of Non-Fungible Resource (NFR) to virtualize idle resources. Users can establish a temporary trusted environment and rent others’ NFR to meet their computing needs. Finally, we simulate and test our solution based on XuperChain, and the experimental results prove the feasibility of our design.

Despite continuous advancements in defense mechanisms, attackers often find ways to circumvent security measures. Windows operating systems, in particular, are vulnerable due to fewer restrictions on downloading software from unknown sources, facilitating the spread of malware. To address this challenge, researchers have focused on developing techniques to identify Windows malware, crucial for mitigating potential damage. Traditional approaches typically categorize threats into broad classes such as trojans or adware, often failing to capture the full spectrum of malicious behaviors exhibited by diverse malware variants. In response, we propose a novel approach to malware categorization that incorporates both the general malware family and subfamily for each sample. Our method leverages self-similarity techniques to extract local semantics and similarities within the blocks of malware binaries while preserving correlations between these blocks. We utilize a VGG11 model to capture these features, enabling accurate classification. Central to our approach is the conversion of malware binaries into self-similarity descriptors, facilitating space savings while capturing essential semantics within blocks. By focusing on local self-similarities and their geometric layouts across malware, our method effectively identifies repetitive patterns indicative of malware behavior. Our proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates the effectiveness of our framework, achieving an impressive average precision of 98.2% on a newly gathered dataset with over 25,000 samples. Moreover, our method offers significant space savings, outperforming recent research efforts by a factor of over 96. These results underscore the efficacy of incorporating self-similarities and correlations within blocks for robust malware classification, making our approach a promising solution for real-world malware detection and prevention.

Although proof of work (PoW) consensus dominates the current blockchain-based systems mostly, it has always been criticized for the uneconomic brute-force calculation. As alternatives, energy-conservation and energy-recycling mechanisms heaved in sight. In this paper, we propose proof of user similarity (PoUS), a distinct energy-recycling consensus mechanism, harnessing the valuable computing power to calculate the similarities of users, and enact the calculation results into the packing rule. However, the expensive calculation required in PoUS challenges miners in participating, and may induce plagiarism and lying risks. To resolve these issues, PoUS embraces thebest-effortschema by allowing miners to compute partially. Besides, a voting mechanism based on the secure two-party computation and Bayesian truth serum is proposed to guarantee privacy-preserved voting and truthful reports. Noticeably, PoUS distinguishes itself in recycling the computing powerback to blockchainsince it turns the resource wastage to facilitate refined cohort analysis of users, serving as thespatial measurerand enabling asearchableblockchain. We build a prototype of PoUS and compare its performance with PoW. The results show that PoUS outperforms PoW in achieving an average transaction per second (TPS) improvement of 24.01% and an average confirmation latency reduction of 43.64%. Besides, PoUS functions well in mirroring the spatial information of users, with negligible computation time and communication cost.

Metaverse has rekindled human beings’ desire to further break space-time barriers by fusing the virtual and real worlds. However, security and privacy threats hinder us from building a utopia. A metaverse embraces various techniques, while at the same time inheriting their pitfalls and thus exposing large attack surfaces. Blockchain, proposed in 2008, was regarded as a key building block of metaverses. it enables transparent and trusted computing environments using tamper-resistant decentralized ledgers. Currently, blockchain supports Decentralized Finance (DeFi) and Non-fungible Tokens (NFT) for metaverses. However, the power of a blockchain has not been sufficiently exploited. In this article, we propose a novel trustless architecture of blockchain-enabled metaverse, aiming to provide efficient resource integration and allocation by consolidating hardware and software components. To realize our design objectives, we provide an On-Demand Trusted Computing Environment (OTCE) technique based on local trust evaluation. Specifically, the architecture adopts a hypergraph to represent a metaverse, in which each hyperedge links a group of users with certain relationship. Then the trust level of each user group can be evaluated based on graph analytics techniques. Based on the trust value, each group can determine its security plan on demand, free from interference by irrelevant nodes. Besides, OTCEs enable large-scale and flexible application environments (sandboxes) while preserving a strong security guarantee.

Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) counting on the mobility of massive workers helps the requestor accomplish various sensing tasks with more flexibility and lower cost. However, for the conventional MCS, the large consumption of communication resources for raw data transmission and high requirements on data storage and computing capability hinder potential requestors with limited resources from using MCS. To facilitate the widespread application of MCS, we propose a novelMCS learning frameworkleveraging on blockchain technology and the new concept of edge intelligence based on federated learning (FL), which involves four major entities, including requestors, blockchain, edge servers, and mobile devices as workers. Even though there exist several studies on blockchain-based MCS and blockchain-based FL, they cannot solve the essential challenges of MCS with respect to accommodating resource-constrained requestors or deal with the privacy concerns brought by the involvement of requestors and workers in the learning process. To fill the gaps, four main procedures, i.e., task publication, data sensing and submission, learning to return final results, and payment settlement and allocation, are designed to address major challenges brought by both internal and external threats, such as malicious edge servers and dishonest requestors. Specifically, a mechanism design-based data submission rule is proposed to guarantee the data privacy of mobile devices being truthfully preserved at edge servers; consortium blockchain-based FL is elaborated to secure the distributed learning process; and a cooperation-enforcing control strategy is devised to elicit full payment from the requestor. Extensive simulations are carried out to evaluate the performance of our designed schemes.

