Demo Data from EDBT 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Xianlong Wang 0001
dblp:54/10133-1
· DBLP profile ↗
10ranked-venue papers
3as first author
10since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0009-3057-827XORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 6 · 1 first-author · 6 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 4 · 4 since 2021Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
6 papers |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 88% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 12% | |
| Artificial intelligence
6 papers |
Trustworthy machine learning · 38% 3D vision · 20% Image recognition and object detection · 18% |
Topics — the 17 heaviest of 19, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Security and privacy of machine learning › poisoning attack
unlearnable examples |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | Detecting and Corrupting Convolution-based Unlearnable Examples · AAAI 2025 Unlearnable 3D Point Clouds: Class-wise Transformation Is All You Need · NeurIPS 2024 |
Computer vision › 3D vision › point cloud analysis
point cloud classification |
0.9 | 2 | 2024 | PointCRT: Detecting Backdoor in 3D Point Cloud via Corruption Robustness · ACM Multimedia 2023 Unlearnable 3D Point Clouds: Class-wise Transformation Is All You Need · NeurIPS 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents · NeurIPS 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
jailbreak attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLM Agents in the Physical World · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
poisoning attack defense |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Detecting and Corrupting Convolution-based Unlearnable Examples · AAAI 2025 |
Cyber-physical and IoT security
robot security |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLM Agents in the Physical World · ICLR 2025 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › multimodal adversarial attack
vision-language model attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied Agents · NeurIPS 2025 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness
adversarial robustness |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | DarkSAM: Fooling Segment Anything Model to Segment Nothing · NeurIPS 2024 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
object detection |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Detector Collapse: Backdooring Object Detection to Catastrophic Overload or Blindness in the Physical World · IJCAI 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › robustness › adversarial examples
universal adversarial perturbation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | DarkSAM: Fooling Segment Anything Model to Segment Nothing · NeurIPS 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Detector Collapse: Backdooring Object Detection to Catastrophic Overload or Blindness in the Physical World · IJCAI 2024 |
Machine learning › Trustworthy machine learning › adversarial machine learning
backdoor robustness |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | PointCRT: Detecting Backdoor in 3D Point Cloud via Corruption Robustness · ACM Multimedia 2023 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › backdoor attack › backdoor defense
backdoor detection |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | PointCRT: Detecting Backdoor in 3D Point Cloud via Corruption Robustness · ACM Multimedia 2023 |
Computer vision › Image recognition and object detection
image classification |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | Detecting and Corrupting Convolution-based Unlearnable Examples · AAAI 2025 |
Human-AI interaction › virtual agents
embodied agents |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLM Agents in the Physical World · ICLR 2025 |
Computer vision › 3D vision
point cloud |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Unlearnable 3D Point Clouds: Class-wise Transformation Is All You Need · NeurIPS 2024 |
Computer vision › Segmentation and scene understanding › prompt-based segmentation
segment anything model |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | DarkSAM: Fooling Segment Anything Model to Segment Nothing · NeurIPS 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
random matrix multiplication · 1.7multimodal large language model · 1.7fine-grained semantic manipulation · 1.7edge pixel detection · 1.7bilinear interpolation · 1.7benchmark construction · 1.7adversarial perturbation · 1.7inverse matrix transformation · 1.5class-wise transformation · 1.5backdoor injection · 1.5semantic decoupling · 0.8frequency-domain texture distortion · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Detecting and Corrupting Convolution-based Unlearnable ExamplesabstractConvolution-based unlearnable examples (UEs) employ class-wise multiplicative convolutional noise to training samples, severely compromising model performance. This fire-new type of UEs have successfully countered all defense mechanisms against UEs. The failure of such defenses can be attributed to the absence of norm constraints on convolutional noise, leading to severe blurring of image features. To address this, we first design an Edge Pixel-based Detector (EPD) to identify convolution-based UEs. Upon detection of them, we propose the first defense scheme against convolution-based UEs, COrrupting these samples via random matrix multiplication by employing bilinear INterpolation (COIN) such that disrupting the distribution of class-wise multiplicative noise. To evaluate the generalization of our proposed COIN, we newly design two convolution-based UEs called VUDA and HUDA to expand the scope of convolution-based UEs. