Crypto-currencies are digital assets designed to work as a medium of exchange, e.g., Bitcoin, but they are susceptible to attacks (dishonest behavior of participants). A framework for the analysis of attacks in crypto-currencies requires (a) modeling of game-theoretic aspects to analyze incentives for deviation from honest behavior; (b) concurrent interactions between participants; and (c) analysis of long-term monetary gains. Traditional game-theoretic approaches for the analysis of security protocols consider either qualitative temporal properties such as safety and termination, or the very special class of one-shot (stateless) games. However, to analyze general attacks on protocols for crypto-currencies, both stateful analysis and quantitative objectives are necessary. In this work our main contributions are as follows: (a) we show how a class of concurrent mean-payoff games, namely ergodic games, can model various attacks that arise naturally in crypto-currencies; (b) we present the first practical implementation of algorithms for ergodic games that scales to model realistic problems for crypto-currencies; and (c) we present experimental results showing that our framework can handle games with thousands of states and millions of transitions.

Smart contracts are computer programs that are executed by a network of mutually distrusting agents, without the need of an external trusted authority. Smart contracts handle and transfer assets of considerable value (in the form of crypto-currency like Bitcoin). Hence, it is crucial that their implementation is bug-free. We identify the utility (or expected payoff) of interacting with such smart contracts as the basic and canonical quantitative property for such contracts. We present a framework for such quantitative analysis of smart contracts. Such a formal framework poses new and novel research challenges in programming languages, as it requires modeling of game-theoretic aspects to analyze incentives for deviation from honest behavior and modeling utilities which are not specified as standard temporal properties such as safety and termination. While game-theoretic incentives have been analyzed in the security community, their analysis has been restricted to the very special case of stateless games. However, to analyze smart contracts, stateful analysis is required as it must account for the different program states of the protocol. Our main contributions are as follows: we present (i) a simplified programming language for smart contracts; (ii) an automatic translation of the programs to state-based games; (iii) an abstraction-refinement approach to solve such games; and (iv) experimental results on real-world-inspired smart contracts.

Two-player games on graphs are central in many problems in formal verification and program analysis, such as synthesis and verification of open systems. In this work, we consider solving recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs) that model the control flow of sequential programs with recursion. While pushdown games have been studied before with qualitative objectives—such as reachability and ω-regular objectives—in this work, we study for the first time such games with the most well-studied quantitative objective, the mean-payoff objective. In pushdown games, two types of strategies are relevant: (1) global strategies, which depend on the entire global history; and (2) modular strategies, which have only local memory and thus do not depend on the context of invocation but rather only on the history of the current invocation of the module. Our main results are as follows: (1) One-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under global strategies are decidable in polynomial time. (2) Two-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under global strategies are undecidable. (3) One-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under modular strategies are NP-hard. (4) Two-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under modular strategies can be solved in NP (i.e., both one-player and two-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under modular strategies are NP-complete). We also establish the optimal strategy complexity by showing that global strategies for mean-payoff objectives require infinite memory even in one-player pushdown games and memoryless modular strategies are sufficient in two-player pushdown games. Finally, we also show that all the problems have the same complexity if the stack boundedness condition is added, where along with the mean-payoff objective the player must also ensure that the stack height is bounded.

In Boolean synthesis, we are given an LTL specification, and the goal is to construct a transducer that realizes it against an adversarial environment. Often, a specification contains both Boolean requirements that should be satisfied against an adversarial environment, and multi-valued components that refer to the quality of the satisfaction and whose expected cost we would like to minimize with respect to a probabilistic environment. In this work we study, for the first time, mean-payoff games in which the system aims at minimizing the expected cost against a probabilistic environment, while surely satisfying an $ω$-regular condition against an adversarial environment. We consider the case the $ω$-regular condition is given as a parity objective or by an LTL formula. We show that in general, optimal strategies need not exist, and moreover, the limit value cannot be approximated by finite-memory strategies. We thus focus on computing the limit-value, and give tight complexity bounds for synthesizing $ε$-optimal strategies for both finite-memory and infinite-memory strategies. We show that our game naturally arises in various contexts of synthesis with Boolean and multi-valued objectives. Beyond direct applications, in synthesis with costs and rewards to certain behaviors, it allows us to compute the minimal sensing cost of $ω$-regular specifications -- a measure of quality in which we look for a transducer that minimizes the expected number of signals that are read from the input.

We consider the quantitative analysis problem for interprocedural control-flow graphs (ICFGs). The input consists of an ICFG, a positive weight function that assigns every transition a positive integer-valued number, and a labelling of the transitions (events) as good, bad, and neutral events. The weight function assigns to each transition a numerical value that represents a measure of how good or bad an event is. The quantitative analysis problem asks whether there is a run of the ICFG where the ratio of the sum of the numerical weights of good events versus the sum of weights of bad events in the long-run is at least a given threshold (or equivalently, to compute the maximal ratio among all valid paths in the ICFG). The quantitative analysis problem for ICFGs can be solved in polynomial time, and we present an efficient and practical algorithm for the problem.

Two-player games on graphs are central in many problems in formal verification and program analysis such as synthesis and verification of open systems. In this work we consider solving recursive game graphs (or pushdown game graphs) that can model the control flow of sequential programs with recursion. While pushdown games have been studied before with qualitative objectives, such as reachability and parity objectives, in this work we study for the first time such games with the most well-studied quantitative objective, namely, mean payoff objectives. In pushdown games two types of strategies are relevant: (1) global strategies, that depend on the entire global history; and (2) modular strategies, that have only local memory and thus do not depend on the context of invocation, but only on the history of the current invocation of the module. Our main results are as follows: (1) One-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under global strategies are decidable in polynomial time. (2) Two-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under global strategies are undecidable. (3) One-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under modular strategies are NP-hard. (4) Two-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under modular strategies can be solved in NP (i.e., both one-player and two-player pushdown games with mean-payoff objectives under modular strategies are NP-complete). We also establish the optimal strategy complexity showing that global strategies for mean-payoff objectives require infinite memory even in one-player pushdown games; and memoryless modular strategies are sufficient in two-player pushdown games. Finally we also show that all the problems have the same computational complexity if the stack boundedness condition is added, where along with the mean-payoff objective the player must also ensure that the stack height is bounded.