As edge computing faces increasingly severe data security and privacy issues of edge devices, a framework called federated edge learning (FEL) has recently been proposed to enable machine learning (ML) model training at the edge, ensuring communication efficiency and data privacy protection for edge devices. In this paradigm, the training efficiency has long been challenged by the heterogeneity of communication conditions, computing capabilities, and available data sets at devices. Currently, researchers focus on solving this challenge via device selection from the perspective of optimizing energy consumption or convergence speed. However, the consideration of any one of them is insufficient to guarantee the long-term system efficiency and stability. To fill the gap, we propose an optimization problem to simultaneously minimize the total energy consumption of selected devices and maximize the convergence speed of the global model for device selection in FEL, under the constraints of training data amount and time consumption. For the accurate calculation of energy consumption, we deploy online bandit learning to estimate the CPU-cycle frequency availability of each device, based on an efficient algorithm, named fast-convergent energy-efficient device selection (FCE2DS), is proposed to solve the optimization problem with a low level of time complexity. Through a series of comparative experiments, we evaluate the performance of the proposed FCE2DS scheme, verifying its high training accuracy and energy efficiency.

In the given technology-driven era, smart cities are the next frontier of technology, and these smart cities aim to improve the quality of people’s lives. In this article, we introduce such future Internet of Things (IoT)-based smart cities that leverage blockchain technology. Particularly, when there are multiple parties involved, blockchain helps in improving the security and transparency of the system in an efficient manner. However, if a current fee-based or first-come–first-serve-based processing is used, emergency events may get delayed and even threaten people’s lives. Thus, there is a need for transaction prioritization based on the priority of information and a dynamic block creation mechanism for efficient data recording and faster event response. Also, our system focuses on the consortium blockchain maintained by a group of members working across different organizations to provide more efficiency. The leader election procedure in such a consortium blockchain becomes more important for the transaction prioritization process to take place honestly. Hence, in our proposed consensus protocol, we deploy a machine-learning (ML) algorithm to achieve efficient leader election, based on which a novel dynamic block creation algorithm is designed. Also, to ensure the honest block generation behavior of the leader, a peer-prediction-based verification mechanism is proposed. Both security analysis and simulation experiments are carried out to demonstrate the robustness, accuracy, and efficiency of our proposed scheme.

Decentralized learning involves training machine learning models over remote mobile devices, edge servers, or cloud servers while keeping data localized. Even though many studies have shown the feasibility of preserving privacy, enhancing training performance or introducing Byzantine resilience, but none of them simultaneously considers all of them. Therefore we face the following problem:how can we efficiently coordinate the decentralized learning process while simultaneously maintaining learning security and data privacy for the entire system?To address this issue, in this paper we propose SPDL, a blockchain-secured and privacy-preserving decentralized learning system. SPDL integrates blockchain, Byzantine Fault-Tolerant (BFT) consensus, BFT Gradients Aggregation Rule (GAR), and differential privacy seamlessly into one system, ensuring efficient machine learning while maintaining data privacy, Byzantine fault tolerance, transparency, and traceability. To validate our approach, we provide rigorous analysis on convergence and regret in the presence of Byzantine nodes. We also build a SPDL prototype and conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that SPDL is effective and efficient with strong security and privacy guarantees.

Natural forking is tantamount to the “black swan” event in blockchain since it emerges unexpectedly with a small probability, and may incur low resource utilization and costly economic loss. The ongoing literature analyzes natural forking mainly from the macroscopic perspective, which is insufficient to further understand this phenomenon since it roots in theinstantaneous differencebetween block creation and propagation microscopically. Hence, in this article, we fill this gap by leveraging the large deviation theory to conduct the first micro study of natural forking, aiming to reveal its inherent mechanism substantially. Our work is featured by 1)conceptual innovation. We creatively abstract the blockchain overlay network as a “service system”. This allows us to investigate natural forking from the perspective of “supply and demand”. Based on this, we can identify the competitive dynamics of blockchain and construct a queuing model to characterize natural forking; 2)progressiveness. We scrutinize the natural forking probability as well as its decay rate via a three-step scheme from simple to complex, which are the single-source i.i.d. scheme, the single-source non-i.i.d. scheme, and the many-source non-i.i.d. scheme. By doing so, we can answerwhenandhow fastshould we take actions andwhatactions should we take against natural forking. Our valuable findings can not only put forward decisive guidelines theoretically from the top level, but also engineer optimal countermeasures operationally on a practical level to thwart natural forking.