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of detection scheme EPD and that our defense COIN outperforms 11 state-of-the-art (SOTA) defenses, achieving a significant improvement on the CIFAR and ImageNet datasets. Xianlong Wang 0001, Zhifei Yu, Shengshan Hu, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Longling Zhang, Leo Yu Zhang |
AAAI | 2 |
| 2025 | PB-UAP: Hybride Universal Adversarial Attack for Image SegmentationabstractWith the rapid advancement of deep learning, the model robustness has become a significant research hotspot, i.e., adversarial attacks on deep neural networks. Existing works primarily focus on image classification tasks, aiming to alter the model’s predicted labels. Due to the output complexity and deeper network architectures, research on adversarial examples for segmentation models is still limited, particularly for universal adversarial perturbations. In this paper, we propose a novel universal adversarial attack method designed for segmentation models, which includes dual feature separation and low-frequency scattering modules. The two modules guide the training of adversarial examples in the pixel and frequency space, respectively. Experiments demonstrate that our method achieves high attack success rates surpassing the state-of-the-art methods, and exhibits strong transferability across different models. Ziqi Zhou 0001, Xianlong Wang 0001, Hangtao Zhang, Menghao Deng, Shengshan Hu, Leo Yu Zhang |
ICASSP | 4 |
| 2025 | BadRobot: Jailbreaking Embodied LLM Agents in the Physical WorldabstractEmbodied AI represents systems where AI is integrated into physical entities. Multimodal Large Language Model (LLM), which exhibits powerful language understanding abilities, has been extensively employed in embodied AI by facilitating sophisticated task planning. However, a critical safety issue remains overlooked: could these embodied LLMs perpetrate harmful behaviors? In response, we introduce BadRobot, the first attack paradigm designed to jailbreak robotic manipulation, making embodied LLMs violate safety and ethical constraints through typical voice-based user-system interactions. Specifically, three vulnerabilities are exploited to achieve this type of attack: (i) manipulation of LLMs within robotic systems, (ii) misalignment between linguistic outputs and physical actions, and
(iii) unintentional hazardous behaviors caused by world knowledge's flaws. Furthermore, we construct a benchmark of various malicious physical action queries to evaluate BadRobot's attack performance. Based on this benchmark, extensive experiments against existing prominent embodied LLM frameworks (e.g., Voxposer, Code as Policies, and ProgPrompt) demonstrate the effectiveness of our BadRobot. We emphasize that addressing this emerging vulnerability is crucial for the secure deployment of LLMs in robotics.
Warning: This paper contains harmful AI-generated language and aggressive actions. Hangtao Zhang, Chenyu Zhu, Xianlong Wang 0001, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Changgan Yin, Lulu Xue, Yichen Wang 0013, Shengshan Hu, Aishan Liu, Peijin Guo, Leo Yu Zhang |
ICLR | 3 |
| 2025 | AdvEDM: Fine-grained Adversarial Attack against VLM-based Embodied AgentsabstractVision-Language Models (VLMs), with their strong reasoning and planning capabilities, are widely used in embodied decision-making (EDM) tasks in embodied agents, such as autonomous driving and robotic manipulation. Recent research has increasingly explored adversarial attacks on VLMs to reveal their vulnerabilities. However, these attacks either rely on overly strong assumptions, requiring full knowledge of the victim VLM, which is impractical for attacking VLM-based agents, or exhibit limited effectiveness. The latter stems from disrupting most semantic information in the image, which leads to a misalignment between the perception and the task context defined by system prompts. This inconsistency interrupts the VLM's reasoning process, resulting in invalid outputs that fail to affect interactions in the physical world. To this end, we propose a fine-grained adversarial attack framework, AdvEDM, which modifies the VLM's perception of only a few key objects while preserving the semantics of the remaining regions. This attack effectively reduces conflicts with the task context, making VLMs output valid but incorrect decisions and affecting the actions of agents, thus posing a more substantial safety threat in the physical world. We design two variants of based on this framework, AdvEDM-R and AdvEDM-A, which respectively remove the semantics of a specific object from the image and add the semantics of a new object into the image. The experimental results in both general scenarios and EDM tasks demonstrate fine-grained control and excellent attack performance. Yichen Wang 0013, Hangtao Zhang, Hewen Pan, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Xianlong Wang 0001, Peijin Guo, Lulu Xue, Shengshan Hu, Leo Yu Zhang |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2024 | ECLIPSE: Expunging Clean-Label Indiscriminate Poisons via Sparse Diffusion Purification
