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Nektarios Leontiadis

dblp:54/854 · DBLP profile ↗
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9ranked-venue papers
4as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
0000-0001-5882-4502ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 3 first-author · 1 since 2021Computer networks · 2Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-authorSystems, architecture and hardware · 1Theory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
6 papers
Web and mobile security · 53% Network security · 26% Authentication and access control · 15%
Interdisciplinary, comprehensive, and emerging computing
3 papers
Computational finance and economics · 84% Computational social science and digital humanities · 16%
Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
2 papers
Web and social media mining · 64% Data mining · 36%
Computer networks
2 papers
Network measurement and analytics · 100%

Topics — the 12 heaviest of 17, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Web and mobile security › online fraud
account takeover
0.512021
SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Web and mobile security › web attacks
search-engine poisoning
0.212014
A Nearly Four-Year Longitudinal Study of Search-Engine Poisoning · CCS 2014
Computational finance and economics
electronic commerce
0.212013
Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmacies · EC 2013
Usable security
user behavior
0.112021
SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts · USENIX Security Symposium 2021
Web and mobile security › web attacks
malicious web content
0.112011
Fashion crimes: trending-term exploitation on the web · CCS 2011
Network security
malware propagation
0.112011
Fashion crimes: trending-term exploitation on the web · CCS 2011
Network security
traffic analysis
0.112011
Measuring and Analyzing Search-Redirection Attacks in the Illicit Online Prescription Drug Trade · USENIX Security Symposium 2011
Web and mobile security › web authentication
OAuth security
0.112017
Measuring and mitigating oauth access token abuse by collusion networks · Internet Measurement Conference 2017
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
longitudinal measurement
0.112014
A Nearly Four-Year Longitudinal Study of Search-Engine Poisoning · CCS 2014
Data mining
clustering
0.012013
Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmacies · EC 2013
Computational finance and economics › economics
security economics
0.012011
Fashion crimes: trending-term exploitation on the web · CCS 2011
Network measurement and analytics
web measurement
0.012011
Fashion crimes: trending-term exploitation on the web · CCS 2011