Smart home systems are both technologically and economically advancing rapidly. As people become gradually inalienable to smart home infrastructures, their security conditions are getting more and more closely tied to everyone's privacy and safety. In this paper, we consider smart apps, either malicious ones with evil intentions or benign ones with logic errors, that can cause property loss or even physical sufferings to the user when being executed in a smart home environment and interacting with human activities and environmental changes. Unfortunately, current preventive measures rely on permission-based access control, failing to provide ideal protections against such threats due to the nature of their rigid designs. In this paper, we propose CommandFence, a novel digital-twin-based security framework that adopts a fundamentally new concept of protecting the smart home system by letting any sequence of app commands to be executed in a virtual smart home system, in which a deep-q network (DQN) is used to predict if the sequence could lead to a risky consequence. CommandFence is composed of an Interposition Layer to interpose app commands and an Emulation Layer to figure out whether they can cause any risky smart home state if correlating with possible human activities and environmental changes. We fully implemented our CommandFence implementation and tested against 553 official SmartApps on the Samsung SmartThings platform and successfully identified 34 potentially dangerous ones, with 31 of them reported to be problematicAuthor: Please provide index terms/keywords for your article. To download the IEEE Taxonomy go tohttp://www.ieee.org/documents/taxonomy_v101.pdf?> the first time to our best knowledge. Moreover, We tested our CommandFence on the 10 malicious SmartApps created by Jiaet al.2017, and successfully identified 7 of them as risky, with the missed ones actually only causing smartphone information leak (not harmful to the smart home system). We also tested CommandFence against the 17 benign SmartApps with logic errors developed by Celiket al.2017, and achieved a 100% accuracy. Our experimental studies indicate that adopting CommandFence incurs a neglectable overhead of 0.1675 seconds.

The explosive amount of data generated at the network edge makes mobile edge computing an essential technology to support real-time applications, calling for powerful data processing and analysis provided by machine learning (ML) techniques. In particular, federated edge learning (FEL) becomes prominent in securing the privacy of data owners by keeping the data locally used to train ML models. Existing studies on FEL either utilize in-process optimization or remove unqualified participants in advance. In this paper, we enhance the collaboration from all edge devices in FEL to guarantee that the ML model is trained using all available local data to accelerate the learning process. To that aim, we propose acollective extortion (CE)strategy under the imperfect-information multi-player FEL game, which is proved to be effective in helping the server efficiently elicit the full contribution of all devices without worrying about suffering from any economic loss. Technically, our proposed CE strategy extends the classical extortion strategy in controlling the proportionate share of expected utilities for a single opponent to the swiftly homogeneous control over a group of players, which further presents an attractive trait of being impartial for all participants. Moreover, the CE strategy enriches the game theory hierarchy, facilitating a wider application scope of the extortion strategy. Both theoretical analysis and experimental evaluations validate the effectiveness and fairness of our proposed scheme.

Virtual network functions (VNFs) have been widely deployed in mobile edge computing (MEC) to flexibly and efficiently serve end users running resource-intensive applications, which can be further serialized to form service function chains (SFCs), providing customized networking services. To ensure the availability of SFCs, it turns out to be effective to place redundant SFC backups at the edge for quickly recovering from any failures. The existing research largely overlooks the influences of SFC popularity, backup completeness, and failure rate on the optimal deployment of SFC backups on edge servers. In this paper, we comprehensively consider from the perspectives of both the end users and edge system to backup SFCs for providing popular services with the lowest latency. To overcome the challenges resulted from unknown SFC popularity and failure rate, as well as the known system parameter constraints, we take advantage of the online bandit learning technique to cope with the uncertainty issue. Combining the Prim -inspired method with the greedy strategy, we propose a Real-Time Selection and Deployment (RTSD) algorithm. Extensive simulation experiments are conducted to demonstrate the superiority of our proposed algorithms.

Though voting-based consensus algorithms in blockchain outperform proof-based ones in energy- and transaction-efficiency, they are prone to incur wrong elections and bribery elections. The former originates from the uncertainties of candidates’ capability and availability, and the latter comes from the egoism of voters and candidates. Hence, in this paper, we propose an uncertainty- and collusion-proof voting consensus mechanism, including the selection pressure-based voting algorithm and the trustworthiness evaluation algorithm. The first algorithm can decrease the side effects of candidates’ uncertainties, lowering wrong elections while trading off the balance between efficiency and fairness in voting miners. The second algorithm adopts an incentive-compatible scoring rule to evaluate the trustworthiness of voting, motivating voters to report true beliefs on candidates by making egoism consistent with altruism so as to avoid bribery elections. A salient feature of our work is theoretically analyzing the proposed voting consensus mechanism by the large deviation theory. Our analysis provides not only the voting failure rate of a candidate but also its decay speed. The voting failure rate measures the incompetence of any candidate from a personal perspective by voting, based on which the concepts of the effective selection valve and the effective expectation of merit are introduced to help the system designer determine the optimal voting standard and guide a candidate to behave in an optimal way for lowering the voting failure rate.

Blockchain-based federated learning (BCFL) has recently gained tremendous attention because of its advantages, such as decentralization and privacy protection of raw data. However, there has been few studies focusing on the allocation of resources for the participated devices (i.e., clients) in the BCFL system. Especially, in the BCFL framework where the FL clients are also the blockchain miners, clients have to train the local models, broadcast the trained model updates to the blockchain network, and then perform mining to generate new blocks. Since each client has a limited amount of computing resources, the problem of allocating computing resources to training and mining needs to be carefully addressed. In this paper, we design an incentive mechanism to help the model owner (MO) (i.e., the BCFL task publisher) assign each client appropriate rewards for training and mining, and then the client will determine the amount of computing power to allocate for each subtask based on these rewards using the two-stage Stackelberg game. After analyzing the utilities of the MO and clients, we transform the game model into two optimization problems, which are sequentially solved to derive the optimal strategies for both the MO and clients. Further, considering the fact that local training related information of each client may not be known by others, we extend the game model with analytical solutions to the incomplete information scenario. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the validity of our proposed schemes.