Xianlong Wang 0001, Shengshan Hu, Yechao Zhang, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Leo Yu Zhang, Peng Xu 0003, Hai Jin 0001 |
ESORICS (1) | 1 |
| 2024 | PointAPA: Towards Availability Poisoning Attacks in 3D Point Clouds
Xianlong Wang 0001, Peng Xu 0003, Wei Liu 0304, Leo Yu Zhang, Shengshan Hu, Yanjun Zhang 0002 |
ESORICS (1) | 1 |
| 2024 | Detector Collapse: Backdooring Object Detection to Catastrophic Overload or Blindness in the Physical World
Hangtao Zhang, Shengshan Hu, Yichen Wang 0013, Leo Yu Zhang, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Xianlong Wang 0001, Yanjun Zhang 0002, Chao Chen 0015 |
IJCAI | 6 |
| 2024 | Unlearnable 3D Point Clouds: Class-wise Transformation Is All You NeedabstractTraditional unlearnable strategies have been proposed to prevent unauthorized users from training on the 2D image data. With more 3D point cloud data containing sensitivity information, unauthorized usage of this new type data has also become a serious concern. To address this, we propose the first integral unlearnable framework for 3D point clouds including two processes: (i) we propose an unlearnable data protection scheme, involving a class-wise setting established by a category-adaptive allocation strategy and multi-transformations assigned to samples; (ii) we propose a data restoration scheme that utilizes class-wise inverse matrix transformation, thus enabling authorized-only training for unlearnable data. This restoration process is a practical issue overlooked in most existing unlearnable literature, i.e., even authorized users struggle to gain knowledge from 3D unlearnable data. Both theoretical and empirical results (including 6 datasets, 16 models, and 2 tasks) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed unlearnable framework. Our code is available at https://github.com/CGCL-codes/UnlearnablePC. Xianlong Wang 0001, Wei Liu 0004, Hangtao Zhang, Shengshan Hu, Yechao Zhang, Ziqi Zhou 0001, Hai Jin 0001 |
NeurIPS | 1 |
| 2024 | DarkSAM: Fooling Segment Anything Model to Segment NothingabstractSegment Anything Model (SAM) has recently gained much attention for its outstanding generalization to unseen data and tasks. Despite its promising prospect, the vulnerabilities of SAM, especially to universal adversarial perturbation (UAP) have not been thoroughly investigated yet. In this paper, we propose DarkSAM, the first prompt-free universal attack framework against SAM, including a semantic decoupling-based spatial attack and a texture distortion-based frequency attack. We first divide the output of SAM into foreground and background. Then, we design a shadow target strategy to obtain the semantic blueprint of the image as the attack target. DarkSAM is dedicated to fooling SAM by extracting and destroying crucial object features from images in both spatial and frequency domains. In the spatial domain, we disrupt the semantics of both the foreground and background in the image to confuse SAM. In the frequency domain, we further enhance the attack effectiveness by distorting the high-frequency components (i.e., texture information) of the image. Consequently, with a single UAP, DarkSAM renders SAM incapable of segmenting objects across diverse images with varying prompts. Experimental results on four datasets for SAM and its two variant models demonstrate the powerful attack capability and transferability of DarkSAM. Our codes are available at: https://github.com/CGCL-codes/DarkSAM. Ziqi Zhou 0001, Shengshan Hu, Xianlong Wang 0001, Leo Yu Zhang, Dezhong Yao 0002, Hai Jin 0001 |
NeurIPS | 5 |
| 2023 | PointCRT: Detecting Backdoor in 3D Point Cloud via Corruption RobustnessabstractBackdoor attacks for point clouds have elicited mounting interest with the proliferation of deep learning. The point cloud classifiers can be vulnerable to malicious actors who seek to manipulate or fool the model with specific backdoor triggers. Detecting and rejecting backdoor samples during the inference stage can effectively alleviate backdoor attacks. Recently, some black-box test-time backdoor sample detection methods have been proposed in the 2D image domain, without any underlying assumptions about the backdoor triggers. However, upon examination, we have found that these detection techniques are not effective for 3D point clouds. As a result, there is a pressing need to bridge the gap for the development of a universal approach that is specifically designed for 3D point clouds. Shengshan Hu, Wei Liu 0304, Yechao Zhang, Xiaogeng Liu, Xianlong Wang 0001, Leo Yu Zhang, Junhui Hou |
ACM Multimedia | 6 |