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Arash Afshar

dblp:55/10366 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2015
0000-0002-1679-6627ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 3 · 3 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%

Topics — the 5 heaviest of 5, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
malicious security		 0.212015
How to Efficiently Evaluate RAM Programs with Malicious Security · EUROCRYPT (1) 2015
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › oblivious data structures
oblivious RAM		 0.212015
How to Efficiently Evaluate RAM Programs with Malicious Security · EUROCRYPT (1) 2015
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure computation protocols
secure computation with RAM programs		 0.212015
How to Efficiently Evaluate RAM Programs with Malicious Security · EUROCRYPT (1) 2015
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation › secure two-party computation
cut-and-choose		 0.212014
Non-Interactive Secure Computation Based on Cut-and-Choose · EUROCRYPT 2014
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure computation protocols
non-interactive secure computation		 0.212014
Non-Interactive Secure Computation Based on Cut-and-Choose · EUROCRYPT 2014

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

cut-and-choose · 0.4malicious security · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2015 How to Efficiently Evaluate RAM Programs with Malicious Security
Arash Afshar, Zhangxiang Hu, Payman Mohassel, Mike Rosulek
 EUROCRYPT (1)1
2014 Non-Interactive Secure Computation Based on Cut-and-Choose
Arash Afshar, Payman Mohassel, Benny Pinkas, Ben Riva
 EUROCRYPT1
2011 Reconstructing security types for automated policy enforcement in FABLE
abstract
Providing security at programming language level has received enormous attention in recent years. FABLE is an outstanding language intended to enforce the security policies specified by programmers. In doing so, it employs a rich type system whereby only a program with appropriate labels and policy-function calls can type-check. In this paper, we present a constraint-based type system that enables FABLE to infer security labels. It can also be utilized to correct an ill-typed program by identifying missing policy-function invocations. The point is how to preserve the intended functionality of a program when we add code to satisfy a given policy.
Arash Afshar, Mehran S. Fallah
 NSS1