As one of the typical settings of Federated Learning (FL), cross-silo FL allows organizations to jointly train an optimal Machine Learning (ML) model. In this case, some organizations may try to obtain the global model without contributing their local training, lowering the social welfare. In this paper, we model the interactions among organizations in cross-silo FL as a public goods game for the first time and theoretically prove that there exists a social dilemma where the maximum social welfare is not achieved in Nash equilibrium. To over-come this social dilemma, we employ the Multi-player Multi-action Zero-Determinant (MMZD) strategy to maximize the social welfare. With the help of the MMZD, an individual organization can unilaterally control the social welfare without extra cost. Experimental results validate that the MMZD strategy is effective in maximizing the social welfare.

Leveraging on the wealth of data and advancements in Artificial Intelligence, smart cities have demonstrated their great potential in providing solutions to challenges that the urban population faces today. However, as the urban population becomes more privacy sensitive and with the introduction of stringent privacy regulations, the differential-private FL (DPFL) is a promising technology that can enable privacy-preserving collaborative model training. In this paper, we consider an FL network of model owners and data owners with heterogeneous privacy budgets and preferences respectively. In exchange for their participation in the training, the model owner offers a reward pool that is shared among the data owners that take part in the FL training. In turn, the FL worker with heterogeneous privacy preferences may select the model owner to contribute its parameters to. To model the dynamic and strategic behaviour of the workers in the process of model owner selection, we propose an evolutionary game approach. Then, we conduct simulations to validate the evolutionary equilibrium, as well as provide the sensitivity analyses of the model.

Payment channel network (PCN) is a layer-two scaling solution that enables fast off-chain transactions but does not involve on-chain transaction settlement. PCNs raise new privacy issues including balance secrecy, relationship anonymity and payment privacy. Moreover, protecting privacy causes low transaction success rates. To address this dilemma, we propose zk-PCN, a privacy-preserving payment channel network using zk-SNARKs. We prevent from exposing true balances by setting up public balances instead. Using public balances, zk-PCN can guarantee high transaction success rates and protect PCN privacy with zero-knowledge proofs. Additionally, zk-PCN is compatible with the existing routing algorithms of PCNs. To support such compatibility, we propose zk-IPCN to improve zk-PCN with a novel proof generation (RPG) algorithm. zk-IPCN reduces the overheads of storing channel information and lowers the frequency of generating zero-knowledge proofs. Finally, extensive simulations demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of zk-PCN in various settings.

Advances in distributed machine learning can empower future communications and networking. The emergence of federated learning (FL) has provided an efficient framework for distributed machine learning, which, however, still faces many security challenges. Among them, model poisoning attacks have a significant impact on the security and performance of FL. Given that there have been many studies focusing on defending against model poisoning attacks, it is necessary to survey the existing work and provide insights to inspire future research. In this paper, we first classify defense mechanisms for model poisoning attacks into two categories: evaluation methods for local model updates and aggregation methods for the global model. Then, we analyze some of the existing defense strategies in detail. We also discuss some potential challenges and future research directions. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to survey defense methods for model poisoning attacks in FL.

The importance of transaction fees in maintaining blockchain security and sustainability has been confirmed by extensive research, although they are not mandatory in most current blockchain systems. To enhance blockchain in the long term, it is crucial to design effective transaction pricing mechanisms. Different from the existing schemes based on auctions with more consideration about the profit of miners, we resort to game theory and propose a correlated equilibrium based transaction pricing mechanism through solving a pricing game among users with transactions, which can achieve both the individual and global optimum. To avoid the computational complexity exponentially increasing with the number of transactions, we further improve the game-theoretic solution with an approximate algorithm, which can derive almost the same results as the original one but costs significantly reduced time. We also propose a truthful assessment model for pricing mechanism to collect the feedback of users regarding the price suggestion. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanism.

Smart cities have become a trend with improved efficiency, resilience, and sustainability, providing citizens with high quality of life. With the increasing demand for a more participatory and bottom–up governance approach, citizens play an active role in the process of policy making, revolutionizing the management of smart cities. In the example of urban infrastructure maintenance, the public participation demand is more remarkable as the infrastructure condition is closely related to their daily life. Although blockchain has been widely explored to benefit data collection and processing in smart city governance, public engagement remains a challenge. In this article, we propose a novel public participation consortium blockchain system for infrastructure maintenance that is expected to encourage citizens to actively participate in the decision-making process and enable them to witness all administrative procedures in a real-time manner. To that aim, we introduced a hybrid blockchain architecture to involve a verifier group, which is randomly and dynamically selected from the public citizens, to verify the transaction. In particular, we devised a private-prior peer-prediction-based truthful verification mechanism to tackle the collusion attacks from public verifiers. Then, we specified a Stackelberg-game-based incentive mechanism for encouraging public participation. Finally, we conducted extensive simulations to reveal the properties and performances of our proposed blockchain system, which indicates its superiority over other variations.