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

measurement study · 1.2honeypot infiltration · 0.6interview study · 0.5regression analysis · 0.4network analysis · 0.4economic modeling · 0.4cross-validation · 0.3clustering · 0.3
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 SocialHEISTing: Understanding Stolen Facebook Accounts
Jeremiah Onaolapo, Nektarios Leontiadis, Despoina Magka, Gianluca Stringhini
USENIX Security Symposium2
2018 Following Their Footsteps: Characterizing Account Automation Abuse and Defenses
Louis F. DeKoven, Trevor Pottinger, Stefan Savage, Geoffrey M. Voelker, Nektarios Leontiadis
Internet Measurement Conference5
2017 Measuring and mitigating oauth access token abuse by collusion networks
abstract
We uncover a thriving ecosystem of large-scale reputation manipulation services on Facebook that leverage the principle of collusion. Collusion networks collect OAuth access tokens from colluding members and abuse them to provide fake likes or comments to their members. We carry out a comprehensive measurement study to understand how these collusion networks exploit popular third-party Facebook applications with weak security settings to retrieve OAuth access tokens. We infiltrate popular collusion networks using honeypots and identify more than one million colluding Facebook accounts by "milking" these collusion networks. We disclose our findings to Facebook and collaborate with them to implement a series of countermeasures that mitigate OAuth access token abuse without sacrificing application platform usability for third-party developers. These countermeasures remained in place until April 2017, after which Facebook implemented a set of unrelated changes in its infrastructure to counter collusion networks. We are the first to report and effectively mitigate large-scale OAuth access token abuse in the wild.
Shehroze Farooqi, Fareed Zaffar, Nektarios Leontiadis, Zubair Shafiq
Internet Measurement Conference3
2014 A Nearly Four-Year Longitudinal Study of Search-Engine Poisoning
abstract
We investigate the evolution of search-engine poisoning using data on over 5 million search results collected over nearly 4 years. We build on prior work investigating search-redirection attacks, where criminals compromise high-ranking websites and direct search traffic to the websites of paying customers, such as unlicensed pharmacies who lack access to traditional search-based advertisements. We overcome several obstacles to longitudinal studies by amalgamating different resources and adapting our measurement infrastructure to changes brought by adaptations by both legitimate operators and attackers. Our goal is to empirically characterize how strategies for carrying out and combating search poisoning have evolved over a relatively long time period. We investigate how the composition of search results themselves has changed. For instance, we find that search-redirection attacks have steadily grown to take over a larger share of results (rising from around 30% in late 2010 to a peak of nearly 60% in late 2012), despite efforts by search engines and browsers to combat their effectiveness. We also study the efforts of hosts to remedy search-redirection attacks. We find that the median time to clean up source infections has fallen from around 30 days in 2010 to around 15 days by late 2013, yet the number of distinct infections has increased considerably over the same period. Finally, we show that the concentration of traffic to the most successful brokers has persisted over time. Further, these brokers have been mostly hosted on a few autonomous systems, which indicates a possible intervention strategy.
Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore 0001, Nicolas Christin
CCS1
2014 Empirically Measuring WHOIS Misuse
Nektarios Leontiadis, Nicolas Christin
ESORICS (1)1
2013 Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmacies
abstract
Electronic commerce has transformed how goods are supplied to consumers, but has also exposed weaknesses in supply regulations of certain goods, such as alcohol, weapons or prescription drugs. While licensed pharmacies have tread carefully with online sales, many enterprising operators have been selling pharmaceuticals without a license for years. Despite facing considerable adversity, unlicensed online pharmacies have managed not only to survive, but even to generate considerable revenue. In this paper, we attempt 1) to understand the economic reasons for their success, while facing stiff competition from both legal and illegal alternatives, and 2) to identify characteristics of their supply chains that could be used to disrupt illicit sales. We collected six months' worth of inventory and pricing data from 265 online pharmacies that advertise through search- engine poisoning. We compare this to data from Silk Road, an anonymous online marketplace, and from familymeds.com, a licensed online pharmacy. We discover that instead of directly competing with licensed pharmacies, unlicensed pharmacies often sell drugs that licensed pharmacies do not or cannot sell. Furthermore, unlicensed pharmacies are not only cheaper overall, but they also offer volume discounts. Clustering analysis of inventories reveals that only a few suppliers appear to cater for most unlicensed pharmacies, which suggests that cutting them off could disrupt unlicensed sales. Cross-validating our data with inventories from a random sample of 265 different pharmacies deemed ``not recommended'' by the National Association of Boards of Pharmacy shows that our results are consistent across different types of questionable vendors.
Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore 0001, Nicolas Christin
EC1
2011 Fashion crimes: trending-term exploitation on the web
abstract
Online service providers are engaged in constant conflict with miscreants who try to siphon a portion of legitimate traffic to make illicit profits. We study the abuse of "trending" search terms, in which miscreants place links to malware-distributing or ad-filled web sites in web search and Twitter results, by collecting and analyzing measurements over nine months from multiple sources. We devise heuristics to identify ad-filled sites, report on the prevalence of malware and ad-filled sites in trending-term search results, and measure the success in blocking such content. We uncover collusion across offending domains using network analysis, and use regression analysis to conclude that both malware and ad-filled sites thrive on less popular, and less profitable trending terms. We build an economic model informed by our measurements and conclude that ad-filled sites and malware distribution may be economic substitutes. Finally, because our measurement interval spans February 2011, when Google announced changes to its ranking algorithm to root out low-quality sites, we can assess the impact of search-engine intervention on the profits miscreants can achieve.
Tyler Moore 0001, Nektarios Leontiadis, Nicolas Christin
CCS2
2011 Measuring and Analyzing Search-Redirection Attacks in the Illicit Online Prescription Drug Trade
Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore 0001, Nicolas Christin
USENIX Security Symposium1
2008 A lookup service in an interconnected world of uniquely identified objects
abstract
Automatic identification (auto-ID) procedures exist to provide information about people, animals, goods and products in transit. The RFID technology is one of the newest and mostly emerging implementations of the auto-ID concept. Most of the current applications of the RFID technology pair the unique ID (UID) stored in RFID tags attached to an item with information about it, which is located in information systems. When the item gets transferred or modified, new information might need to be paired with its UID as well. The EPCglobal has defined standards that facilitate the collection, storage, update, location and sharing of the information related to the UID. In this paper, we explain the disadvantages of the EPC glocal approach and discuss an infrastructure with an associated service built on top, which is intended to organize the information associated with any object, and guide the process of discovering and retrieving specific information for specific items, tagged with a unique id, in an efficient and scalable way. Then we will describe the overall architecture and the proposed service, called service lookup service (SLS) and we will provide a proposed protocol for implementing the aforementioned service.
Elias Polytarchos, Nektarios Leontiadis, Stylianos Eliakis, Katerina Pramatari
ETFA2