Quality control plays a critical role in crowdsourcing. The state-of-the-art work is not suitable for crowdsourcing applications that require extensive validation of the tasks quality, since it is a long haul for the requestor to verify task quality or select professional workers in a one-by-one mode. In this paper, we propose a misreport- and collusion-proof crowdsourcing mechanism, guiding workers to truthfully report the quality of submitted tasks without collusion by designing a mechanism, so that workers have to act the way the requestor would like. In detail, the mechanism proposed by the requester makes no room for the workers to obtain profit through quality misreport and collusion, and thus, the quality can be controlled without any verification. Extensive simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism. Finally, the importance and originality of our work lie in that it reveals some interesting and even counterintuitive findings: 1) a high-quality worker may pretend to be a low-quality one; 2) the rise of task quality from high-quality workers may not result in the increased utility of the requestor; 3) the utility of the requestor may not get improved with the increasing number of workers. These findings can boost forward looking and strategic planning solutions for crowdsourcing.

Blockchain is a distributed ledger technology based on the underlying peer-to-peer network. In this paper, we focus on improving the chances of a transaction being packaged into a valid block so as to be recorded on the main chain. Blockchain nodes typically broadcast transactions they receive to the whole network. Hence, for recording transactions on the blockchain more efficiently, it becomes essential to determine influential nodes to publish transactions, where influential nodes are more actively involved in mining, recording, or broadcasting transactions in the network. To that aim, we propose an Influential Node Determination Framework (INDF) using a series of significant factors, such as hash rate, latency, active time, and degree of a node. Specifically, INDF consists of two parallel schemes: the first scheme figures out influential pools according to their hash rates where a truth-telling mechanism design is employed to encourage the pool nodes to report their true hash rate values; the second one determines influential individual nodes based on an improved L-H index algorithm. Remarkably, the proposed truth-telling mechanism is proved to be incentive-compatible. Our improved L-H index algorithm is comparatively studied to reflect the impacts of different node parameters on the node’s ranking. Extensive experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed framework.

Due to the increasing demand from mobile devices for the real-time response of cloud computing services, federated edge learning (FEL) emerges as a new computing paradigm, which utilizes edge devices to achieve efficient machine learning while protecting their data privacy. Implementing efficient FEL suffers from the challenges of devices’ limited computing and communication resources, as well as unevenly distributed datasets, which inspires several existing research focusing on device selection to optimize time consumption and data diversity. However, these studies fail to consider the energy consumption of edge devices given their limited power supply, which can seriously affect the cost-efficiency of FEL with unexpected device dropouts. To fill this gap, we propose a device selection model capturing both energy consumption and data diversity optimization, under the constraints of time consumption and training data amount. Then we solve the optimization problem by reformulating the original model and designing a novel algorithm, named E2DS, to reduce the time complexity greatly. By comparing with two classical FEL schemes, we validate the superiority of our proposed device selection mechanism for FEL with extensive experimental results.

The emergence of mobile edge computing (MEC) empowers the popularity of resource-consuming applications on edge devices, where virtual network functions (VNFs) are widely employed to provide flexible and scalable network service to users in an individual or chained manner. To maintain high availability of VNFs, deploying redundant backups of VNFs on edge servers has become an effective method for swift recovery. However, the existing studies largely ignore the impact of heterogeneous VNF importance on appropriately placing VNF backups at the edge. In this work, we specify the concept of VNF demand levels considering both the user service needs and service function chain (SFC) composition requirements to fill the above gap, which is employed as a significant factor to formulate the edge-assisted VNF backup issue as an optimization problem with the resource constraint of edge servers. To solve the challenge brought by the uncertain demand levels of VNFs, we resort to the combinatorial multi-armed bandit (CMAB) problem to propose an online learning based approximate VNF backup selection and deployment algorithm, named BSPS, with acceptable computation complexity and regret bound. Furthermore, regarding the balance of workload among edge servers, the basic problem is extended to accommodate the extra constraint and an additional VNF backup scheme is devised accordingly. Extensive simulation results with numerical analysis demonstrate the attractive performances of our proposed schemes.

Scalability has long been a major challenge of cryptocurrency systems, which is mainly caused by the delay in reaching consensus when processing transactions on-chain. As an effective mitigation approach, the payment channel networks (PCN) enable private channels among blockchain nodes to process transactions off-chain, relieving long-time waiting for the online transaction confirmation. The state-of-the-art studies of PCN focus on improving the efficiency and availability via optimizing routing, scheduling, and initial deposits, as well as preventing the system from security and privacy attacks. However, the behavioral decision dynamics of blockchain nodes under potential malicious attacks is largely neglected. To fill this gap, we employ game theory to study the characteristics of channel interactions from both the micro and macro perspectives under the situation of channel depletion attacks. Our study is progressive, as we conduct the game-theoretic analysis of node behavioral characteristics from individuals to the whole population of PCN. Our analysis is complementary, since we utilize not only the classic game theory with the complete rationality assumption, but also the evolutionary game theory considering the limited rationality of players to portray the evolution of the PCN. The results of numerous simulation experiments verify the effectiveness of our analysis.

The pool-hopping attack casts down the expected profits of both the mining pool and honest miners in Blockchain. The mainstream countermeasures, namely PPS (pay-per-share) and PPLNS (pay-per-last-N-share), can hedge pool hopping but need to charge miners some fees when they join in a pool. Obviously, the higher fee charged, the higher cost of joining the pool, the less motivation of a miner to mine in the pool. In this article, we apply the zero-determinant (ZD) theory to design a novel pooled mining which offers an incentive mechanism for motivating miners not to switch in pools strategically by economic means without fee charged. In short, the proposed pooled mining has three unique features: 1) fee-free. No fee is charged if the miner does not hop, 2) wide applicability. It can be employed in both prepaid and postpaid mechanisms, and 3) fairness. Even can dominate the game with any miner, a pool has to cooperate when a miner does not hop among pools, implying that the pool cannot squeeze the honest miners financially. The fairness of our scheme makes it have long-term sustainability. Both theoretical analyses and numerical simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of our scheme.

The growing threat of personal data breach in data trading pinpoints an urgent need to develop countermeasures for preserving individual privacy. The state-of-the-art work either endows the data collector with the responsibility of data privacy or reports only a privacy-preserving version of the data. The basic assumption of the former approach that the data collector is trustworthy does not always hold true in reality, whereas the latter approach reduces the value of data. In this paper, we investigate the privacy leakage issue from the root source. Specifically, we take a fresh look to reverse the inferior position of the data provider by making her dominate the game with the collector to solve the dilemma in data trading. To that aim, we propose the noisy-sequentially zero-determinant (NSZD) strategies by tailoring the classical zero-determinant strategies, originally designed for the simultaneous-move game, to adapt to the noisy sequential game. NSZD strategies can empower the data provider to unilaterally set the expected payoff of the data collector or enforce a positive relationship between her and the data collector's expected payoffs. Both strategies can stimulate a rational data collector to behave honestly, boosting a healthy data trading market. Numerical simulations are used to examine the impacts of key parameters and the feasible region where the data provider can be an NSZD player. Finally, we prove that the data collector cannot employ NSZD to further dominate the data market for deteriorating privacy leakage.

A cost-efficient deal that can achieve high sensing quality with a low reward is the permanent goal of the requestor in mobile crowdsensing, which heavily depends on the quantity and quality of the workers. However, the spatial diversity and temporal dynamics lead to heterogeneous worker supplies, making it hard for the requestor to utilize a homogeneous pricing strategy to realize a cost-efficient deal from a systematic point of view. Therefore, a cost-efficient deal calls for a cost-efficient pricing strategy, boosting the whole sensing quality with less operation (computation) cost. However, the state-of-the-art studies ignore the dual cost-efficient demands of large-scale sensing tasks. Hence, we propose a combinatorial pinning zero-determinant (ZD) strategy, which empowers the requestor to utilize a single strategy within its feasible range to minimize the total expected utilities of the workers throughout all sensing regions for each time interval, without being affected by the strategies of the workers. Through turning the worker-customized strategy to an interval-customized one, the proposed combinatorial pinning ZD strategy reduces the number of pricing strategies required by the requestor from O(n3) to O(n). Besides, it extends the application scenarios of the classical ZD strategy from two-player simultaneous-move games to multiple-heterogeneous-player sequential-move ones, where a leader can determine the linear relationship of the players' expected utilities. Such an extension enriches the theoretical hierarchy of ZD strategies, broadening their application scope. Extensive simulations based on real-world data verify the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed scheme.

Proof of work (PoW), the most popular consensus mechanism for blockchain, requires ridiculously large amounts of energy but without any useful outcome beyond determining accounting rights among miners. To tackle the drawback of PoW, we propose a novel energy-recycling consensus algorithm, namely proof of federated learning (PoFL), where the energy originally wasted to solve difficult but meaningless puzzles in PoW is reinvested to federated learning. Federated learning and pooled-mining, a trend of PoW, have a natural fit in terms of organization structure. However, the separation between the data usufruct and ownership in blockchain lead to data privacy leakage in model training and verification, deviating from the original intention of federal learning. To address the challenge, a reverse game-based data trading mechanism and a privacy-preserving model verification mechanism are proposed. The former can guard against training data leakage while the latter verifies the accuracy of a trained model with privacy preservation of the task requester's test data as well as the pool's submitted model. To the best of our knowledge, our article is the first work to employ federal learning as the proof of work for blockchain. Extensive simulations based on synthetic and real-world data demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed mechanisms.

Driven by the sheer amount of data generated at the network edge and improved computation capabilities of mobile devices, federated edge learning (FEL) emerges as a novel paradigm to achieve edge intelligence with a favorable property of protecting privacy for data generators, i.e., edge devices. However, limited computation and communication resources at the edge make it challenging to execute FEL cost-efficiently in practice. Faced with this challenge, lots of existing work focus on the optimization control during the learning process. However, these research take no precaution in terms of composing the FEL system given heterogeneous candidate devices, which can severely impact the implementation performance. To solve this issue, we define a participation game to capture the dependent but competitive relationships among edge devices with respect to making decisions on whether to participate in a round of FEL. Then we propose a correlated equilibrium based participation decision making strategy to achieve individual rationality and global profit maximization at the same time, which can maintain the efficiency and sustainability of FEL in the long term. Furthermore, we devise an improved method with polynomial computational cost to enhance the scalability of the game-theoretic solution. The performance of our proposed scheme is evaluated through extensive experimental results.

Collaborative Filtering (CF) is a popular recommendation system that makes recommendations based on similar users’ preferences. Though it is widely used, CF is prone to Shilling/Profile Injection attacks, where fake profiles are injected into the CF system to alter its outcome. Most of the existing shilling attacks do not work on online systems and cannot be efficiently implemented in real-world applications. In this paper, we introduce an efficient Multi-Armed-Bandit-based reinforcement learning method to practically execute online shilling attacks. Our method works by reducing the uncertainty associated with the item selection process and finds the most optimal items to enhance attack reach. Such practical online attacks open new avenues for research in building more robust recommender systems. We treat the recommender system as a black box, making our method effective irrespective of the type of CF used. Finally, we also experimentally test our approach against popular state-of-the-art shilling attacks.

At present, the proliferation of the online connected devices conceives the Internet of Things (IoT), in which many wireless sensors, smart devices are implemented. However, the nature of openness rooted in IoT makes itself vulnerable to be attacked. One of the pioneer countermeasures is the moving target defense (MTD), which encourages an active and dynamic defense in IoT. In this article, a macroscopic research in MTD is carried out. The existing macroscopic studies take advantage of a traditional game theory. Consequently, protected IoT devices need extra operations to dominate the game. In this article, we take a dramatically different approach where a player can dominate the game without extra operation. Our approach benefits from the power of the zero-determinant (ZD) strategy, in which the player who adopts ZD can unilaterally set the expected payoff of the adversary or itself. Aware of such a powerful strategy, both players may want to employ it for dominating the confrontation. In this case, two fundamental questions need to be answered: who should take the ZD strategy? And to what extent can the ZD player dominate the game? To solve these problems, we model the interactions between the IoT devices and the malicious attackers as a Markov game. Besides, we obtain the conditions to adopt ZD, based on which we deduce the effectiveness of the ZD player. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to employ the ZD strategy theory to enhance a better counterattack performance in IoT.

Crowdsourcing is a promising technology to accomplish a complex task via eliciting services from a large group of contributors. Recent observations indicate that the success of crowdsourcing has been threatened by the malicious behaviors of the contributors. In this paper, we analyze the attack problem using an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game and propose a reward-penalty expected payoff algorithm based on zero-determinant (ZD) strategies to reward a worker's cooperation or penalize its defection in order to entice the final cooperation. Both theoretical analysis and simulation studies are performed, and the results indicate that the proposed algorithm has the following two attractive characteristics: 1) the requestor can incentivize the worker to become cooperative without any long-term extra cost; and 2) the proposed algorithm is fair so that the requestor cannot arbitrarily penalize an innocent worker to increase its payoff even though it can dominate the game. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to adopt the ZD strategies to stimulate both players to cooperate in an IPD game. Moreover, our proposed algorithm is not restricted to solve only the problem of crowdsourcing dilemma - it can be employed to tackle any problem that can be formulated into an IPD game.

Quality control in crowdsourcing is challenging due to the heterogeneous nature of the workers. The state-of-the-art solutions attempt to address the issue from the technical perspective, which may be costly because they function as an additional procedure in crowdsourcing. In this paper, an economics based idea is adopted to embed quality control into the crowdsourcing process, where the requestor can take advantage of the market power to stimulate the workers for submitting high-quality jobs. Specifically, we employ two sequential games to model the interactions between the requestor and the workers, with one considering binary strategies while the other taking continuous strategies. Accordingly, two incentive algorithms for improving the job quality are proposed to tackle the sequential crowdsourcing dilemma problem. Both algorithms are based on a sequential zero-determinant (ZD) strategy modified from the classical ZD strategy. Such a revision not only provides a theoretical basis for designing our incentive algorithms, but also enlarges the application space of the classical ZD strategy itself. Our incentive algorithms have the following desired features: 1) they do not depend on any specific crowdsourcing scenario; 2) they leverage economics theory to train the workers to behave nicely for better job quality instead of filtering out the unprofessional workers; 3) no extra costs are incurred in a long run of crowdsourcing; and 4) fairness is realized as even the requestor (the ZD player), who dominates the game, cannot increase her utility by arbitrarily penalizing any innocent worker.

The great market success of Blockchain makes it an extremely valuable target for attackers. A well-known attack in Blockchain is the forking attack, where divergent blockchains are produced for inserting some new features to facilitate security breaches. The state-of-the-art works mostly focus on how to detect attacks in real-time transactions, which is in hindsight and cannot deter the forking attack from the root. To take precautions, we employ the large deviation theory to study the vulnerability of blockchain networks incurred by intentional forks from a micro point of view, boosting forward-looking and strategic planning mechanisms for resisting the forking attack. Our study is fine-grained, because it offers not only the vulnerability probability of a blockchain network but also its decay speed, through which we find setting the parameter related to the robust level has more power than enhancing the computer power in speeding up the failure of attacks. This finding is valuable since it renders an opportunity to improve the robustness of a blockchain network in a cost-efficient way. Our analysis is complementary, since it studies both the impacts of the computational power as well as the number of confirmations on the vulnerability of a blockchain network, providing a theoretical basis to design reasonable schemes for invigorating a blockchain network from technical as well as managerial levels. Extensive experiments carried out on a large-scale cloud platform running the Ethereum protocol show the experimental and analytical results match well, verifying the effectiveness of our analysis.

In Bitcoin's incentive system that supports open mining pools, block withholding attacks incur huge security threats. In this paper, we investigate the mutual attacks among pools as this determines the macroscopic utility of the whole distributed system. Existing studies on pools' interactive attacks usually employ the conventional game theory, where the strategies of the players are considered pure and equal, neglecting the existence of powerful strategies and the corresponding favorable game results. In this study, we take advantage of the Zero-Determinant (ZD) strategy to analyze the block withholding attack between any two pools, where the ZD adopter has the unilateral control on the expected payoffs of its opponent and itself. In this case, we are faced with the following questions: who can adopt the ZD strategy? individually or simultaneously? what can the ZD player achieve? In order to answer these questions, we derive the conditions under which two pools can individually or simultaneously employ the ZD strategy and demonstrate the effectiveness. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the ZD strategy to analyze the block withholding attack among pools.

Internet of Things (IoT)-based E-commerce is a new business model that relies on autonomous transaction management on IoT-devices. The management system toward IoT-based E-commerce demands autonomy, lightweight, and legitimacy. As blockchain is an innovative technology that is competent in governing the decentralized network, we adopt it to design the autonomous transaction management system on IoT E-commerce. However, current blockchain solutions, most namely cryptocurrencies, have fatal drawbacks of nonsupervisability and huge computational overhead, and hence cannot be directly applied on IoT-based E-commerce. In this paper, we propose NormaChain, a blockchain-based normalized autonomous transaction settlement system for IoT-based E-commerce. By designing a special three-layer sharding blockchain network, we can significantly increase transaction efficiency and system scalability. Additionally, by designing an innovative decentralized public key searchable encryption scheme (decentralized public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme), we can uncover illegal and criminal transactions and achieve crime traceability. Our new decentralized PEKS scheme cryptographically eliminates the dependence of a trusted central authority in the original PEKS scheme and instead expands it to a fully decentralized governance, which distributes the supervision power equally among all parties. More importantly, by proving NormaChain is secure against chosen ciphertext attacks and against the stealing of the secret key, we show that NormaChain prevents a legitimate user’s privacy from being violated by banks, supervisors or malicious adversaries. Finally, we deliver the NormaChain system with design details and full implementations. Experiments show that the average transaction-per-second on IoT devices is around 113, and the supervision accuracy is 100% when proper target illegal keywords are provided.

Abstract Trajectory clustering, which aims at discovering groups of similar trajectories, has long been considered as a corner stone task for revealing movement patterns as well as facilitating higher level applications such as location prediction and activity recognition. Although a plethora of trajectory clustering techniques have been proposed, they often rely on spatio‐temporal similarity measures that are not space and time invariant. As a result, they cannot detect trajectory clusters where the within‐cluster similarity occurs in different regions and time periods. In this paper, we revisit the trajectory clustering problem by learning quality low‐dimensional representations of the trajectories. We first use a sliding window to extract a set of moving behaviour features that capture space‐ and time‐invariant characteristics of the trajectories. With the feature extraction module, we transform each trajectory into a feature sequence to describe object movements and further employ a sequence‐to‐sequence auto‐encoder to learn fixed‐length deep representations. The learnt representations robustly encode the movement characteristics of the objects and thus lead to space‐ and time‐invariant clusters. We evaluate the proposed method on both synthetic and real data and observe significant performance improvements over existing methods.

Crowdsourcing is a promising paradigm to accomplish a complex task via eliciting services from a large group of contributors. However, recent observations indicate that the success of crowdsourcing is being threatened by the malicious behaviors of the contributors. In this paper, we analyze the malicious attack problem using an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game and propose a zero-determinant (ZD) strategy based scheme by rewarding a worker's cooperation or penalizing the defection for enticing his final cooperation. Both theoretical analysis and simulation study indicate that the proposed algorithm has two attractive characteristics: 1) the requestor can incentivize the worker to keep on cooperating by only increasing the short-term payment; and 2) the proposed algorithm is fair, so the requestor cannot arbitrarily penalize an innocent worker to increase her payoff even though she can dominate the game. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to use the ZD strategy to stimulate both players to cooperate in an IPD game. Moreover, our proposed algorithm is not restricted to solve the problem of the malicious crowdsourcing - it can be employed to tackle any problem that can be formulated by an IPD game.

As a promising technology, crowdsourcing aims to accomplish a complex task via eliciting services from a large group of workers. However, recent observations indicate that the success of crowdsourcing is being hindered by the malicious behaviors of the workers. In this paper, we analyze the attack problem using an iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD) game and propose an zero-determinant (ZD) strategy based algorithm. Simulation results demonstrate that the requestor can incentivize the worker to keep on cooperating.

Cognitive radio provides an efficient technology to solve the problem of spectrum resource scarcity while cooperative communications can increase channel capacity. It is a common sense that combining the two benefits the system performance of cognitive radio networks (CRNs). A challenging problem of intelligent cooperation in CRNs is how to make control decisions when a secondary user cooperates with a primary user to get an optimal cooperation outcome. In this paper, we consider a scenario where a secondary user provides effort to the primary user to win the competition from many secondary users and simultaneously achieves optimal throughput. We establish a novel cooperation scheme termed Low Price to Win (LPW), and abstract the cooperation problem in CRNs as an optimization problem with multiple constraints. Unlike some traditional methods that provide direct solutions, we design a novel greedy algorithm using the Lyapunov optimization technique, by which the sophisticated optimization problem can be divided into a few subproblems and then cross-layer optimization can be applied. Our simulation results demonstrate the efficiency and effectiveness of the proposed algorithm.